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When a country experiences a balance of payments problem, the typical rem-
edy mix proposed by the International Monetary Fund consists of fiscal auster-
ity, tight monetary policies, devaluation, privatization, elimination of subsidies and
trade liberalization, combined with low interest rate loans. Throughout the late
1980s, Ghana has been hailed as a success story for that policy mix. However,
Ghana’s performance has been increasingly disappointing during the 1990s. This
thesis explores the reasons for that slowdown, its distributional implications, and
the extent to which the behavior of the Ghanaian economy validates commonly used
assumptions in economic models of developing countries.
We compile a complete consistent yearly dataset of financial stocks, nominal
money flows (arranged in Social Accounting Matrices) and real product flows for
Ghana in 1990-2001. The real-side data, available yearly, are then examined using fit
optimization with alternative functional forms, while nominal time series (Consumer
Price Index, the broad money supply and the exchange rate), available on a monthly
basis, are analyzed using ARIMA-X regressions.
We find that industrial production, as well as investment, has been demand-
constrained during our period, while agriculture has hit an aggregate supply con-
straint around year 1995. The relative price elasticity of substitution between im-
ports and non-traded goods (in volume terms) is around minus one. The government
was the only net source of demand during the period. Inflation could be predicted
extremely well using only broad money supply, wholesale price of food crops and
price of fuel, and formed a weak positive feedback loop with money supply growth.
The main channel through which exchange rate depreciation impacted the price level
was revaluation of the foreign currency-denominated money supply component. The
response of broad money supply to interest rate increases was significant but small.
We also formulate a novel matrix formalism for a more compact description and
analysis of financial stock dynamics, cleanly separating structural and accounting
constraints from behavioral descriptions.
We conclude that the major reasons for the economic slowdown of the 1990s
were excessive liberalization of commodity imports and strangulation of industry
through lack of demand and volatile real interest rates, and of agriculture through
withdrawal of government support programs.
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When a country experiences a balance of payments problem, the typical remedy
mix proposed by the International Monetary Fund consists of fiscal austerity, tight
monetary policies, devaluation, privatization, elimination of subsidies and trade
liberalization, combined with low interest rate loans.
Throughout the late 1980s, Ghana has been hailed as a success story for that
policy mix, known internationally as “neoliberal policies” and in Ghana as the “Eco-
nomic Recovery Program” or ERP. However, Ghana’s performance has been in-
creasingly disappointing during the 1990s, with economic growth slowing down and
government deficit surging out of control.
This thesis explores the reasons for that slowdown, its distributional implica-
tions, and the extent to which the behavior of the Ghanaian economy conformed to
commonly used assumptions in economic models of developing countries.
The following section states the specific research questions of this thesis. Hav-
ing stated the questions, we proceed to discuss the methods we use in answering
these research questions, as well as the intermediate, technical results of these meth-
ods, in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 then uses these intermediate results to answer our
research questions, and Section 1.4 discusses some limitations of our approach.
1.1 Research Questions
In this dissertation, we address three closely interlinked research questions.
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1.1.1 Why Was Macroeconomic Performance Not Sustained?
In the 1990s, what caused
1. Balance of Payments problems
2. Inflation
3. Low GDP growth
1.1.2 What Were the Distributive Impacts?
How did the structural adjustment policies affect the real incomes of different pop-
ulation groups during the 1990s?
1.1.3 Does the behavior of the Ghanaian Economy in 1990s conform to the as-
sumptions of economic models?
Once we understand the key causal mechanisms for the Ghanaian economy in the
period under study, we are in a position to evaluate the common assumptions of
models and qualitative descriptions that are used to assess impacts of structural
adjustment programs.
1.2 Methods and Intermediate Results
Our research for this thesis consists of three steps. First, we compile a stock-flow
consistent time series of yearly Social Accounting Matrices and monthly Financial
Accounting Matrices for 1990-2001. Then, we use this dataset along with additional
2
monthly macro time series (such as interest rates) to statistically test a series of key
relationships, which we have selected based on Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) and macroeconomic theory, so as to achieve a systematic picture of the
Ghanaian economy’s structure. Finally, the results of these investigations are used
in qualitative discussion to address our research questions. The following sections
describe each step in more detail.
1.2.1 Compile a Dataset: SAM/FAM time series for 1990-2001
We begin by compiling a yearly time series of Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs),
each of which is a complete picture of the money flows in the Ghanaian economy
in a given year, at a certain level of aggregation. Then, we augment this by a
monthly time series of Financial Accounting Matrices (FAMs) that describe the
financial stocks held by the various institutions in the Ghanaian economy (the SAM
and FAM methodologies are discussed in detail in Chapter 5). The two datasets
are logically connected as the net lending flows of an institution in each SAM have
to be consistent with the changes in that institution’s net worth (after correcting
for revaluation). We achieve that consistency by forcing the SAMs to yield the let
lending flows implied by the FAMs, for the following reason.
In developing countries, financial asset stock time series are available and gen-
erally more reliable than most flow data. Besides being interesting in its own right,
knowledge of financial asset stock time series allows us to get more reliable estimates
for net financial savings (net lending) of each institution. In an economy where some
important sectors are demand-driven (that is, probably, any economy), knowledge
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of net lending is important to account for injections and leakages contributing to the
aggregate demand. Unfortunately, net lending is normally computed as a residual
from flow data, and is thus quite unreliable; using asset stocks for that purpose
makes for a much more reliable estimate.
Compiling a SAM/FAM time series dataset such as ours is worthwhile for
several reasons: firstly, in the process of compilation one discovers the errors and
inconsistencies in the data and can to an extent correct for these, or at least draw
conclusions as to which uses of that data are meaningful even in view of the errors
and which are not (Chapter 7 discusses several grave errors in official data that we
could discover and to an extent correct).
Thirdly, a sufficiently long stock-flow consistent SAM-FAM time series pro-
vides a sufficient data base for estimation and validation of a multisectoral dynamic
model. A complete set of real and nominal flow time series allows us to derive the
causal behavior of the model from history, instead of specifying it a priori as the
CGE models do, be they neoclassical or structuralist. Further, if we split the SAM-
FAM time series into an estimation and a validation segment, we can also gain an
idea of how good the chosen causal structure is at predicting future behavior of the
economy. Such an approach unites the advantage of a CGE-like ability to handle
sectoral disaggregation and a high number of variables with an ability to specify
measures of confidence of the model output.
Finally, as the present project demonstrates, such a dataset can be used to
understand the overall structure of an economy through statistical testing of specific
relationships, even without estimating a complete model. This is an advantage
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for our approach’s potential to be replicated in other developing countries, where
technical capacity constraints are often binding.
Summing up, we demonstrate that in spite of low data quality and availability,
it is feasible to construct stock-flow consistent SAM/FAM time series for Ghana for
more than a decade, providing a strong foundation for further analysis. While that
is not a novel approach for industrialized countries with their high data availability,
to the best of our knowledge this is the first time such a dataset has been compiled
for a developing country.
1.2.2 Statistical Analysis of Selected Variables
The statistical analysis we undertake consists of two parts. On the one hand, macro
time series such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI), interest rates, etc. are available
monthly, so that we can use reasonably sophisticated statistical techniques. On the
other hand, the real side and sectoral data in only available yearly (for a total of
12 data points in our time period), necessitating a different strategy. Let us discuss
each in turn.
We use ARIMA-X regressions to explain the behavior of the three variables
Consumer Price Index, broad money supply, and the exchange rate, which we denote
(in log form) cpi, m2 and er. All of these are I(1), and in none of the initial
regressions was cointegration observed. Therefore, the regressions are run on the first
differences of the logs (corresponding to growth rates of the underlying variables).
We start out by investigating the behavior of the Consumer Price Index, arriv-
ing at both expected and unexpected results. On the expected side, money supply
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is highly significant for price formation, and takes its effect gradually over with a
lag of two to nine months. Increases in fuel and wholesale food crop prices are
also highly significant, but their impacts happen over a much shorter period (0-2
months). Using just these three variables, we could predict cpi surprisingly well
four years into the future (1998-2001), with coefficients estimated using pre-1998
data only.
On the surprising side, exchange rate depreciation, interest rate changes, and
GDP growth appear to not have a significant direct effect on inflation.
As we find that growth of broad money supply is the major driver of CPI
inflation, we proceed to investigate the dependence of broad money supply growth on
the changes in interest rates, inflation, exchange rate depreciation, and base money
growth, as well as its own past values. The results show a strong dependence on the
exchange rate, monetary base, and Consumer Price Index, as well as a significant
but rather small response to interest rates.
From a .37 coefficient of the depreciation rate in the m2 regression, combined
with the fact that exchange rate depreciation was not significant in the cpi re-
gression, we could draw the somewhat surprising conclusion that the main channel
for the impact of currency depreciation on inflation is not through cost-push such
as cost of imports, but through revaluation of the money supply. In contrast to
the CPI regression, all impacts on money supply are quite fast, taking at most 3
months for the full impact to be felt; the predictions of post-January 1998 values
based on the regressions exhibit realistic behavior and are quite robust with respect
to the estimation time period, but not as precise as the CPI predictors, tending to
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over-estimate broad money supply.
The two regressions we just discussed imply that if we consider broad money
supply m2 to be given in advance (as a function of time), a change of one percent
in m2 would over time lead to a change of about .33 percent in cpi; conversely, if
we considered the price level to be exogenous, a one percent increase in it would
lead over time to about a .67 percent increase in m2. In reality, neither of them is
given, but rather both evolve (approximately) according to the behavioral equations
that we have estimated in the previous section. Therefore, the two variables form a
feedback loop - a change in the money supply, happening for whatever reason, will
lead to an increase in the price level, which will in turn lead to an increase in money
supply, etc., amplifying the initial impact. The total impact of the feedback loop
can be computed as 1/(1 − 0.33 ∗ 0.67) ≈ 1.3, so that the feedback loop amplifies
by about 30% any effects of other variables on CPI inflation or broad money supply
growth.
Following the same model identification strategy that led us to success in
explaining the behavior of cpi and m2, we identify a model of exchange rate behavior.
The only two significant variables turn out to be the import price index, each 1%
increase in it translating into a 4% depreciation over a year’s time; and the interest
rate, with interest rate increase by 1% increasing depreciation by one third of a
percent. Unlike in the cases of cpi and m2, however, the estimated model proves to
be quite bad at predicting values of er when used as a recursive equation.
These problems, together with a brief qualitative discussion of exchange rate
behavior, lead us to conjecture that better understanding of the exchange rate be-
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havior would require separate study of managed floating and freely falling periods,
as well as of the conditions for the change between the two modes.
While we are lucky enough to have monthly time series for the key nominal
indicators (such as the Consumer Price Index, the exchange rate, and the money
supply), the real-side sectoral data, along with most nominal flow data, is only
available on a yearly basis.
As our sample length of 12 years is too short to allow for rigorous econometrics,
we use a different method to evaluate hypotheses of real-side behavior. We take the
years 1990-1997 as the estimation period and the years 1998-2001 as the validation
period. We use the estimation period data to estimate the coefficients of behavioral
hypotheses and then use their ability to predict the validation period data as the
way to choose between the different hypotheses.
This approach has the potential to increase our confidence in the choice of
functional form, as a good fit in the estimation period does not necessarily translate
into a good prediction ability in the validation period. On the other hand, if a func-
tional formulation was good at predicting the validation period data when estimated
with only estimation period data, we can have some confidence in its predictions for
the future (or counterfactuals in the past) when estimated using the data of both
periods. After having thus identified the functional form, we use ordinary least
squares to produce standard errors for the intercepts and elasticities involved.
The first relationship we test is the venerable constancy of the Incremental
Capital Output Ratio, that is the hypothesis that output growth is directly propor-
tional to investment. In line with previous research, this hypothesis is not supported
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by the data.
We then turn to the productive sectors. In agriculture, we observe a price
elasticity of substitution between export and nontraded crops of .42(.15); until 1995,
land surface under cultivation is approximately constant, and the wholesale price
of food crops relative to CPI moves in the same direction as food crop production,
suggesting a demand-driven regime. However, starting in 1995, land surface under
cultivation begins to grow substantially, and the relative price of wholesale food
crops moves consistently in the opposite direction to food crop output, suggesting
a shift to a supply-constrained mode.
In industry, the elasticity of substitution between exports and nontraded out-
put turns out to be negative, equaling -1.00(.23). This is not compatible with a
neoclassical productivity-frontier description, but fully compatible with a demand-
driven nontraded industrial sector. The hypothesis that nontraded industrial output
is demand driven is further supported by the behavior of said elasticity when we
change the estimation time period or exclude mining from the estimated ratio, as
discussed in Chapter 9. Thus, we conclude that the nontraded industrial sector is
demand-driven.
Turning to the demand side, we discover that the government was the major
source of demand injections throughout the period under consideration. As non-
traded industry is demand-driven, and most likely so is the informal sector, we
conclude that government demand was one of the key drivers of the economy.
As far as investment is concerned, we see that investment as a share of GDP
has been low (about 15%) and declining; investment demand decreased by about
9
2% (not percentage points) for each percentage point increase in interest rates.
Finally, turning to import demand, we find a quite large price elasticity of sub-
stitution between nontraded and imported manufactures, namely -1.18(.31). This
implies that the balance of payments will be quite sensitive to both exchange rate
and tariff changes. The corresponding elasticity for services was -0.38(0.11), smaller
but still substantial.
1.2.3 Discussion of Quantitative Results’ Implications
Having thus reached a number of quantified insights into the structure and behavior
of the Ghanaian economy, we proceed to use these to answer our research questions.
We do so by means of a verbal discussion, rather than an overall formal model of
the Ghanaian economy. The latter decision is defended in Section 1.4.1; let us now
proceed to the implications of our data investigations for our research questions.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Neoclassical/Monetarist vs. Structuralist Theory
The estimates of key macro and sectoral relationships we have discussed above,
such as the various elasticities and the determinants of inflation and money supply
growth (all of them complete with significance measures), allow a data-driven com-
parison of the applicability of the two competing schools, neoclassical/monetarist
and structuralist, to the Ghanaian economy.
On the macro/nominal side of things, we observe a very strong link from
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money supply growth to inflation (a monetarist staple assumption) and a weaker but
also significant link from inflation to money supply growth (a common structuralist
theme). The two variables thus form a feedback loop, which amplifies by about
a third all effects of other variables on either inflation or money supply. While
broad money supply growth is the dominant determinant of inflation, the price of
fuel and the wholesale price of food crops are also important. Additional influences
are growth of monetary base and exchange rate depreciation, both of which impact
inflation not directly, but through their effects on broad money growth.
Overall, on the nominal side the monetarist hypotheses are better supported
by the data than their structuralist counterparts, but with two important caveats.
Firstly, certain cost factors were also important, though less so than money supply
growth; and secondly, the relevant money supply measure was broad money, and not
monetary base that is commonly used for that purpose in monetarist CGE models.
On the real side, agriculture is supply constrained while industry is demand-
driven - a setup quite common in structuralist models, as opposed to the neoclassi-
cal assumption that all sectors are always at full capacity utilization and therefore
supply-constrained. On the other hand, import demand is quite sensitive to the rel-
ative price of imports vs. nontraded goods, which is a typical feature of neoclassical
models, while structuralist models often assume that quantity effects dominate and
relative price effects are of moderate importance.
Summing up, on the side of price formation monetarist theory has the upper
hand, while on the real/sectoral side of things structuralist theory is better supported
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by the data. In both cases, however, the optimal description must include elements
of both theories.
1.3.2 Reasons for Poor Macroeconomic Performance
The quantitative understanding of the Ghanaian economy that we have gained also
allows us to give a well-founded explanation to the poor macroeconomic performance
of the Ghanaian economy in the 1990s. Briefly, the story is as follows.
First of all, import liberalization strangulated domestic manufacturing, as the
demand for manufactures was redirected towards imports. At the same time, with-
drawal of government support programs for agriculture, combined with population
growth, led to an increasing supply problem in nontraded food crops, which led
to an increase of food crop imports, especially rice. As the growth in exports was
not sufficient to pay for these increases in imports, a persistent balance of payments
deficit appeared. As that deficit accumulated in a growing foreign debt, the resulting
interest payments further worsened the balance of payments.
The next part of the story are the occasional bursts of government spending,
particularly in the years around the first general election of the 1990s, in 1992-
1994. While the demand generated thereby did stimulate domestic manufacturing
somewhat, it also led to abnormal money supply growth and resultant inflation.
Furthermore, a large part of that demand spilled into imports, resulting in even
more balance of payments deficits. The inflation combined with balance of payments
deficits led to exchange rate depreciation, which in turn boosted money supply
growth and inflation in yet another positive feedback loop.
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The demand strangulation in industry and the withdrawal of government sup-
port programs in agriculture are a part of the explanation for the low GDP growth
rate in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s; another reason is that the starting
point for GDP in early 1980s was so low that high initial growth rates were easy
to realize - and this was no longer the case in 1990s. The final reason for low GDP
growth are the high, and volatile, inflation rates. As the result of the the Bank of
Ghana’s attempts to keep real interest rates positive, nominal interest rates became
quite high, and real interest rates quite volatile. That further depressed investment
demand, adding to the effects of low demand.
1.3.3 Distributional Impacts
As this thesis focuses on analyzing macro and sectoral relationships, it can un-
fortunately only shed a limited amount of understanding onto the distributional
implications of the government policies and external shocks during the 1990s. What
we can do is to provide an understanding of how incomes of the various sectors (at
our level of aggregation) were affected, which is a necessary first step for a more
detailed analysis.
The overall impacts of the government policies certainly benefited export pro-
ducers, which in Ghana means mainly mining and cocoa. As mining is to a large
extent foreign-owned, those profits were not really passed on to the employees (re-
sulting in a profit rate of 50% for mining companies in 1993, far above any other
sector), so that the main beneficiaries were the cocoa farmers. These certainly did
benefit, with the average cocoa farmer household’s income exceeding the average
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food farmer household’s income by about 50%. However, their income was still be-
low that of an average formal sector (industry or government) employee household
by another 50%; and geographical reasons limited the expansion of cocoa produc-
tion.
All agriculture was badly hit by withdrawal of government support programs,
and manufacturing was adversely affected by the leakage of demand into imports -
thus the net incentives, apart from the benefits to cocoa producers, were towards
relocation of labor into the informal sector, comprising a variety of transport, retail,
and personal service activities, to a large extent untaxed.
1.4 Limitations
While we believe that this thesis provides significant insight into its research ques-
tions, it also was more successful in some areas than in others. This section’s purpose
is to mark out the main limitations or our work.
1.4.1 No Formal Overall Model
An important limitation of this thesis is that while we compile a dataset sufficient
to estimate a complete model of the Ghanaian economy at a certain level of disag-
gregation (6 sectors, 5 institutions), we do not, in fact, estimate such a model.
In addition to compiling the dataset, we do estimate key relationships that
would be useful for building such a model in Chapters 9 and 11, and present ac-
counting frameworks that would form the backbone of such a model in Chapters 8
and 10. However, we stop short of putting all the pieces together and estimating
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a comprehensive model of the Ghanaian economy in the 1990s. How do we justify
this?
There are four major reasons we chose that course of action, namely trans-
parency, management of uncertainty, optimal return to effort, and replicability. Let
us discuss each in turn. By management of uncertainty we mean that as the data
for different parts of the system is of varying quality, the level of confidence of re-
sults derived from that data will also vary. While with monthly data we can test
a number of hypotheses involving a variable, yearly data at best allows us to get a
reasonable estimate of something like one elasticity per time series; and one or two
time series had to be derived as pro-rating from point estimates, making them even
less reliable. In a model, all these would appear as numbers with little to indicate
their relative reliability - while in a qualitative discussion such as ours, it is possible
to distinguish between them.
A similar reasoning applies to higher transparency: in a verbal discussion,
it is much more apparent to the reader where the conclusions come from - the
reasoning must be stated argument for argument; on the other hand, while model
equations are a language in themselves (and arguably a more powerful and versatile
one for certain purposes), it is a language that is spoken by a much smaller audience.
Therefore, when addressing a non-technical audience, and presenting the results as
coming from a model, one risks to be perceived as an oracle for a black box - not
an ideal communication strategy.
Neither of these problems is in itself fatal. One could cleanly combine data
of varying quality in the same model by specifying model-wide confidence measures
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that take these quality differences into account. A model-wide optimization, followed
by model-wide Monte Carlo experiments, could generate simultaneous confidence
intervals for all parameters as well as model output. On the transparency side,
nothing prevents a modeler, after having built a model, from also deriving the
results in a verbal discussion; the results will stand all the stronger if they come
from both a discussion and a modeling exercise.
That brings us to the last two reasons, namely return to effort and replicability.
While model-wide estimation and optimization, followed by model-wide Monte Carlo
experiments, would in fact allow us to effectively manage uncertainty, and additional
discussion would clarify the results to a non-technical audience, the overall effort
required would be quite high. That, in turn, would restrict the usefulness of the
approach to the institutions that have the appropriate technical capacity and willing
to make the extra effort, a fairly high threshold if one is talking of developing
countries. Finally, even when the ultimate objective is building a comprehensive
model, it is useful to be able to generate analyses like ours beforehand, both to map
out the shape of the model-to-be and to generate intermediate output for funding
purposes.
Summing up, we don’t deny that estimating an overall formal model of Ghana
in the 1990s would be very interesting and yield additional insights compared to our
approach. However, our approach already surpasses the existing ones in being more
systematic than isolated econometric regressions, and in providing measures of con-
fidence in its results based on time series data, which CGE models can’t do. It lays
the necessary data foundation for building a formal model, and reaches substantial
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analytical and policy conclusions from study of carefully selected variables; thus, it
is well suited for replication in other developing countries, where both varying data
quality and limited technical capacity are common.
1.4.2 Limited Analysis of Distributional Impacts
Another important limitation of the present thesis is that it does not provide a deep
analysis of distributional impacts of the government policies discussed. The reason
for this is twofold, namely the scope of our effort and poor data availability.
The present thesis contains an analysis of the Ghanaian economy in the 1990s
on the macro and sectoral levels, based on yearly or monthly time series. The
macro/sectoral scope of the effort limited the amount of understanding we could
provide of the finer distributional impacts of government policies. A good under-
standing of the sectoral structure of the economy is a necessary foundation for a
sound distributional analysis, as it enables us to see how the incomes of broad oc-
cupation groups are affected by macro and sectoral policies and shocks. This is the
kind of very broad analysis that we were able to conduct here.
Substantial advances in distributional analysis would require either a further
increase in sectoral resolution of the data, or better the use of micro-level data such
as household surveys. Finer sectoral price and output data would have been even
harder to collect than our present dataset. On the micro data side, there are only
two household surveys available for the period under study, and these are in form
of raw tables with sparse documentation, requiring much effort to extract useful
summary data.
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Given the high effort of collecting and processing the necessary data for a
deeper distributional analysis, along with an already high workload from the other
parts of the research project, we regretfully restrict ourselves to a quite shallow
sectoral-level distributional analysis.
1.5 Structure of This Manuscript
The structure of this thesis is designed to address the diverse levels of technical
background that its readers will have. The challenge is to make the document
interesting to readers with a high level of expertise in economics, while at the same
time keeping it accessible to readers with limited economics background.
We aim to achieve it by separating the document into “narrative” and “tech-
nical” chapters. Thus, a non-technical reader might want to read Chapters 2 to 6
that provide introduction to all relevant concepts and techniques, skim the technical
details of Chapters 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 and get all the key points from the discussion
of these chapters’ results in Chapters 12 and 13. Also, at one of the committee
members’ request, each chapter includes a short summary.
On the other hand, the readers with substantial economic expertise may wish
to read Chapters 1 and 6 for a brief summary of the research question and the
overall strategy of this thesis, skim or skip Chapters 2 to 5, and turn to Chapters 7,
9, and 11 for the empirical/data-related content and to Chapters 8 and 10 for some
modeling technique issues.
Chapters 12 and 13 are meant for all readers as they pull together all the





Structural Adjustment: Causes, Content and Assessments
2.1 What is Structural Adjustment?
Structural adjustment can be defined as “an adjustment to some shock that requires
not only compositional changes in production, resource allocation, demand, and
relative prices, but also changes in macroeconomic aggregates such as income, in-
vestment, absorption, consumption, and government expenditure” [Robinson 1989].
While this definition would allow for a wide range of different “structural adjust-
ment programs”, historically the term has come to refer to a specific policy package,
for reasons described in this section.
During the past two and a half decades, the history of most economies in
Asia, Africa and Latin America was characterized by recurring or ongoing economic
crises that consisted of some combination of escalating domestic government debt,
escalating foreign debt (government or private), and out-of-control inflation. While
the debate on the underlying causes of these crises is far from settled, a frequent
proximate cause was an acute shortage of foreign exchange, due to some combination
of high interest rates, high indebtedness, adverse terms of trade, fluctuating foreign
capital inflows, and lack of access to commercial lending. In most cases, countries
experiencing such a crisis applied for a loan from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), whose institutional purpose is to assist countries in bridging transient balance
of payments imbalances.
If the crisis facing the country was not judged by the IMF to be of a transient
20
nature, an IMF loan was made contingent on the country undertaking a structural
adjustment program approved by the IMF and the World Bank. These programs
for different countries shared many common features, and are discussed in the next
section.
2.2 A Typical Structural Adjustment Policy Package
The last two decades have seen widespread application of the so-called neoliberal
policy package as a response to balance of payments difficulties. This package is a
combination of fiscal austerity, tight monetary policies, devaluation, privatization,
elimination of subsidies, trade and capital account liberalization.
One important reason for the widespread application of these policies is that
neoclassical economics is the preferred paradigm of the World Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), which through loans as well as their standing
as experts in development and adjustment issues are widely believed to have sub-
stantial influence on the policies chosen by the developing country governments.
Between the two institutions, it was largely the IMF that determined the specifi-
cally macroeconomic content of the policies.
A structural adjustment policy package aims to achieve the two goals of balance
of payments (BoP) stabilization and inflation reduction through the two levers of
changes in exchange rate and control of the money supply1.
1The causal connection between the targets and the levers is modeled by a simple model known
as the Financial Programming Framework (FPF) that was first formulated by Polak [1957] and is
discussed in detail by Khan et al. [1990]. FPF assumes constant price elasticities of export supply
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In practice, a typical stabilization program has the following components:
Cut government spending and increase taxes Firstly, the resulting decrease in total
demand is supposed to improve the balance of payments both through decreasing
the demand for imports and freeing up domestic productive capacity to supply more
exports (as the IMF analytical approach, the Financial Programming Framework
(FPF), implicitly assumes the total production is unaffected by the stabilization
program).
Second, as typically the government in question is running a deficit, addi-
tional benefits are expected, depending on the previously dominant source of deficit
financing: if the deficit was financed by borrowing from the central bank, i.e. by
printing money, its reduction is expected to contribute towards inflation control; if
the deficit was financed by foreign borrowing, its reduction will improve the bal-
ance of payments. The FPF does not really have a way to represent non-monetized
borrowing from the domestic private sector (be it commercial banks or households),
but the rhetoric is that a reduction in domestic borrowing should free up resources
for private investment.
and import demand (connecting the exchange rate to the current account), and constant velocity
of money, with the implication that ceteris paribus increases in the money supply translate in strict
proportion into increases in the price level. FPF also assumes that the real output is unaffected
by any of the variables in the model. We will discuss the FPF model in more detail alongside the
other models in Chapter 4.
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Introduce floating exchange rates and depreciate the currency The corresponding
increase in domestic prices of exports and imports is supposed to make exports more
competitive and to redirect demand away from imports. The overall reduction in
domestic demand from reductions in government spending is supposed to make sure
there is nonetheless no excess demand for domestic goods.
This is a common feature of programs that primarily aim at balance of pay-
ments stabilization, as common in Africa. The programs primarily aiming at infla-
tion, such as seen in Latin America, often fix the nominal exchange rate instead,
aiming to use it as a nominal price anchor through stabilizing the price of imports.
Increase the interest rates and/or reduce the rate of expansion of the monetary base
Increasing the interest rates is supposed to stimulate savings, and thus provide
more funds for investment. At the same time, high interest rates are supposed to
prevent excessive depreciation of the currency by attracting foreign capital inflows.
Reducing the rate of growth of monetary base is meant to decrease the rate of
money supply growth and thus reduce inflation under the constant velocity of money
assumption. (In the case of market-determined interest rates, these two policies
coincide, as increased control of monetary base makes credit more scarce and thus
more expensive).
Liberalize the current account That measure is achieved by abolishing import quo-
tas and reducing import tariffs and is expected to increase efficiency in some not
clearly specified way. Sometimes it is also argued that lower prices for imports
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benefit consumers, but since at the same time higher import consumption means
less income for domestic producers, that argument is not tenable without further
refinement.
Liberalize the capital account Allowing a higher measure of capital mobility is
expected to attract more funds for investment.
2.3 Assessments and Criticisms
It has been a subject of much controversy whether these policies achieved their de-
clared objectives of macroeconomic stabilization (primarily stabilizing the balance of
payments and lowering inflation) and sustainable GDP growth, or whether they had
no effect at all or worsened the situation (at least in the medium to long term). An
equally controversial issue is the impact of these policies on the income distribution.
Haque and Khan [1998] discuss a number of studies using a variety of ap-
proaches to analyze the impact of IMF programs on balance of payments, current
account, inflation, and growth. The following results stand out:
Firstly, the number of statistically significant results in cross-country studies is
quite low, which can be taken as an indicator of a large degree of variation between
countries.
Secondly, the impact of IMF programs on the balance of payments and the
current account, when significant, is generally found to be positive, while the impacts
on inflation and growth rates vary in magnitude and in sign depending on the method
chosen as well as between studies using a particular method.
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Thirdly, the changes often take time to manifest themselves. Thus, Khan
[1990] using the generalized evaluation estimator approach, found that both balance
of payments and the current account deficit reductions are strengthened over time,
and the initially adverse effects on growth are reversed in the subsequent years.
Killick et al. [1995] in an extensive before-after study also find positive balance of
payments and current account effects, and find that “[The programme effects] are
at their smallest in the twelve months immediately following adoption of a program
but larger in the following two years”.
Fourthly, the real exchange rate depreciates significantly right at the onset of
a program and this depreciation is deepened in the following years. However, the
reductions in the rate of credit expansion are small and non-significant, contrary to
both expectations and Fund intentions.
Taylor [1988, 2001] discusses a series of case studies, and while finding a wide
variety of individual experiences, points out the following similarities between them:
Firstly, when fiscal austerity did result in an improvement in the balance of
payments it was not primarily because of relative price effects as postulated by neo-
classical theory, but rather, because reduced government spending reduced domestic
output and thus demand for imports, and also because the decrease in domestic ab-
sorption increased exports. Relative price effects did not appear important in the
short run.
Secondly, fiscal austerity was not often successful in fighting inflation, while
by reducing both private and public investment it undermined the prospects for
long-term prosperity. If it was coupled with high interest rates, investment was
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undermined even further.
Killick et al. [1995] also find that the brunt of the reduction in domestic ab-
sorption, which is the keystone of IMF programs, seems to fall on investment, with
overall consumption staying comparatively constant.
The stabilization and structural adjustment programs have also come under
extensive criticism from civil society organizations both in developing and developed
countries. Kanbur [2001] notes that many of their criticisms were not concerned
with the specific research results that claimed to demonstrate positive impacts of
structural adjustment, but were instead due to several persistent differences in focus
between the civil society groups (referred to by Kanbur as “Group B”) and the
majority of the development economics profession (“Group A”). Kanbur identifies
three such differences in perspective:
The first difference is in the level of aggregation used to evaluate impacts, with
academic studies often focusing on the aggregate poverty rates for the population
as a whole and their critics highlighting the plight of specific groups. “Quite often
a national fall in the poverty incidence can be composed of large movements in
opposite directions”.
The second difference in perspective is the time horizon over which the con-
sequences of policy are assessed. While development economists tend to think in
terms of the “medium term”, used to refer to a time horizon of three to ten years,
their critics are concerned with both the short term consequences of economic poli-
cies (“short run survival trumps medium run benefits every time, if the family is
actually on the edge of survival”) and a time horizon much longer than a decade,
26
in reference to issues of sustainable development.
The final systematic difference in perspective concerned the perspective of
market structure and power. “The implicit framework of Group A in thinking
through the consequences of economic policy on distribution and poverty is that of
a competitive market structure of a large number of small agents interacting without
market power over each other. The instinctive picture that Group B has of market
structure is one riddled with market power wielded by agents in the large and in the
small.”
These different assumptions lead to very different expected results of policies
such as increased openness to trade, and a model that pre-judges any one of these
issues will not be helpful for achieving agreement on optimal policy choice.
Summary
When a country experiences balance of payments problem, the typical remedy mix
proposed by the International Monetary Fund consists of fiscal austerity, tight mon-
etary policies, devaluation, privatization, elimination of subsidies and trade liberal-
ization, combined with low interest rate loans.
To the extent that these prescriptions are based on economic theory, the theory
used is neoclassical, with an explicit or implicit assumption of full employment and
thus blind to possible recessionary impacts of the programs. It is these recessionary
impacts that are the source of most criticism of structural adjustment.
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Chapter 3
Structural Adjustment in Ghana
This chapter sets Ghana into the context of the Sub-Saharan Africa region, narrates
the history of structural adjustment in Ghana, and reviews the literature as to the
reasons of the poor macroeconomic performance in the 1990s.
3.1 The economies of Sub-Saharan Africa
To create a context for the case study proposed, this section provides an overview
of the economic and institutional specifics of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Probably the most well known characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa as a region
is the extent to which its growth performance during the last three decades has
lagged below that of other regions. As a result of the combination of slow GDP
growth rates with fast population growth, many African countries that were middle-
income, comparable to the South Asian nations in the fifties and sixties have since
become low-income countries with average per capita GDP growth below one percent
and often negative.
Collier and Gunning [1999] provide a detailed discussion of different explana-
tions advanced to explain that poor performance. On the domestic side, the govern-
ments were typically undemocratic and “captured by the educated, urban-resident
population, with few agricultural or commercial interests. They expanded the public
sector while imposing wide-ranging controls on private activity. [. . . ] Since public
sector employment was the main priority, [. . . ] Africa experienced the paradox of
poor public services despite relatively high public expenditure”. That, in turn, led to
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increasing transaction costs (for transactions such as transport, telecommunication
and contract enforcement) and missing infrastructure, making private manufactur-
ing unattractive. This situation continues to hold to this day, and is quoted as an
important reason why private investment in Africa remains significantly below that
of other countries with comparable income levels.
Also, “since the political base of the governments was urban, agriculture was
heavily taxed and the public agronomic research [. . . ] was neglected”. As on the one
hand the population was predominantly rural, and on the other hand agricultural
exports were for many countries the principal source of foreign exchange (necessary
to buy intermediate inputs and capital goods for the domestic industries), that
combination of policies typically led to decline in GDP and a balance of payments
crisis. These are the major ways in which misguided domestic policies contributed
to economic decline.
As a consequence, since the late 1970s the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in-
creasingly made use of loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank as a solution to their balance of payments crises, and therefore were increas-
ingly led to implement the set of policy measures advocated by these institutions,
discussed above.
Sender [1999] critically discusses the consequences of these policy measures.
His main criticism is that “Public investment as a share of GDP in Sub-Saharan
Africa is now much lower than in any other region of the world. This has had negative
effects on both the volume and the productivity of private investment in the region,
because of the well-established complementarity between these two categories of
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investment. [. . . ] Far too little attention has been given to the accumulation of
evidence suggesting a causal relationship between the macroeconomic stabilization
programs of the International Monetary Fund and declines in investment ratios”.
As far as the external connections of the economies in question are concerned,
African countries’ exports were and remain concentrated in a few primary commodi-
ties, whose prices are notoriously volatile. (In a classification by Taylor [1988] of
countries undergoing structural adjustment, the “externally strangled small primary
product (or labor) exporters” category contained all African countries of the sam-
ple.) As Deaton [1999] points out, as a result of price-inelastic demand functions
for primary commodities the variance of price can equal several times the variance
of supply. For the exporting country, an upward spike in prices can then prove as
difficult to manage as a downward spike, as the former easily leads to Dutch disease
as well as tempting the government to enter commitments that cannot be upheld
once the boom is over.
The neoclassical policy advice further encouraged expansion of primary com-
modity exports for all African countries on the basis of comparative advantage
arguments. While neoliberal policies emphasizing export-led growth were often ef-
fective in the short term, in the medium term the simultaneous expansion in supply
in fairly price-inelastic markets led to a continuous decrease in the terms of trade.
Borenszstein et al. [1994] finds a secular downtrend in non-oil commodity prices
since the mid-1970s. They further find that the supply expansion explains about
40 percent of the price change in the period 1971-1984, and over 60 percent in the












Figure 3.1: Population Growth, Annual (World Development Indicators 2002)
ciency increases or changes in demand by the industrial countries that is the primary
cause of the adverse terms of trade trend.
Commodity price shocks also have immediate and far-reaching distributional
effects, depending on the identity of the exporters (who can be small cocoa farmers
or large mining companies) and the linkages of the export sector to the rest of the
economy. Both of these factors are clearly country-specific.
3.2 The case of Ghana
The experience of Ghana during the last decades is largely representative of Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole. Population growth in Ghana was largely in line with the
rest of the region, well above the low-income average (Figure 3.1).
Gross economic mismanagement during the 1970s led to an exchange rate
that was almost 1000% overvalued and thus “not so much wrong as irrelevant to
economic calculation” [Taylor 1988]. As a result, cocoa production, which was the
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main source of foreign exchange, had dropped drastically; domestic industries were
unable to operate due to lack of parts and intermediate inputs.
After a turbulent period in 1978-1981 that saw several regimes come and go,
Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings came to power in a military coup on 31. December 1981.
The first year of his rule consisted of what Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries [2000] call
“distributionist-cum-populist mobilization”, comprising large doses of vigilante jus-
tice aiming to root out corruption and restore economic justice. “The goods of
hapless traders accused by vigilantes of hoarding and overpricing were confiscated
and sold off to the public at reduced prices. In somewhat extreme but certainly
dramatic cases, traders’ sheds and tables were destroyed and whole markets (tagged
as ‘dens of corruption’ and symbols of the discredited commercial order) were razed
to the ground.”[Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries 2000, p.43]
However, after a year of such policies, which also coincided with a severe
drought and a huge repatriation of Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983, the government
decided to change course and seek foreign assistance. It first approached the Soviet
block, but was advised by them to turn to the IMF and the World Bank, which
it did. The standard structural adjustment reform package (known in Ghana as
the Economic Recovery Program) was proclaimed by the government, including a
maxi-devaluation, fiscal austerity and tight money.
As Aryeetey and Tarp [2000] observe, reforms were designed on the basis of
the neo-liberal orthodoxy, with a “particularly optimistic view about the efficacy
of the market mechanism as a vehicle for promotion of efficiency and development,
including misconceptions about the prevalence of institutional pre-conditions for
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market efficiency”.
According to Aryeetey and Tarp [2000], it was taken for granted that the
government had better refrain from intervening in the economy, except from taking
care of macroeconomic management and a few other minimalist functions. Not
much attention was given to the second-best consideration that trade and market
liberalization may not increase efficiency when some markets (such as insurance and
credit markets) cannot be made to function properly. Crowding out of the public by
the private sector was seen as the critical impediment, and little attention went to
exploring what was required to make sure the private sector would indeed respond.
The policy reforms were accompanied by “abnormally high” capital receipts
from abroad, mostly from multilateral and bilateral lenders [Killick and Malik 1995],
that led to overall balance of payments surpluses in spite of persistent current ac-
count deficits as much-needed imports were brought into the country. The more
realistic exchange rate, combined with good weather and decreases in smuggling
due to better producer prices, increased cocoa export receipts; and thanks to the
lifting of the foreign exchange constraint GDP grew by as much as 5% per year
(Figure 3.2).
During the 1980s, these reforms were happening in the political context of a
military dictatorship. While there were attempts by various groups to resist the re-
forms and to launch counter-coups, none of these were able to topple the regime or
even present any very effective organized opposition to the reforms. Gyimah-Boadi
and Jeffries [2000] attribute that to the unusual degree of skill and determination













Figure 3.2: GDP growth, Annual (World Development Indicators 2002)
enjoyed a substantial degree of popular support, while also resorting to strong re-
pressive measures to silence any opposition. Overall, Ghana in the 1980s was a
relatively strong (for the region), authoritarian state.
During the late 1980s the government has embarked on a series of democrati-
zation reforms such as decentralization and the establishment of district assemblies,
and the early 1990s saw a return to multi-party politics, with a national election
taking place in 1992 (with the party of Jerry Rawlings, the PNDC, coming out as
the winner).
Given this combination of a relatively well-functioning (if authoritarian) state,
wide economic reforms, rebounding GDP and export growth, and a broad move to-
wards decentralization and democracy, it will come as no surprise that during the
late 1980s Ghana was widely touted as the “Front-runner in adjustment” [Husain
and Faruquee 1994]. As a result, the behavior of the Ghanaian economy was exten-
sively studied by both proponents and opponents of structural adjustment, resulting

















Figure 3.3: GDP Deflator, Annual Inflation (World Development Indicators 2002)
The democratization process continued unabated through the 1990s. The
elections of 1992 were followed by the next round in 1996 (PNDC winning again),
and another in 2000, when PNDC lost and peacefully transferred power to the
winning party. Overall, Ghana enjoyed remarkable political stability throughout
the period, with occasional protests (for example, opposing the introduction of the
Value Added Tax in 1995) but no civil unrest and no systematic opposition to the
economic reforms.
Given the positive political developments, it is all the more disappointing that
they were not matched by economic success. Inflation remained persistently high,
averaging 30% per annum in 1986-89 (Figure 3.3). In order to boost its popularity
prior to the 1992 elections, the government made excessive commitments that led
to egregious budget deficits during 1992-1994, further fueling inflation during that
period (fortunately, that was not as strongly the case for the subsequent elections).













Figure 3.4: Debt to GDP ratio (World Development Indicators 2002)
6-12% in 1988 [Killick and Malik 1995], and even exhibited a slight downward trend
in the 1990s (Figure 7.4, p. 115). The continuing capital inflows led to debt buildup
and mounting interest payments. The medium-term benefits of liberalization didn’t
set in; growth turned from high in the late 80s to lagging in early to mid-90s1
(Figure 3.2), and external debt has increased to an extent that Ghana qualified for
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative (Figure 3.4).
Let us discuss the key aspects of the Ghanaian economy in some more detail.
3.2.1 Fiscal Policy
Let us begin with a brief discussion of fiscal policy. As we have seen in Chapter
2, fiscal austerity is one of the pillars of structural adjustment. The average deficit
values for the last four five-year periods can be seen in Table 3.1; however, it might
1As we will see in Chapter 7, the official GDP numbers for Ghana for the 1990s are somewhat



















































Figure 3.5: Composition of the Fiscal Deficit (International Monetary Fund)
be more informative to look at a decomposition of the deficit over time in Figure
3.5.
As the figure packs quite a bit of information, let us go quickly over its contents.
All values in Figure 3.5 are plotted as shares of GDP. The lowermost line (empty
circles) represents the total grants received. As they reduce the deficit, they are
plotted with a minus sign. The large area on top of that represents the primary
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000
Primary deficit as % of GDP 4.5% 1.2% 3.6% 2.8% 0.4%
Total deficit as % of GDP 6.0% 2.7% 5.9% 8.5% 9.7%
Broad money growth rate 32% 42% 33% 28% 35%
Nominal TB interest rate 13% 20% 27% 36% 35%
Real TB interest rate -40% -6% 9% 14% 17%
Effective import tariff 25% 16% 15% 14% 13%
Effective cocoa duty 51% 35% 28% 35% 14%
Exchange rate overvaluation 1279% 50% 4% 1% 0%
Table 3.1: Indicators of Ghana’s adherence to Structural Adjustment policies.
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deficit (that is, without taking into account the expenditure on interest payments)
excluding grants; by stacking it onto the grants graph, its upper border represents
the primary deficit including grants. Stacked on top of that there are the two
areas representing interest payments on domestic and foreign debt, respectively.
The topmost line (filled-in squares) is merely there to emphasize that all the areas
together stack up to the total deficit.
Looking at Figure 3.5, we see several distinct periods. First, there is the period
of turmoil in 1980-1982 with large deficits and no grants; then from 1984 until 1989
we see growing pre-grant primary deficits compensated by an even larger growth
in grants, with the interest payments remaining comparatively small. In 1990 and
1991, grants fell, but so did the primary deficit, actually resulting in a tiny primary
surplus.
Unfortunately, this fairly rosy picture unravels immediately after that. In 1992
(election year, bad cocoa harvest) revenues fell, expenditures rose, and foreign grants
stayed low, leading to a huge primary deficit. The primary deficit remained high
for the next couple of years, at the same time as grants were shrinking. While the
primary deficit was brought under control from 1997 onwards, the interest payments
on the debt accumulated during earlier excesses make sure the broad deficit never
again fell under 6% of GDP, and generally stayed around 8%.
Summing up, fiscal policy during both the 1980s and the 1990s cannot really
be characterized as particularly austere, with the worst excesses happening between
1992 and 1997, during the transition to democracy. As the next step in our in-




To get a picture of monetary policy, let us look at three variables: growth rate in
broad money supply, nominal interest rates (treasury bills) and real interest rates,
as pictured in Figure 3.6. To compute real interest rates, we subtracted year-on-
year CPI inflation from the nominal interest rates. CPI was chosen because it is the
most readily available deflator, and year-on-year inflation was computed to avoid
interference from the (quite strong) seasonal effects in inflation. Likewise, money
supply growth is year-on-year. The averages of the same three variables over five-
year periods are also reproduced in Table 3.1.
What Figure 3.6 tells us is that monetary policy since 1980 has been any-
thing but tight. During the the 1980s, real interest rates were more often than not
negative, and money supply growth rates of over 40% were quite common. Money
supply has grown in the 1980s mainly because of the high foreign exchange inflows
that were monetized by the Bank of Ghana, and in the 1990s primarily because
of government deficits. In the 1990s, likely in reaction to the fiscal excesses, inter-
est rates were raised somewhat, but were still occasionally negative for extended
periods; and money supply growth likewise slowed down, but not by much.
High interest rate spreads between lending and deposit rates meant that real
rates on deposits were even more likely to be negative than treasury bill rates, giving
no incentive to save with the banks. Instead of savings accounts, holding foreign







































































































forex holdings in the definition of money. [Brownbridge et al. 2000]
Stimulating credit to the private sector was one of the goals of the Economic
Recovery Program. However, that was hard to achieve because of extremely high
government borrowing. On the one hand, the government borrowed from the Bank
of Ghana, thus increasing the money supply; on the other hand, it also borrowed
from the domestic commercial banks, making commercial credit scarce. As raising
interest rates on treasury bills did not increase savings much, tight restrictions on
bank lending to the private sector were necessary to avoid even more money supply
growth.
The Bank of Ghana had very little room for manoeuvre: If it accommodated
government borrowing demand, it could only control money supply growth by con-
straining private sector borrowing; however the latter is only 30% of the broad
money supply [Aryeetey and Harrigan 2000].
The result was a crowding out of the private sector from the credit market
(although reserve requirements of commercial banks e.g. in 1993 were 52% of Bank
of Ghana bills plus 5% cash, actual rates were over 70% [Aryeetey and Harrigan
2000]) and strangulation of investment. Bank credit to the private sector averaged
less than 5% of GDP, and if we adjust it for the increased cost of capital goods
(mostly imported), it hardly grew at all in real terms [Brownbridge et al. 2000].
What little bank lending went to the private sector financed working capital
rather than investment, especially as the need for working capital went up with
constant inflation and depreciation [Aryeetey and Harrigan 2000]. Discussions with
private investors and executives of the Private Enterprises Foundation suggested
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that high nominal interest rates made firms reluctant to use loans for investment
purposes, and also increased cost of operation, thus pushing up prices [Brownbridge
et al. 2000]. Even though real interest rates were not that high, even in the 1990s,
high nominal interest rates combined with very volatile inflation made real rates
hard to predict, making borrowing to invest too risky.
From this discussion we extract two hypotheses: firstly, that interest rates had
little impact on the money supply and secondly, that interest rates were a cost-
push factor, and thus increasing interest rates increased inflation. We will test these
hypotheses in Chapter 11.
3.2.3 Inflation
One of the persistent problems of the Ghanaian economy has been out-of-control
inflation - as Figure 3.3 shows, it was almost triple the average value for either
Sub-Saharan Africa or the low-income countries. Given the huge growth in money
supply throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it is not surprising that this growth is
usually taken as the main explanation for the high inflation rates. However, there
are also dissenting opinions.
The view that money supply was the primary driver of inflation is critiqued by
Sowa et al. [Sowa and Kwakye 1991, Sowa 1994, CEPA 1996], who argue that real-
side factors matter more in the inflationary spiral. Their econometric regressions
are used to suggest that elasticity of inflation with respect to output is almost unity,
so output volatility (especially in food production, which has a weight of 50% of
CPI) rather than monetary factors drive inflation.
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Another supply-side explanation for the persistent inflation is the low growth
rate and capacity utilization of the industrial sector. However, as Aryeetey and
Harrigan [2000] remarks, that seems unlikely to be a major influence as the industrial
sector is so small (less than 10% of GDP).
Upon reviewing the above supply-side arguments, Aryeetey and Harrigan
[2000] concludes that they might explain the short-term jumps in inflation (for
instance during a drought, such as the 60% inflation rate in 1995) but not persis-
tent high inflation, unless there are continued high rates of monetary growth. A
structuralist explanation would only be useful if it could show that the huge money
supply growth rates since the start of ERP were caused by inflation rather than vice
versa.
This debate is clearly central to one of our research questions, namely under-
standing of inflation, and thus we expect to provide substantial evidence allowing
us to evaluate the above debates. To be precise, in Chapter 11 we will address the
question of the relative importance of money supply, cost factors, and inertia in
determining the level of inflation.
3.2.4 Labor Market
The availability of data on labor market is much lower than that on macroeconomic
indicators. No yearly data for overall employment composition are being collected
in Ghana to the best of the author’s knowledge. The only source of employment
composition data are various surveys happening at irregular intervals. The most
detailed of these is the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), of which a total of
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four rounds have been conducted, in 1987, 1988, 1991 and 1998.















































Figure 3.7: Employment composition (GLSS1-4 and author’s estimates)
We see that the majority of the population are farmers, followed by non-
agricultural self employment (transport, personal services, etc. - most of these
activities fall into the informal sector) and wage employees.
To get an idea of the relative attractiveness of the different occupations, con-
sider Figure 3.8, showing the composition of an average household’s income across
different occupations in 1998, derived by the author from GLSS4 data. For a sense of
proportion, note that the poverty line at that time was 0.7 million cedis per person.
Seeing that the income of an average food farmer household is barely twice that,
and that of an average informal sector or cocoa farmer household about three times






























Figure 3.8: Average Households’ Income Composition in 1993 by Main Occupation
(author’s estimates from GLSS4 data)
poor, and that employment in the informal sector presents only a marginally better
alternative.
From Figure 3.7 we see that the share of population in agriculture is sinking,
but very slowly. Unfortunately, that decrease goes not go towards the lucrative wage
employment in the modern sector, but towards the informal sector which serves as
a catch-all. The share of wage employees in the labor force has been stagnating in
absolute terms, and thus decreasing in relative terms.
Disaggregating wage employment between government, state enterprises, and
private firms (data not shown here) we see that the labor force employed by govern-
ment has been fairly stable, the labor force employed by the state enterprises has
sunk drastically (due to extensive divestiture programs) and increases in employ-
ment by private firms have just about made up for that decrease, with no overall
growth in absolute terms.
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According to Aryeetey and Tarp [2000], the least addressed aspect of fiscal
adjustment is its effect on employment, both directly on public employment and
through demand effects. Reductions in import duties also had negative impact on
domestic employment, and displaced workers mostly landed in the informal sector,
further depressing its productivity.
This appears to be a fairly disturbing picture in terms of poverty alleviation
prospects. To gain a better understanding for its reasons, let us take a look at the
behavior of the different productive sectors.
We do not formulate specific hypotheses concerning the employment composi-
tion and income structure of the households. The GLSS surveys are quite rich and
fascinating datasets, but unfortunately the detailed investigation thereof is beyond
the scope of the present thesis.
3.2.5 Sectoral Behavior
A major goal of most structural adjustment programs is eliminating or reducing
what is perceived as price distortions, in particular government subsidies and tariffs.
That was also the case in Ghana. This section discusses the sectoral implications.
The sectoral structure of the Ghanaian economy is dominated by agriculture
(primarily food for domestic consumption and cocoa for export) followed by a large
services sector (some 40% of GDP). The industrial sector is dominated by mining,
which is largely foreign owned and has few linkages to the rest of the economy.
The agricultural sector in Ghana is crucial for any poverty reduction strategy,
containing as it does over half of the country’s working population and having by
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far the highest poverty incidence. Thus, impacts on the agricultural sector are an
important gauge of distributional impacts of a policy.
The impacts of the ERP on the agricultural sector appear to have been mixed.
On the one hand, the initial opening up to foreign trade and the flood of foreign
assistance to finance it led to increased availability of capital goods and inputs
such as fertilizer; furthermore, the cocoa producers profited from increased producer
prices of cocoa and from liberalization of cocoa marketing. On the other hand, the
food subsector appears to be weakened by the switch to price incentives for cash
crops and by increased cost of fertilizer and labor.
According to Nyanteng and Seini [2000], the level of productivity is gener-
ally low due to poor farming practices and very low use of fertilizer, the latter
additionally depressed by fertilizer subsidy cuts. Likewise, removal of subsidies on
insecticides and fungicides almost tripled their real prices. As government pulled
out of procurement, supply and distribution of inputs, private sector did not jump
in to fill the gap, resulting in decreased availability.
A major constraint on the marketing of foodstuffs is the poor infrastructure;
transportation alone is said to contribute as much as 70% to marketing costs, and
storage losses are estimated at between 15% and 30%.
Let us now consider the policies of the ERP that affected the industrial sector.
A major component of the program was a package of investment incentives, including
unlimited repatriation of profits, a reduction in corporate tax rates, and a shift in
price incentives for investment favoring export industries and disadvantageous to
formerly protected manufacturing industries.
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The main components of the industrial sector are mining, manufacturing
(largely for the domestic market), and utilities (largely government-owned). As
we have mentioned, mining is mostly foreign-owned and its products are mostly
exported. Investment in mining is largely foreign-financed, and thus apart from
providing some employment, tax revenue, and modest intermediate input demand,
the mining sector appears to be largely insulated from the rest of the economy.
In response to the investment incentives listed above together with generous
tax concessions, the mining sector did indeed grow substantially. However, the
impacts on domestic manufacturing were largely negative.
Real depreciation and real interest rate raises led to almost a doubling of the
cost of capital goods relative to the GDP deflator from 1983 to 1991 [Brownbridge
et al. 2000, Table 4.2]. That did not affect mining as it was largely indifferent to
domestic price levels, but it combined with the competition from increased imports
to depress manufacturing. Average capacity utilization for medium and large facto-
ries was between 40% and 46% during 1990-1993 [IMF 1998, Table 12] Apparently,
capacity utilization data was no longer collected after 1993.
From this discussion we extract the following testable hypotheses. Firstly, we
would expect an increased scarcity of domestic food production, expressed in the
increase of its relative price. Secondly, this increase may or may not have been a
major driver of overall inflation, as the producer price of crops at the farm gate
appears to be a small percentage of retail price of food, due among other things to
high transport costs. Thirdly, it would be interesting to know how strongly the com-
position of output in agriculture and industry (export vs. nontraded) responds to
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relative price – relative price adjustments being the mainstay of mainstream theory
and policy design. Finally, we would like to ask whether industry and manufactur-
ing are primarily demand-driven or supply-constrained. This is important in terms
of policy design, as a supply-constrained sector would primarily need capital invest-
ment (private or public) to expand its output, regardless of the fiscal policy stance,
while a demand-driven sector would be harmed by austerity and benefited by a
loose fiscal policy. Note that the answers to the above questions can be different for
agriculture and industry.
3.2.6 External Trade and Balance of Payments
Another major component of the ERP was to liberalize the trade and payments
regime. According to Aryeetey and Harrigan [2000], that had the following goals:
narrow the gap between official and parallel exchange rate, provide foreign exchange
to ease import strangulation, achieve a viable balance of payments position, clear
up arrears, and introduce current account convertibility.
The means to that were devaluations in 1983-86, a foreign exchange auction
from 1986, and a free interbank market from 1992 onwards. This was accompa-
nied by a gradual liberalization of imports, with import licenses abolished in 1989
and import tariff rate lowered to between 10% and 30%. Export policies were also
gradually liberalized, allowing exporters to retain an increasing share of earnings,
reaching 100% in 1991 for all exports except gold and cocoa. The import liberal-
ization programme and the forex auction could only be maintained with the help of






















































Figure 3.9: Effective Tariff Rates on Trade (World Development Indicators 2002,
Oduro [2000], International Monetary Fund)
Figure 3.9 shows the effective tariff rates on imports and on cocoa exports.
The effective tariff rates are computed as the ratio of duties actually collected over
the total value of imports resp. exports. The five-year averages of these rates are
reported in Table 3.1, which also contains the degree of exchange rate overvaluation
(computed from official and parallel exchange rate data in Reinhart and Rogoff
[2004]). The tariffs on non-cocoa exports were so low as to be negligible (low single
digits). While the tariffs on cocoa are not exactly low, their importance among
overall exports is decreasing as the revenue from cocoa exports has been overtaken
by both gold and non-traditional exports over the course of the 1990s. What Figure
3.9 and Table 3.1 tell us is that as opposed to tight money and austere fiscal policy
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Figure 3.10: GDP, imports, and exports in real terms (author’s estimates, Chap-
ter 7)
Import tariffs went down and stayed that way, minor fluctuations notwithstanding;
exchange rate overvaluation was eradicated by the beginning of the 1990s; and as
can be seen in Figure 3.10, both imports and exports were growing as shares of
GDP.
Thus, the goals of trade liberalization have been mostly achieved, with the
exception of a viable balance of payments position. Looking at the data, we see
a continuous nominal depreciation of the exchange rate, approximately (but not
exactly) keeping pace with inflation, and a steady increase in volumes of exports
and imports, in absolute terms as well as as a share of GDP (Figure 3.10). Although
imports and exports grew at about the same rate, the trade balance was always in
deficit as the total volume of imports exceeded that of exports by a large margin.
In the early ERP, the overriding objective of trade policy was stimulation
of exports. Since 1990s, competing policy objectives have emerged: “Expansionary
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fiscal and monetary policies have placed pressure on the balance of payments making
import liberalization balance of payments incompatible as well as placing pressure on
the government budget making import liberalization through reduced tariffs fiscally
incompatible” [Oduro 2000].
As a result of the investment surge in mining, gold exports are now ahead of
cocoa, but since the former are dominated by transnational firms, the net foreign
exchange inflows they generate are comparatively small because of profit repatriation
and salaries of expatriate staff [Oduro 2000].
The export-led growth dominated by few primary commodities (cocoa, gold
and timber) also made Ghana increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in international
commodity prices. Ghana experienced a double terms of trade shock starting 1999



























Figure 3.11: Some Price Indices (IMF Ghana Desk Country Reports and author’s
estimates)
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increase in external debt and inflation, as well as a substantial devaluation.
The continuing current account deficits were financed by capital inflows, es-
pecially official transfers - leading to a steady increase in external debt from 36.6%
of GNP (1982) to 128.3% (2000) (Figure 3.4). While donor assistance was plentiful
in the 1980s, the macroeconomic instability in the 1990s (exchange rate instability,
rapid money supply growth, inflation, and high government budget deficits) had a
negative effect on aid flows [Harrigan and Younger 2000], as a glance on Figure 3.5
will confirm.
Based on this discussion, we would like to ask the following questions: firstly,
what are the main drivers of import demand? To be precise, how responsive is
import demand to the relative price of imports vs. domestically produced goods, and
is there an additional increasing time trend in import demand due to the structural
opening up of the economy? (The corresponding question with regard to export
supply has already been posed in the previous section). Secondly, it would be very
interesting to understand the behavior of the exchange rate and the degree to which
it interacts with the domestic price level. As Figure 3.11 shows, the exchange rate’s
behavior was quite volatile, so that prices of imports relative to nontraded goods
varied over as much as a factor of two; thus the role of floating exchange rate as the
stabilizer for the real exchange rate deserves to be questioned.
3.3 Summary
Ghana is representative of small, open, poor primary commodity producers. In the
1980s, Ghana undertook a radical reform program that largely followed the stan-
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dard Structural Adjustment blueprint, including elimination of subsidies, opening
to trade and capital flows, floating the exchange rate, and combating inflation with
high interest rates. In the 1980s, this was accompanied by high foreign exchange in-
flows, both grants and loans, and the combination resulted in high GDP growth, in
particular in the import sector, as well as an accumulation of a large external debt.
In the 1990s, the growth rate of the economy diminished, capital formation remained
low, current account deficits persisted, and a high inflation rate was combined with
periods of “freely falling” exchange rates.
Most structural reforms were concluded by 1991, so that the structure of the
economy was comparatively stable during the 1990s. The question of whether the
stagnating state of the economy happened because of particular features of the
structural adjustment program (such as excess fiscal austerity and high interest
rates), or because the latter was not followed consistently enough (meaning mainly
too high government deficits), or for other reasons altogether, is far from being
settled. Based on the discussion of the literature, we have formulated a number of
specific policy-relevant questions and hypotheses that we will attempt to answer in




This section reviews the strengths, weaknesses, and common assumptions of the
different model types used to assess impacts of structural adjustment programs.
Developing country economies have a number of distinctive features that influ-
ence the nature of models that are built to understand their behavior. One of these is
a much greater magnitude of shocks (externally or internally caused, such as volatil-
ity of export prices or money printing binges by the government) compared to the
developed countries - thus, double-digit inflation or depreciation rates are common-
place and triple digits are not unheard of, especially in the context of an adjustment
program. Another such feature is relatively simple financial systems (though less so
with every passing year). Another is a great variety of economic structures among
different countries: for example, it makes a lot of difference whether the main export
of the country is largely produced by small farmers, a handful of rich landowners, or
largely foreign-owned firms doing resource extraction. Yet another is data paucity -
while much data exists, it is often scattered among agencies, its coverage can vary
greatly and merely putting enough data for a model together can be a major effort.
The large shocks together with poor data have important implications for
modeling. Firstly, linear models are not plausible in view of the large impacts, and
lack of data means that the shape of nonlinearities must often be derived from para-
bles and stylized facts. It is thus perhaps not surprising that there is no agreement
among different modelers regarding even the direction of certain impacts and causal
connections, as we will see in this chapter.
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Secondly, much as in quantum mechanics, high cost of getting data means
that conservation laws, whenever they can be found, have to be milked for all they
can yield. In quantum mechanics the conservation laws are called symmetries, in
economics, accounting identities. Thus accounting and precise definitions of equi-
libria have a much larger importance in models of developing countries, both for
cross-checking the data one has and for inferring data one does not have.
Four model types are commonly used to assess impacts of structural adjust-
ment programs. First of all, there are the fixed ratio models RMSM-X and the
Financial Programming Framework that are used by most World Bank and IMF
country desk practitioners. These are very crude models and the validity of their
equations has been empirically tested and shown to be very poor. They are not
at present to the author’s knowledge taken seriously by any research economist;
however, their implicit assumptions still shape much of the debate around struc-
tural adjustment, in addition to guiding the back-of-the-envelope estimates that
IMF country economists use as a starting point for negotiating new structural ad-
justment programs.
The two model types most popular for applied analysis of structural adjust-
ment programs are econometric models and and CGE models. These are in a sense
opposites: econometric models allow for rigorous significance testing but their the-
oretical limitations restrict them to comparatively few variables and simple, mostly
linear equations. On the other hand, CGE models are constructed around a refined
accounting framework and set virtually no limit to the amount and type of variables
and functional relationships used. However, they are completely incapable of empir-
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ical verification, and a CGE model with virtually any behavior can be calibrated to
any economy, with no way to distinguish between different causal stories1. Within
CGE models, there are two major schools of thought, neoclassical and structuralist,
distinguished by certain characteristic assumptions. The main assumption on which
they differ is whether productive capacity is fully employed at all times, with all mar-
kets clearing through price adjustments (neoclassical) or whether market clearing
through quantity adjustment has an important role to play as well (structuralist).
We will discuss further differences between the two views in the body of this chapter.
Finally, microsimulation models are a recently fashionable methodology to
assess finer-grained distributional impacts of changes in macro and sectoral variables.
They work by specifying simple household behavior functions in response to these
variables, and then estimate these functions for each of the households in a household
survey. This is then used to represent impacts of macro variables on each of the
households modeled. While the results are clearly not reliable on the individual
household level, the households can then be grouped in various ways, and the group
averages and intra-group distributions can be more robust. While microsimulation
is a promising technique, such a model still needs a separate macro model to drive
it, and will inherit the latter’s weaknesses.
In the following, we discuss the strengths, weaknesses, and common assump-
tions of these models in more detail.
1While it is possible to build models that to a large extent incorporate the virtues of both types
without the drawbacks, as demonstrated e.g. by the Inforum models Meade [2002], these have to
the author’s knowledge never yet been used in the context of structural adjustment policies.
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4.1 Fixed Ratio Models
Interestingly, although most World Bank and IMF rhetoric is based on the neoclassi-
cal tradition, the models the country desk practitioners still use in both institutions
rely not on diminishing returns and flexible ratios (such as output per worker or
output per unit of capital) of the neoclassical school, but on fixed ratios combined
with accounting identities.
4.1.1 Key assumptions
The two most important fixed ratios are the capital to actual output ratio (known
as the Incremental Capital Output Ratio, or ICOR) and the nominal output to
money supply ratio (constant velocity of money). RMSM-X (Revised Minimum
Standard Model - eXtended), the World Bank staple model, uses both; the IMF
financial programming framework uses the constant velocity of money assumption
and assumes that output is unaffected by the program.
4.1.2 Strengths
The main strength of these models is their simplicity, and the ability to fit together
the key macro variables, namely national accounts, the balance of payments, and
the government deficit.
The models also provide simple, intuitive connections between three key policy
variables, namely government deficit, total investment, and the exchange rate , and




The main weakness of these models is that the simple, intuitive behavioral equations
that are implied by the fixed ratios are not supported by the data.
The constancy of the capital/output ratio has been tested by Easterly [1997],
who in a wide range of statistical tests found no evidence for constancy of the capital-
output ratio. For instance, regressing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth on
Gross Domestic Investment over GDP country-by-country (which should yield the
ICOR by country), he found a positive and significant relationship in only 11 out
of 138 countries tested. Other regressions were similarly disappointing. Similarly,
Reinhart [1991] tested the assumptions of the RMSM-X model and found no support
for the constancy of ICOR; the constant velocity of money hypothesis was rejected
in about half of the countries in the sample, including Ghana.
Given the shaky theoretical foundations of the two models, it is not surprising
that they are not taken too seriously even by the people using them. Thus, Mussa
and Savastano [1999] in their discussion of how IMF conditionalities are formed ad-
mit that “[The] educated guess embodied in the performance criteria is typically an
outcome of the negotiation with the authorities, not the result of rigorous statistical
estimation”. However, when no explicit model is used one has to resort to a mental
model, and the discussion on p.33 of Mussa and Savastano suggests that no influence
of monetary and fiscal policy on output growth is still an implicit assumption, so
that monetary and fiscal tightening are expected to reduce inflation while having
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no recessionary effects on output.
4.2 Statistical Macro Models
Much of the theoretical work done on the effects of adjustment policies takes the
form of econometric models that rely on time series regression (country-specific or
cross-country) to find behavioral coefficients. The most prominent of these is the
model by Khan and Knight [1981, 1985] who estimated a small dynamic econometric
model, estimated its parameters on a pooled cross-section time-series sample of 29
countries, and used the estimated model to conduct hypothetical policy experiments.
The simulation of a typical IMF program produced a sharp price deflation in the first
year, followed by a temporary burst of inflation; output contracted sharply in the
first year, then rose above its full-employment level, and then gradually approached
equilibrium.
4.2.1 Main assumptions
The main assumption of most econometric models it that the dependent variables are
linear functions of the independent variables (possibly after appropriate transforms
such as taking a logarithm) plus random noise. There is a variety of additional
assumptions on the fine structure of the noise, used to draw conclusions from the
errors in a given regression to statistical significance of its coefficients.
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4.2.2 Strength
The main strength of econometric models is the ability to rigorously specify measures
of confidence and significance of model results.
4.2.3 Weaknesses
Macro-econometric models have two major weaknesses. Firstly, they are compara-
tively data-hungry, in that they need many data points to come up with statistically
significant estimates. Unfortunately, time series for individual developing countries
are often too few and too short. On the other hand, cross-country regressions usually
come up with non-significant coefficients due to large variations between countries.
Secondly, due to theoretical limitations most econometric models have few
variables and few equations, most of them linear. Macro-econometric models have
recently been used to “inspire” Computable General Equilibrium models [Ferreira
et al. 2003], but to the author’s knowledge they have never been integrated into a
comprehensive accounting framework in the context of developing economies (the
work of Inforum on industrialized countries shows that this is possible, but quite
labor-intensive).
Thus, Haque and Khan [1998] conclude that the existing econometric models
“don’t capture the complex ways in which policy variables are related to the ultimate
objectives of programs.”
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4.3 Computable General Equilibrium Models
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are currently the dominant method-
ology for assessing distributional impacts of macro policies. The CGE model litera-
ture is rich in alternative formulations, somewhat fragmented, and full of sometimes
quite subtle detail. Thus here we briefly touch upon the points that appear perti-
nent, without a claim for exhaustiveness.
The main organizing principle of CGE models is comprehensive tracing of
nominal money flows through the economy, and determination of a set of prices and
sectoral output levels that allow all markets to clear. During the past fifteen years
or so, this focus on flows has been augmented by representation of asset stocks and
financial markets.
4.3.1 Key assumptions
The defining assumption of CGE models is that of flow equilibrium in all markets,
both in nominal and in real terms. This is expressed by calibrating each model to a
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) that is a complete description of nominal money
flows inside the country and has to fulfill a balancing requirement. This balancing
requirement is equivalent to a conservation law for money, that is, to the statement
that money can be created or destroyed only in the financial sector or outside of the
country.
As we will see below, CGE models allow to calibrate any causal story to any
country’s data. Thus, there are two distinct schools of CGE modeling, neoclassical
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and structuralist, each with its favorite set of key assumptions and causal stories.
We discuss these in Section 4.4.
4.3.2 Strengths
The CGE technique has two main strengths. Firstly, the SAM structure is a mature
accounting framework for integrating the various types of data and for tracing of
economy-wide effects of policies.
Secondly, within that framework there is still a large scope for storytelling
about specific parts of the economy and alternative causal mechanisms. The CGE
literature of the past two decades is rich in alternative stories of how, for example,
credit can impact real output. The variety of model formulations is large enough
that we cannot cover it here, and have to refer the interested reader to Kraev [2003].
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) methodology has over the past three
decades developed quite a powerful toolkit for assessing distributional impacts of cer-
tain kinds of policies, in particular those working through relative prices. Combining
CGE models with microsimulation techniques (covered below) allows to further ex-
tend the analysis from sectoral aggregates and representative household groups to
cover substantially more detailed distributional impacts.
4.3.3 Weaknesses
The main weakness of CGE models is that they are fundamentally non-testable.
The way a CGE is built is first to specify an a priori causal structure (“story”) and
then calibrate it to a Social Accounting Matrix of a given country. The behavioral
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parameters are hereby specified in a largely ad hoc manner. Thus any story can be
calibrated to any country.
The traditional CGE models use a base year SAM to calibrate the share pa-
rameters of the model, and mostly use unrelated studies or guesstimates for the
remaining behavioral parameters; in the best case (e.g. Demery and Demery 1991),
some parameters are estimated from single-equation regressions. As CGE models
also aim to represent medium-term equilibria, the time series they produce (if any)
are typically only interpreted in qualitative terms.
There are two unfortunate results of this practice: firstly, models with very
different behavior can be calibrated to the same data, with no ready measure of
which formulation best describes a given country (see e.g. the controversy in Sahn
et al. 1996, de Maio et al. 1999, Sahn et al. 1999). Second, even if one has settled on
a given causal structure, the behavioral parameters cannot be directly calibrated to
data. The usual solution are borrowing parameter estimates from unrelated studies,
ad hoc sensitivity tests and “reasonable range” guesstimates, none of which seem
very satisfactory.
A different way of addressing the uncertainty in free parameters is discussed
by Harrison et al. [1993], who assume a priori probability distributions for all free
parameters and proceed to do simultaneous sensitivity analysis on all of them, gen-
erating probability distributions for output variables. However, this approach seems
to have two flaws that limit its use in applied models: firstly, the a priori probability
distributions still have to be guesstimated, and secondly, doing a full unconstrained
sensitivity analysis on all free parameters simultaneously is likely to produce a spread
64
of end results so large as to be of no practical use.
Thus, until the CGE methodology is modified to allow for significance and
quality-of-fit measures akin to those of econometrics, CGEs will remain little more
than elaborate a priori stories, a medium for narrating the modeler’s favorite theories
in a consistent framework, but with little rational reason to prefer one such story to
another.
The second major weakness of the CGE methodology is that due to its flow
equilibrium core, it is not really comfortable with integrating stocks and stock-
flow relationships. As stocks such as the money supply or the foreign currency
reserves are clearly important in practice, most applied CGE models since 1990
have attempted to integrate them. However, all such attempts were largely ad hoc,
compared to the standardized SAM framework for describing flows. Thus, there is
a need for a formalism to represent financial stocks that is as clean as the SAM
formalism, and integrates cleanly with the SAM to satisfy stock-flow relationships.
In this thesis, we will introduce such a formalism.
4.4 The Major Theoretical Differences between Neoclassical and Structuralist CGE
Models
There are at present two major traditions in CGE modeling. The neoclassical tra-
dition tends to assume full employment of labor and capital, sectoral adjustments
driven by relative prices, and aggregate price level driven by money supply. Struc-
turalist tradition tends to assume quantity adjustments of output and cost-driven
prices. Here we present the two traditions in more detail.
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4.4.1 Neoclassical CGE Models
Neoclassical CGEs have their intellectual roots in Walras’ model of the competi-
tive economy [Walras 1984] and Solow’s model of economic growth [Solow 1956].
Their motto is “sound theoretical foundations”, mainly used to mean close adher-
ence to Walras’ model. Decaluwé and Martens [1988] summarize the structure of
neoclassical CGEs as follows:
Only relative prices matter, producers are profit maximizers facing
non-increasing returns to scale, consumers are insatiable utility maximiz-
ers, and production factors are paid according to their marginal revenue
productivity. The model’s solution provides a set of prices, which, by
making all these individual optimizations feasible and mutually consis-
tent, clears all markets simultaneously.
Robinson [1989] gives a lucid and detailed description of “the” neoclassical model
of an open economy.
In practice, the distinguishing assumptions of the neoclassical models are full
capacity utilization, full employment2 and prices determined by marginal productiv-
ity rules. Because of the full employment assumption, adjustment to a disturbance
such as an export price shock takes place through reallocation of labor between pro-
ductive sectors (driven by relative prices) without substantial changes in overall real
2In view of the neoclassical school’s emphasis on sound theoretical foundations, it is rather
amusing that one of their main distinguishing assumptions, namely full employment, has no basis
either in data or in general equilibrium theory. We will return to that point in Section 4.4.3.
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output. Labor reallocation (and possibly new investment patterns over the longer
term) change labor intensities and therefore labor productivity and thus wages in
different sectors to match the new set of relative prices.
As the neoclassical economy always operates at capacity, the typical way to
determine the level of investment (going back to Solow [1956]) is to set it equal to the
level of savings (in real terms), known as the neoclassical closure. However, models
in the neoclassical tradition also use other closures (for example an endogenous
savings ratio that passively accommodates investment demand) though virtually
always those with full employment.
The Walrasian framework also naturally dictates the mechanism determining
the aggregate price level. Because of Walras’ law (if all markets but one clear, so
does the last one) one only needs n − 1 prices to clear all n markets in the model.
“However, the behavioral assumptions are such that typically all the supply and
demand functions are homogenous of degree zero in all prices. Thus, one is free to
add an additional equation defining a numeraire price index, which defines a unit of
account and has no effect on the equilibrium value of any real variable” [Robinson
1989]. This is typically (e.g. Agénor et al. [2000]) augmented with a simple macro
model that gives a definition of money supply (e.g. as sum of domestic government
liabilities, implicitly assumed to be all monetized, and foreign exchange reserves).
One proceeds to define money demand as a multiple of the numeraire price level
(calling the inverse of the proportionality constant the velocity of money), and sets
money demand equal to money supply. Then government deficit and the balance
of payments developments together determine the money supply, which in turn
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determines the aggregate price level. One way to look at this mechanism is to say
that supply is given from the real side, and nominal aggregate demand determines
the price level. Thus we have here a pure demand-pull model of price determination.
The interesting property of that whole mechanism is that neither government
deficit, nor the money supply, nor the aggregate price level, have any impact on the
full employment state of the economy. Neither are relative prices affected, unless the
government uses the deficit spending to change the composition of demand. Thus in
a Walrasian world, fiscal austerity reduces prices without incurring any recessionary
impacts whatsoever.
The picture is somewhat complicated by introducing foreign trade, because
once the domestic nontraded good aggregate price level is fixed with the above
mechanism, the nominal exchange rate determines the relative price of exports and
imports compared to nontraded goods (“the real exchange rate”) which has real
effects. Through this channel, movements in the domestic aggregate price level
can influence the balance of payments and the composition of domestic output.
However, this complication can be (and often is, e.g. in Devarajan et al. [1990])
easily circumvented by postulating a fixed balance of payments in foreign currency
terms and letting the nominal exchange rate adjust to achieve that. The result is
that the nominal exchange rate scales proportionally to the domestic aggregate price
index, so that the real exchange rate remains unchanged.
The first neoclassical CGE was a model of Korea by Adelman and Robinson
[1978]. Since then, there have been countless implementations of the basic framework
for different countries, with essentially identical structure (Decaluwé and Martens
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[1988] provide an extensive review) . Worthy of note is the “123” model [Devarajan
et al. 1990, 1993, Devarajan and Go 1998, Agénor et al. 2000] which reduces the
framework to the bare essentials of the structure.
An early attempt to integrate financial markets into the neoclassical CGE
model was made in a model of Turkey [Lewis 1985, 1992, 1994]. A substantially
more advanced and influential model that incorporates many structuralist features
is the maquette [Bourguignon et al. 1991, 1992]. The maquette is really a model
template, that allows for variable employment for some sectors/labor types, and for
markup pricing in some sectors; however, its treatment of the aggregate price level
is strictly monetarist. The basic structure of the maquette has since been used in
many applied models (see e.g. the whole issue containing Bourguignon et al. [1991]),
so that at present the maquette is the most widely used framework to incorporate
financial effects in a model with sectoral structure.
Almost all CGE models of industrialized countries are neoclassical (see e.g. the
review of the models of NAFTA in Stanford [1992]). The structuralist CGE tradition
has to date focused on developing countries, and its techniques are described below.
4.4.2 Structuralist CGE Models
The other branch of CGE models for developing countries is the structuralist school.
While the “patron saint” of neoclassical CGE’s is Walras, those of the structuralist
school are Kalecki, Kaldor and Keynes [Kalecki 1971, Kaldor 1957, Keynes 1936].
The structuralist motto is “capturing the institutional specifics of the economy at
hand”. The leading figure of this tradition is Lance Taylor, who describes the
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structuralist techniques in Taylor [1991] and Taylor [2004]. True to their motto,
the structure of individual structuralist models varies much more than that of their
neoclassical counterparts, thus the description below refers to typical and frequent
features, rather than to a uniform “structuralist model”.
In contrast to the neoclassical models (that hinge on full capacity utilization
and relative price-driven shifts in composition of output) structuralist models work
mainly through quantity adjustment, often resorting to fixed ratios where a neoclas-
sical model would have relative price dependence. The structuralist prototype is the
model of Kalecki [1971], with employment and output freely adjusting to demand
up to the maximum productive capacity of the economy (as would follow from per-
fect complementarity of labor and capital). As in this setup the marginal product
of at least one of the factors of production is zero, marginal productivity pricing is
abandoned in favor of markup pricing (price being equal to a markup over variable
costs of production). The markup is usually constant when the economy operates
below capacity, and is the adjusting variable once capacity is reached. In practice,
many models such as Rosensweig and Taylor [1990] or Easterly [1990] effectively
assume the maximum capacity to be infinite, focusing on short-term adjustments in
output (often of recessionary nature).
Since in this model in an economy operating below maximum capacity the
output adjusts freely to demand, there is really no place for demand-pull inflation,
and money supply, while well-defined, has no particular role to play. To explain
the occurrence of persistent inflation in most developing countries one then has to
resort to some kind of cost-push formulation. The structuralist favorite is competing
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claims, for instance simultaneous indexation of wages and price determination as a
fixed markup on wage costs, leading to a steady inflation spiral.
While early structuralist models had many attractive features representative of
the developing country reality, such as variable capacity utilization and bottom-up
price determination, they also made many stylized assumptions that were in their
way no less restrictive than their neoclassical counterparts, such as constant wages
and constant aggregate real investment. Even in relatively refined models such as
Rosensweig and Taylor [1990] or Easterly [1990] the prices are still determined purely
from the side of costs. However, structuralist models built since the late nineties
such as Vos [1998] rely on a sector-dependent combination of price and quantity
adjustments, meeting many of the criticisms of the early models.
4.4.3 Whose assumptions are better?
Given two schools with such different assumptions, it is natural to ask which of
these assumptions, if any, are to be preferred. Note that neither school’s position
is logically indivisible - it is quite possible, and in fact quite useful, to mix and
match assumptions from both schools. While, as we discussed before, the CGE
methodology does not allow to empirically verify the assumptions of a model, still
we can attempt to draw some preliminary comparisons here, with a view towards
more empirical verification later in the thesis.
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Full Employment vs. Output Adjustment
A frequent neoclassical claim is that quantity adjustment in the product markets
only happens in the short term, while in the longer term price adjustment coupled
with full employment can be expected to prevail [Robinson 1989, p.928]. The source
for that is often claimed to be found in general equilibrium theory.
Unfortunately, reading up on the theory (Arrow [1974] and Tobin [1982]),
shows that there is no reason to expect full employment to obtain even in the
long run unless there are future and contingent markets for all commodities, a
requirement presently (and in the foreseeable future) not technically possible in
any economy, let alone those of developing countries. Thus the frequently heard
neoclassical contention that full employment will automatically occur if markets are
allowed to operate freely has no basis whatsoever even in general equilibrium theory,
let alone in practice3.
Thus variable and demand-driven output (with diminishing or constant returns
to labor) is symptomatic not of the “short term” or “excess capacity”, but rather of
the behavior of particular sectors. A frequent heuristic associates variable output
with “modern sector” and fixed (in the short term) output with “agriculture”. That
view is supported by the excellent data fit of demand-driven models of developed
countries such as LIFT [Meade 2002] and also recognized in recent models of the
neoclassical school such as the maquette [Bourguignon et al. 1991, 1992]. Models
3In a sense, this can be regarded as a case of missing markets, but this insight is not much
help in practice as the necessary markets would involve futures in every conceivable commodity
conditional on every possible future state of the world.
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combining fixed-output (price-clearing) and flexible-output sectors are known as
fix-flex models.
Nominal Price Determination
The neoclassical and structuralist views on the role of credit and money supply lead
one to expect radically different responses to the same policy packages. Which one
should we believe? The answer might lie in the classic quote from Keynes [Keynes
1925] that compares monetary policy to a string attached to the real economy: “you
can pull on a string but you can’t push on a string”. The structuralist vision would
then correspond to a string stretched taut, with credit supply being a limiting factor
of production; and the monetarist view would be that of a limp string that can be
pulled quite a way before much real impacts materialize.
If one puts the question that way, it would seem that the issue cannot be
decided a priori: a given economy might better fit one of the two descriptions, and
indeed switch between modes as a result of policy packages (for example, a harsh
restriction of credit could conceivably push an economy from a capacity constrained
excess-demand mode into a credit-constrained mode). Thus it would seem that to
adequately address the relationship between credit and the real economy, a financial
CGE model must also be capable of such an endogenous switch. Once a model is
capable of different modes, one could compare the behavior of the model to the
behavior of the actual economy and determine which of the mechanisms turns out
to dominate, and thus turn a theoretical debate into an empirical one.
A recent example of such a model is a model of the impacts of fiscal deficit
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reduction in India Naastepad [2001, 2002b,a], capable of different “modes” and
of endogenous mode-switching. In this model, depending on the policies applied
and on the evolution of the economy, one particular constraint (demand, supply, or
credit) may prove to be binding, and correspondingly price behavior will correspond
to either the structuralist or the monetarist model of the role of credit and price
formation.
Summing up, one can expect different sectors within the same country to be
either supply-constrained at full employment of productive capacity, or to work
below maximum capacity with output driven by demand. Likewise, the relative
strength of demand-pull and cost-push factors in price formation is an empirical
question. The two model traditions provide us with a valuable vocabulary of possible
model formulations, but we will have to go beyond the CGE methodology to decide
which of these are actually applicable to Ghana during the period we are interested
in.
The following section provides an overview of an extension to macro/sectoral
models that promises a greater insight into distributional impacts of a given change
in macro behavior.
4.5 Microsimulation Models
”Microsimulation” refers to modeling of income and consumption of distinct individ-
uals or households, instead of resorting to representative household groups (RHGs)
as the traditional CGE models do. The idea goes back to Orcutt [1957], but was
not used for analysis of macro-poverty links until the late nineties. Davies [2003]
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provides a review of microsimulation in other contexts.
Starting with Cogneau [1999], a number of models attempted to use microsim-
ulation for analysis of macro-poverty links by combining the well-tested CGE appa-
ratus with the micro data provided by one or several household surveys. This was
approached in two different ways, top-down and integration.
The top-down approach solves a traditional CGE with a limited number of
household groups, and then uses a microsimulation model to generate household
behavior that reproduces the output of the CGE model. The specification of the
microsimulation model can range from simple pro-rating as in Bussolo and Round
[2003] to models econometrically estimated from a household survey that endogenize
the labor supply choices of each household, such as Bourguignon et al. [2003] and
Ferreira et al. [2003].
The integration approach, represented by Cogneau and Robilliard [2000] and
Cockburn [2002], uses the individual households directly in the CGE instead of
representative households. This approach appears more promising than top-down
for several reasons: it comes closer to the vision of general equilibrium in Arrow
[1974]; it has the potential for household heterogeneity to have impacts on sectoral
and macro aggregates; and, according to Cockburn [2002], it presents “very little
technical difficulty”.
While CGE/microsimulation models appear to be a promising methodology
for assessing fine-grained distributional impacts of macro policies, one should not
forget that a CGE/micro model, be it top-down or integrated, is subject to the same
choices and weaknesses as other CGE models, especially as regards choice of closure
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and validation.
If the closure of a CGE/micro model is not a good description of the country
in question, the model is in danger of giving finely disaggregated, false results (of the
models mentioned here, only Bussolo and Round [2003] conduct systematic closure
exploration, and of the rest, only the model of Ferreira et al. [2003] has a modular
structure that would easily permit such exploration.)
Validation is another chronic problem of CGE models that is inherited by
CGE/micro models. Of all the models discussed, only Ferreira et al. [2003] compare
the model predictions to a later household survey, concluding “we cannot claim that
this approach [can] predict the distributional outcomes of [...] policy packages with
any accuracy”.
An interesting potential of CGE/micro models would be in addressing gender-
related distributional issues; however, to the author’s knowledge, that has not yet
been attempted, possibly in part because most survey data is still household-level,
not individual-level.
Summing up, microsimulation is a promising extension of the CGE technique
for assessing fine-grained distributional impacts, but we should not expect it to
address any of the other weaknesses of CGE models that we have discussed.
4.6 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the major types of models used to evaluate macro and
distributional impacts of structural adjustment programs. Briefly, the fixed-ratio
models are not useful at all because of their reliance on assumptions not supported
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by the data. Econometric models can provide measures of confidence for their output
but are not by themselves well equipped to handle the large amount of variables
and the nonlinear relationships needed to understand distributional impacts. CGE
models use a well-developed Social Accounting Matrix formalism that allows them
to cleanly handle large amount of flow variables and nonlinear relationships, but
lack an equally clean formalism for describing stocks and stock-flow relationships.
Furthermore, the practice of calibrating the CGE models to data for one year and
guesstimating the remaining parameters allows any CGE model to be calibrated
to any country, making empirical comparison of the quality of fit of different CGE
models impossible.
From this list of strengths and weaknesses we can see some properties of an
adequate methodology: to allow validation of behavioral relationships (measures
of significance etc.), it should use data time series rather than just data for an
individual year; to allow representation of macro as well as sectoral effects, it should
be based on a comprehensive accounting framework; this accounting framework
should combine the well-tested SAM technique for tracing flows with an equally
clean formalism for describing financial stocks and stock-flow relationships (flow-of-
funds).
In Chapter 6 we describe how our approach addresses these requirements; first,
however, Chapter 5 introduces some accounting concepts useful for that discussion.
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Chapter 5
An Introduction to Useful Accounting Concepts
This chapter provides an introduction to some accounting formalisms that we will
use and refine in the subsequent chapters. The two major formalisms discussed here
are firstly, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) that is commonly used to represent
nominal currency flows inside an economy under the assumption of flow equilibrium,
together with the corresponding accounting for real product flows; and secondly, the
Financial Accounting Matrix (FAM) that contains the stocks of financial assets. The
FAM is less common in applied models, and one of the innovations of this thesis will
be to integrate it with the SAM to represent nominal flow disequilibria and their
impacts on financial stocks over time. This chapter introduces and discusses the
FAM concept, leaving the details of how we make use of it to later chapters.
5.1 Social Accounting Matrix
A Social Accounting Matrix is simply an ordered listing of all money flows between
different parts of an economy at a specific level of disaggregation. To illustrate the
concept, let us start from a simple money flow chart and see how it is represented
in SAM form.
Figure 5.1 is a simple representation of money flows in an economy. Blocks de-
note different accounts, arrows represent money flows between them (all money flows
are converted to domestic currency). The value added generated in the Production
block is distributed between firms, households, and government in the Income Dis-
tribution block. The resulting disposable incomes flow, according to the demand
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Figure 5.1: A simple money flow diagram
patterns, partly into the Production block (as final consumption and investment ex-
penditures) and partly into the Financial Sector block as savings. From the financial
sector, money is injected back into use of income accounts through loans. Foreign
trade is by SAM convention also routed through the Product Markets account: total
demand from final domestic consumption demand, investment demand, and export
demand, is matched to GDP (value added) plus imports.
Let us now see how such a flow chart would be represented as a SAM. Each
of the blocks becomes an account of the SAM, listed in exactly one row and exactly
one column. The content of the cell belonging to column A and row B then denotes
the money flow from A to B. In our example, the SAM corresponding to Figure 5.1
is depicted in Table 5.1. We see that all money inflows into the product markets,
for instance, are contained in the first row, and all money outflows from the product
markets in the first column of the matrix.






























Table 5.1: A Simple Social Accounting Matrix
flow equilibria. A Social Accounting Matrix must be balanced, that is, the sum of
each row must equal to the sum of the corresponding column, meaning that inflows
into each account must equal the outflows (definition of a flow equilibrium). We will
revisit this assumption in Section 5.3, but first let us discuss the SAM structure in
some more detail.
The tiny SAM of Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 is useful as a first introduction to
the concept, but too simplified to be of much use in practice. For example, the
treatment of intermediate inputs in it is entirely absent. Let us now consider a more
realistic SAM structure that closely corresponds to the one that we will be using
in this thesis. Since the transition between flow chart format and table format is
straightforward, we only reproduce it as a flow chart, this being in our opinion the
more intuitive format.
The flow diagram of the more detailed SAM is pictured in Figure 5.2. Here,
each arrow represents an array (a bundle) of time-dependent flows, and each rect-
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angle represents a group of accounts in the SAM. As the traditional SAM is a
flow-equilibrium system, total inflows into each account must equal total outflows,
thus nothing accumulates in any of the rectangles. Let us walk through the SAM





















































Figure 5.2: A more realistic SAM
accounts. It has a sub-account for each of the “institutions” in the model. The dis-
tinct institutions we consider here are the private sector, the commercial banks, the
central bank, the government, and the rest of the world (foreigners). Each of these
has a disposable income inflow and an outflow of nominal purchases (the latter being
zero for both banks). If the purchases of an institution do not equal its disposable
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income, the difference must be made up by net lending. Flow equilibrium requires
that the sum of all institutions’ net lending flows must equal zero.
Next in the loop, the “Nominal Purchases” group of flows represents the prod-
uct demand of each of the institutions for products of each of the six product types
distinguished in the model1. All inflows of money into the product markets have
their place here. For example, the product demand of the “Rest of the World” in-
stitution for the different products describes exports, and the demand of the private
sector is equal to consumption plus investment demand. Finally, the demand ema-
nating from the government use of income account is just that, government demand;
and the commercial banks and the central bank do not purchase any products (a
stylization common in models).
All the money entering each of the six product accounts is split between taxes
and producer revenues. The latter are divided between imports and revenues of do-
mestic firms. The taxes and import revenues go to the “Income Distribution” group
of accounts (to the sub-accounts of government and of the Rest of the World, respec-
tively), while the revenues of domestic firms (comprising both domestic and export
sales) go to the “Activities” group of accounts. From these revenues, intermediate
input costs are subtracted (and go back into the product markets), while the rest of
the money, that is the value added by each sector, goes to the “Income Generation”
group of accounts. The “Income generation” group of accounts converts the value
added by sectors into value added that accrues to different factors of production,
1Food crops, cocoa, mining, manufacturing, government services and other services. This par-
ticular choice of products and corresponding productive sectors is justified in Chapter 7.
82
that is, different labor types (male/female, formal/informal, and urban/rural) and
firm profits. The “Primary Private Incomes” group of flows converts income by
labor type into income by institution, giving all labor income to households and all
profit income to firms.
We thus come to the “Income Distribution” group of accounts, with a sub-
account for each institution (this time splitting the private sector into firms and
households). As we described above, its two inflow groups are “Primary Private
Incomes” giving the incomes of firms and households, and “Imports and Taxes” giv-
ing the incomes of government and of foreigners. These incomes are redistributed
between the sub-accounts of the different institution with the “Income distribution”
group of flows. This group of flows describes property incomes (such as interest
payments) and transfer payments (such as aid grants to the government from the
rest of the world, transfers from the government to households, and private transfers
from abroad). The resulting total incomes are the disposable incomes of each insti-
tution, going from their “Income Distribution” accounts into their “Use of Income”
accounts.
We have now completed the circulation of money loop that corresponds to
Figure 5.1. The two major changes from Figure 5.1, apart from increased detail, are
demand for intermediate inputs and the disappearance of the side loop of Figure
5.1 that went to the Rest of the World. The reason for this is as follows: The
intermediate input demand has been omitted from our first discussion of the SAM
concept only to simplify presentation; and the Exports/Imports side loop has now
been integrated into the main circular flow, merely a change of notation.
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5.2 Real Product Flows
Our discussion of the circular flow of money in the previous section must have left the
reader (especially one with any exposure to Ecological Economics ideas) wondering:
“But what about the real product flows that are the basis for much of the nominal
flows you discuss”. Our answer is that an accounting system for real flows naturally








Figure 5.3: Real Product Flows
Figure 5.3 shows the flow chart of that accounting system. Note that this
flow chart is essentially identical to a part of Figure 5.2 involving the Product and
Activities account groups, except that the arrows point the other way because goods
flow in the opposite direction to money being paid for them. The real and nominal
product flows can be converted one into another by means of the appropriate price
indices.
The next thing that an ecological economist could object to here is that the
product flows appear to go from a void and end in another void, contrary to con-
servation of matter. Our response to that is that “real product flows” still refer to
the value of the products (measured in constant, that is, inflation-adjusted, prices)
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rather than to the material content thereof, and value does indeed continually get
created in the process of production and destroyed in the process of consumption
(unlike money, that tends to circulate in closed loops).
As Daly Daly [1996a, p.28] remarks, there is probably a fairly close connec-
tion between the flow of value in real terms and the corresponding material flows
(especially in an economy that is as close to subsistence level as Ghana); thus the
real product flows could be used to estimate material throughput. However, we
do not do this here as it would take us beyond the scope of an already ambitious
program. This is not meant to imply that material throughtput is irrelevant to eco-
nomic analysis; but in our case, just compiling and analyzing data on money flows
and corresponding product flows is enough of a challenge in itself.
We do use the real material flows accounting to compute intermediate input
requirements, using the Leontief approach (Chapter 7).
This almost completes our introduction into the SAM accounting technique.
One last issue to discuss is the relationship of the equilibrium assumption to the SAM
methodology. As we have discussed above, a “proper” SAM must “balance”, that is,
the sum of each row must equal the sum of the corresponding column. Translated
to the flow chart representation, this means the total inflows into each account must
equal total outflows, which in turn means there can be no accumulation of stocks
anywhere. This abstraction can perhaps be justified if one works with only one
time slice, as e.g. the CGE’s do, though even there stocks have been introduced
in various ad hoc ways. The assumption of flow equilibrium, however, is entirely
untenable if one wants to consider a series of SAMs for several years, as we do. Each
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of the institutions we consider will typically have a deficit or a surplus (government
deficit, current account deficit, etc.) that will over time determine the behavior of
important stocks such as the foreign debt or the money supply.
The question thus arises of how best to integrate stocks with the SAM for-
malism. We are certainly not the first to attempt that. In fact, the Social Account-
ing Matrix methodology has itself been adapted to describe stocks and stock-flow
relationships. However, as the description of that technique in Taylor [1990] illus-
trates, the resulting SAMs become large and unwieldy very quickly. We will take
another approach, namely combining an almost-unchanged SAM with a different
entity called the Financial Accounting Matrix. We introduce and discuss the latter
in the following section, and leave the details of its integration with the SAM to the
following chapters2
5.3 Financial Accounting Matrix
The purpose of the Financial Accounting Matrix is keeping track of financial stocks
in an economy, that is, of total liabilities of different agents in an economy toward
one another. In the same way that a flow of money always goes from an agent to
another agent, a financial asset is a liability of one agent to another. Thus, in the
same way that a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is a systematic listing of monetary
flows in an economy, the Financial Accounting Matrix (FAM) is a systematic listing
2Essentially, we throw out the financial sector accounts of the SAM and feed the net lending
flows into the FAM instead. However, implementing this fairly intuitive idea turns out to be not
quite trivial.
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of the financial stocks, in a square table such as Table 5.2. The first instance known
to the author of arranging financial stocks for use in a model in the form of a FAM,
rather than a series of double-entry balance sheets, is Easterly [1990].
In the FAM, assets of agents are arranged in rows, and liabilities in columns.
Thus for example, the intersection of “Commercial Bank Liabilities” and “Household
Assets” is an asset of households and a liability of commercial banks, that is, deposits
held by households at the commercial banks.
While the SAM and the FAM thus share some common features, there are
also important differences between them. Firstly, the FAM need not fulfill any
“balancing” requirement. In fact, the difference between the total assets (row sum)
and total liabilities (column sum) of an agent equals the agent’s net worth, and can
be positive or negative3.
A second difference between the SAM and the FAM is that while most pro-
cesses in the SAM such as e.g. private purchases of food) are described by a single
entry in the SAM, even “simple” financial transactions typically affect more than
one entry in the FAM. For example, a bank loan to the private sector will in the
simplest case increase the stock of loans of the private sector to the banks, as well
3This is one of the reasons we think the FAM notation is superior to the double-entry balance
sheet notation commonly used to describe financial stocks e.g. in CGE models. In the double-
entry notation, any financial stock must appear twice, once as somebody’s asset and another time
as somebody else’s liability. Thus there is twice the number of symbols to keep track of (not a
negligible problem as there is typically a lot of symbols already), and the requirement “every asset
appears twice” generates a handful of additional equations to keep track of – while with a FAM,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as increase the stock of private sector’s deposits by the same amount. This makes
the task of disentangling the different causes of changes in financial stocks less than
trivial. (We will address that by developing a new formalism called Transaction
Matrices, see Chapter 7.)
The position of an asset in the FAM as presented in Table 5.2 does not uniquely
define the asset. An important additional characteristic is the denomination of
an asset (e.g. domestic or foreign currency); in addition, asset types of the same
denomination can have other properties (e.g. time deposits vs. checking deposits)
that distinguish them. However, location in the FAM plus denomination exhausts
the types of assets commonly differentiated in CGE models. 4
In principle, any non-diagonal cell of the FAM can be occupied (Diagonal
cells’ values are irrelevant since they represent “institutions’ liabilities towards them-
selves”). However in practice, in any given model only a small part of these assets
will be represented. Thus in Table 5.2, private sector is not allowed to borrow from
abroad, and the government does not lend to private sector. The choice of assets to
allow in a model should be guided by the realities of the country being modeled.
The FAM structure we present here is, in fact, the one we use for Ghana in
this project. The private sector is allowed to hold deposits, cash and government
4In more general terms, “denomination” can be used to distinguish between different types
of assets that have the same issuer/holder combination, for example demand deposits, savings
deposits, and equity all issued by commercial banks and held by the private sector. The FAM is
thus not really a matrix but a stack of matrices (or a three-dimensional array), whose thickness is
determined by the complexity of a given country’s financial sector. However, in the present project
we will not need that richness, and “denomination” will only refer to the cedi/forex distinction.
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bonds, and borrows from commercial banks. Both loans and deposits can be either
denominated in local currency (cedis) or in foreign currency (dollars). Commercial
banks borrow cedis from the central bank, accept deposits of either denomination
from the private sector, and borrow in dollars from the rest of the world. They hold
the resulting assets in form of government bonds(cedi-denominated), forex reserves,
cash and cedi deposits at the central banks, and loans to the private sector of either
denomination. The central bank issues cash, accepts deposits from and gives loans
to commercial banks as just discussed, makes loans to and accepts deposits from
the government, both cedi-denominated, and has foreign assets and liabilities, both
forex-denominated. As a matter of stylization, we pretend that the government
holds all its assets as cash or deposits at the central bank, and that all foreign
exchange entering the country as aid or official loans is held at the central bank on
the government’s behalf. On the other hand, we distinguish between the central
bank’s foreign liabilities (roughly of the same magnitude as its forex reserves) and
the government’s foreign debt (a much larger and growing stock).
5.3.1 Monetary Aggregates and Control of Money Supply
Now that the FAM is defined, let us introduce some closely related concepts that
will be useful in our analysis in later chapters. The first concept we would like
to introduce here is that of a fractional reserve banking system. The fractional
reserve banking system derives its name from the reserve requirements imposed
on the commercial banks. The primary reserve requirement mandates that the
commercial banks will hold a certain fraction of their assets as deposits with the
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central bank, called required deposits. The secondary reserve requirement mandates
that the commercial banks will hold an additional fraction of their assets in form of
government bonds.
The other important concepts are the monetary base and the broad money
supply. Monetary base is the sum of all liquid claims of non-government agents on
the central bank. Reading from the FAM, we see that in our case this means the
cash holdings of the private sector plus and cash and central bank deposits held
by commercial banks. (In the following, we will also refer to commercial banks
as “deposit money banks” or DMBs). The broad money supply is important as a
proxy for overall demand in the economy, and the government attempts to control
it through control of the monetary base5, with the reserve requirements providing
the link between them.
Broad money is the sum of claims of all non-government agents on the banking
system, that is on the central bank or the commercial banks. Again reading from
the table, we see that that in our FAM that equals cash and deposits held by the
private sector.
This is the view of money supply from the side of the liabilities of the banking
system. However, one can also look at it from the side of assets. As banks typically
engage in financial transactions more than in current transactions, the gross stock
of assets (or liabilities) of the central bank or the commercial banks will typically
be much larger than their net worth. Thus, a frequent stylization in applied models
5This describes typical monetary policy in developing countries. In developed countries such as
the US, the policy is instead to target interest rates and let money supply be demand-determined.
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is assuming that the net worth of commercial banks as well as of the central bank is
zero. But even if we do not make this assumption, we can still re-cast the definitions
of the money supply in terms of banking system assets, as we are about to see.
To make the presentation more compact, let us introduce some notation. Let
us refer to the institutions that issue and hold assets by the letters {p, b, c, g, w},
where p stands for the private sector, b for commercial banks, c for the central
bank, g for government, and w for the rest of the world. Further, let us describe the
denomination of a stock by l for local currency and $ for foreign exchange. Then we
can describe an entry of the FAM as Φd i1i2 , where d ∈ {l, $} and i1, i2 ∈ {p, b, c, g, w}.
In accordance with the matrix notation, the first (row) index refers to the issuer,
and the second (column) index to the holder of the financial stock in question. Thus
for example, Φ$ pb refers to forex-denominated deposits of the private sector at the
commercial banks.
Now we can restate our definitions of monetary base and broad money as
MB = Φl pc + Φl bc (5.1)
M = Φl pc + Φl pb + Φ$ pb (5.2)
Let us define the net worth of the central bank and the commercial banks as the
sum of their respective assets net of their respective liabilities. This can be written
as
Ωc = Φl cb + Φl cg + Φ$ cw − (Φl pc + Φl bc + Φl gc + Φ$ wc) (5.3)










Φ$ cw − Φ$ wc DMB Cash Holdings
and Deposits
Φl bc
Loans to DMBs Φl cb Net Worth Ωc









Φ$ cw + Φ$ bw − Φ$ wc − Φ$ wb Private
Deposits
Φl pb + Φ$ pb
Credit to
Private Sector
Φl bp + Φ$ bp Net Worth Ωc + Ωb
Table 5.4: Banking System Balance Sheet
By inserting that into (5.1), we get
MB = Φl cb + (Φl cg − Φl gc) + (Φ$ cw − Φ$ wc) − Ωc (5.5)
M = Φl bp + Φ$ bp + (Φl bg + Φl cg − Φl gc) (5.6)
+ (Φ$ cw + Φ$ bw − Φ$ wc − Φ$ wb) − Ωc − Ωb
To see the implications of these identities, it may be helpful to restate these identities
in terms of balance sheets (Tables 5.3 and 5.4).
Much of the apparent complexity in the topic of money supply comes from
the fact that we can consider it either from the asset side of these tables, or from
the liability side, and the two totals are identically equal. Thus, money supply is
often talked about as “credit” whereas its importance in economics comes mainly
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from its being a close proxy for private sector’s liquid assets, which (besides being
important in their own right) are an important determinant of demand.
Also due to the “dual nature” of the money supply, a policy whose goal is
to change an item on one side of the banking system balance sheet often works by
targeting some item on the other side. This is how that works out: in both tables
above, net worth only changes gradually (mainly through interest flows), and the
other items on the liability side are generally outside of the banking system’s direct
control, being an outcome of private sector’s decisions to hold a certain amount of
cash or deposits. However, as the sum of the right side always equal the sum of the
left side, central banks attempt to control money supply by influencing the items
on the right side. Thus, to control broad money supply, one can limit credit to the
private sector e.g. by increasing interest rates, and limit net claims of the banking
systems on government by either restricting new government borrowing or trying
to get the private sector to buy some of the bonds currently held by the banking
system.
The net effect of a fractional reserve banking system is that the broad money
supply, which according to Table 5.4 can be regarded as either outstanding loans
or as the available liquidity in the economy, is largely determined by market forces
rather than by central bank decisions as to how much new cash to bring into cir-
culation. This is more pronounced in economies with deep financial systems such
as the USA, where the total value of deposits far exceeds the cash in circulation,
and therefore changes in the interest rate (which is the price of credit) of fractions
of a percentage point have a measurable effect on the volume of outstanding credit;
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the effect is strong enough that developed country macroeconomics often ignore the
volume of broad money altogether, focusing on the interest rate instead. In contrast,
in developing countries where the total deposits are of the same order of magnitude
as cash in circulation, the influence of interest rates on money supply is weaker, and
broad money is closer related to monetary base; so that the policy importance of
the monetary base is higher in the developing countries.
5.4 Summary
The Social Accounting Matrix formalism is a well-developed accounting framework
for tracing nominal money flows within an economy, including its interactions with
the rest of the world. It naturally integrates with accounting of real product flows
as well. However, standard balancing requirements for a SAM imply a state of flow
equilibrium that is an unrealistic abstraction, particularly if one is considering a time
series of SAM’s. A more realistic approach would allow for some flow disequilibria
and thus would require financial stocks to absorb these.
In the present thesis, the financial stocks involved are arranged in the form of
a Financial Accounting Matrix (FAM). In this chapter, we introduce and discuss the
FAM concept and its relationship to money supply and fractional reserve banking
system, and will discuss its integration with the SAM in later chapters.
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Chapter 6
The Approach of This Thesis
This chapter reviews the approach that this dissertation takes towards answering the
research questions. The subsequent chapters elaborate each of the steps reviewed
here.
6.1 Introduction
As we have stated in Chapter 1, this thesis aims to answer three interrelated ques-
tions. Firstly, what was the cause of Ghana’s poor macroeconomic performance
in the 1990s, manifested in balance of payments problems, high inflation, and low
GDP growth (compared to the second half of the 1980s)? Secondly, what were the
distributive impacts of economic policies, specifically structural adjustment policies,
during the 1990s? Finally, does the behavior of the Ghanaian economy during the
1990s confirm common assumptions of developing country models of either struc-
turalist or neoclassical school?
In the discussion of the literature on models of developing countries in Chapter
4, we have seen that within the most used methodology for such models, Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) models, there are two opposed schools. The neoclassi-
cal school emphasizes relative price-driven allocation adjustments under permanent
full employment, along with price levels determined by money supply. The struc-
turalist school emphasizes quantity adjustments in output (and therefore variable
employment of both labor and capital) and cost-driven prices. We have seen that
the question of which of these theories is more realistic is an empirical one, and
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furthermore that it cannot be answered from within the CGE methodology, because
the latter only uses data for one year in model calibration, and always uses more
parameters than data points, and thus is incapable of falsification.
We have thus concluded that to decide between alternative hypotheses about
the economy’s behavior, we need to consider data time series rather than just data
for one year. Furthermore, to cleanly handle the many variables needed to describe
macro-sectoral interactions, we need an explicit, clean accounting framework. This
framework should relate to each other both the different flows in any one year and
the stock-flow relationships that hold over time. We found that the SAM formalism
used in CGE’s is good at the former (flow tracking) but not the latter (stock-flow
relationships). This observation is the starting point of the method we use.
The research is segmented into distinct incremental steps, as described below.
6.2 Stock-Flow Consistent Accounting, Social Accounting Matrices and SAM/FAM
Time Series
We use time series (mostly from the International Monetary Fund Ghana country
desk reports) for sectoral output (real as well as nominal), balance of payments
statistics, government accounts, and financial stock data to compile a complete
description of money and product flows in the Ghanaian economy in each year from
1990 until 2001 (a Social Accounting Matrix time series) and an account of the
financial stocks during the same period that is consistent with the nominal flows.
To our knowledge, this is the first time that formal, complete and consistent flow of
funds accounts have been compiled for a developing country for such an extended
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period of time.
We use the Financial Accounting Matrix to store the financial stocks; from
the FAM we can compute the (revaluation-corrected) change in net worth of each
agent, which equals net lending flows of each agent. This provides a link to the
SAM. This way of estimating net lending flows is particularly valuable as normally
net savings in the SAM are estimated as a residual and are thus very error-prone.
The compilation of the dataset is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
6.3 Examination of the Behavior of Key Variables
Once the flow of funds for 1990-2001 dataset is compiled, we can proceed to inves-
tigate it for answers to our original question, namely the causal relationships that
determined the behavior of the Ghanaian economy during the time period.
We do this by considering key behavioral variables such as the share of imports
in domestic absorption or the price level, and see whether they can be explained
using common assumptions such as those discussed in Chapter 4. As the time series
for the real variables are still rather too short to make formal statistical significance
testing reliable, we use the data from 1990 until 1997 to calibrate the equations,
and then use the data from 1998 until 2001 for validation, by looking on how the
equation fitted to the earlier period performs during the latter. If an equation passes
this test well, we have a reason to expect that if we calibrate it to the whole time
period, it will also perform well in the future and in counterfactual simulations. The
details of this process are narrated in Chapter 9.
In contrast to the real-side variables that are available only yearly, for the
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nominal variables such as the exchange rate, the Consumer Price Index and the
money supply, we have the luxury of monthly series for all of our period (even though
financial stock coverage is somewhat shaky in the first couple of years). This allows
us to investigate their interrelationships using rigorous econometric techniques (to
be precise, ARIMA-X). The technical details of the process are presented in Chapter
11.
These chapters are the central part of the dissertation, in that the careful
testing of alternative behavioral assumptions (such as whether a given sector is
price- or quantity-clearing, or whether inflation is mainly driven by money supply
or by cost factors) will allow us to evaluate both the models and the non-model
research on the issue. If a given story about the economy’s behavior depends on a
behavior that is not present in the data, such a story can be discounted.
6.4 Methodological Contributions Towards a Model
This dissertation does not include building a model of the Ghanaian economy. The
reason for that is that a CGE model would not tell us anything we did not know
before building it, and a rigorously estimated dynamic model is beyond the scope
of this already expansive project.
However, we do formulate two methodological suggestions, one major and one
minor, that would be useful for building such a dynamic model.
The major suggestion is a formalism for describing financial stock behavior,
useful for the following reason: While computing the changes in net worth as dis-
cussed in Section 6.2 allows us to make the SAM and the FAM consistent, it does not
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yet allow us to represent how a different vector of net lending (say, less government
deficit) would impact the different financial stocks. To do that, we need an efficient
way to represent financial transactions, which is not a trivial task as any financial
transaction (such as deposit creation) affects several accounts in the FAM.
Our way of dealing with this is in our view this thesis’ main contribution
to economic modeling methodology, a technique we decide to call the Transaction
Matrix (TM) formalism. The idea behind it is to formulate a “vocabulary” of
financial transactions possible in a given economy; some linear algebra then allows
us to easily decompose a given change in the FAM into the different transactions
that caused it, and conversely to write out the implications of a given transaction
for all stocks in the SAM. This massively simplifies the representation of financial
sector behavior, as the TM formalism automatically takes care of the accounting
restrictions that until now have made the modeling of the financial sector so tedious,
and leaves the modeler free to specify behavior.
The Transaction Matrix formalism and the resulting simple decomposition of
FAM dynamics are presented in Chapter 8.
The minor contribution is a bit of somewhat tricky accounting needed in an
open economy model that combines demand-driven and supply-constrained sectors.
It is presented in Chapter 10.
6.5 In-depth Discussion of Implications for Theory and Policy
While the Chapters 9 and 11 inspect many important aspects of the Ghanaian econ-
omy’s behavior, they do not provide an overall picture of the interactions between
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the different parts, and thus are not by themselves useful for evaluating existing
policies and making policy suggestions.
Therefore, Chapters 12 and 13 provide an extensive discussion of the results.
Chapter 12 pulls all the disparate threads into an overall understanding of the
Ghanaian economy’s structure and behavior and uses that understanding to answer
the last research question, namely the extent to which the Ghanaian economy can
be said to conform to either neoclassical or structuralist theories of how a developing
economy behaves.
Chapter 13 builds on that understanding to address the other two research
questions, namely the reasons for the worsening macroeconomic performance of the
1990s and the distributional impacts thereof. It also contrasts the intended vs. the
likely consequences of each component of the structural adjustment policy package
in Ghana, and provides some recommendations in the cases where current policies
are found to be deficient.
6.6 Discussion
This section’s purpose is to answer two questions that are likely to occur to the reader
at this point, namely the extent to which we address environmental constraints on
GDP and the novelty of the proposed method.
How does this approach address environmental constraints on GDP growth? The
main feature of our approach is its closeness to the available data. As the scope
of the project is already quite ambitious, we cannot include any kind of ecosystem
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data into the project due to both poor data availability and additional work in-
volved. The question then transforms into “what kind of environmental constraints
on GDP growth can we hope to see in the data that we explore?”. The main way
in which such constraints are likely to translate into economic data is by forcing
the sector in question to be supply-constrained rather than demand-driven. The
way to distinguish between these two modes from the data is to look at how price
behaves with respect to supply. If an increase in price goes together with an increase
in supply, we probably have to do with a demand-driven sector; if an increase in
supply is typically associated with a decrease in price, we probably are dealing with
a supply-constrained sector.
Let us go through the productive sectors and see in which of these is there a
possibility that environmental constraints were binding during the 1990s1. Firstly,
services, both governmental and private, are not likely to have been constrained by
environmental factors, as service provision relies mainly on labor and comparatively
small amounts of capital (mostly imported in the Ghanaian case). Likewise, man-
ufacturing relies mainly on labor and imported capital, and also on intermediate
inputs. Thus manufacturing will only be constrained by environmental factors if
the latter constrain provision of intermediate inputs, i.e. if the extractive indus-
1Our focus on behavior observed in the data will allow us to understand the Ghanaian economy
in the 1990s. However, its conclusions need to be enjoyed with caution, as constraints that were
not binding in the past can well become so in the future. Jumping ahead, in Chapter 9 we will see
that agriculture has hit a supply constraint in about year 1995. It is not unlikely that forestry or
mining might also hit resource constraints in the future even if they have not yet; but prediction
of such events is beyond the scope of the present effort.
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tries are environmentally-constrained. Thus our first candidate for environmental
constraints are extractive industries, which in Ghana means forestry and mining.
Finally, the environmental constraints are quite likely to be felt in agriculture.
While population has grown, the share of population in agriculture has remained
virtually constant, and the area of arable land has, if anything, diminished due to
the encroachment of the savannah from the south of the country.
We will test these hypotheses in Chapter 9.
What will this approach contribute to economic theory or methodology? We en-
vision three major contributions to modeling methodology in this thesis. Firstly,
it is to our best knowledge the first time that a complete, consistent flow of funds
time series dataset at this level of disaggregation has been compiled for a develop-
ing country. In spite of all the data limitations we have discussed, demonstrating
that compiling such a dataset extending for over a decade is possible for a country
like Ghana is in itself a non-negligible contribution. A Social Accounting Matrix is
useful because it provides a complete snapshot (at a certain disaggregation level) of
an economy’s structure in a given year; SAM/FAM time series augment that with
a representation of how this structure has evolved over time and how the economy
has reacted to past disturbances.
This will lead directly to the second contribution, namely empirical verification
of common CGE assumptions that were incapable of verification within the CGE
methodology itself. Questions such as: “Does non-traded production lie on a pro-
ductivity frontier, implying a tradeoff between nontraded production and exports,
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or is nontraded production determined by demand? Does money supply determine
the price level, or vice versa?” can now be addressed empirically, within a complete,
consistent dataset.
While these first two contributions are based mainly on combining existing
techniques in a somewhat novel way, the last one, namely the Transaction Matrix
formalism, is to the best of our knowledge entirely novel. This formalism cleanly
separates the structure of the financial sector (“What transactions are allowed?
What assets are the different agents allowed to hold? What are the accounting
identities we wish to impose?”) from the description of agent behavior. The way
this is achieved is that in a given model, the choice of a particular transaction matrix
“vocabulary” lays down the structural constraints, and enforces them automatically,
whatever behavioral decisions the individual agents may make.
6.7 Summary
This thesis proceeds in several steps. Firstly, we compile a complete (at a given level
of aggregation), consistent dataset of financial stocks, nominal money flows, and real
product flows for Ghana in 1990-2001. Then, we investigate key time series from
that dataset to arrive at individual behavioral equations as well as a qualitative
understanding of the economy’s behavior. Then, we make some methodological
suggestions that would be useful in building a dynamic model based on the insights
gained. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for both theory and
policy.
The major contributions of this thesis to theory and methodology are compi-
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lation of a consistent SAM/FAM time series for the period 1990-2001, use of that
dataset to empirically verify assumptions of CGE models that up to now had to be
specified a priori, and suggesting a compact formalism for describing financial stock
behavior that cleanly separates structural constraints from behavioral descriptions.
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Chapter 7
Compilation of a SAM/FAM Time Series 1990-2001
In this chapter, we describe the compilation of a stock-flow consistent dataset cov-
ering twelve years. The major data sources are IMF Ghana country desk reports
and International Financial Statistics time series data.
7.1 Data Sources
To compile the SAM/FAM time series, we use five major groups of data, namely
prices, financial stocks, balance of payments, fiscal data, and sectoral production
data, listed in Table 7.1. All data were received as XLS files, with the exception of
the data in IMF country reports, which had to be entered into XLS tables by hand.
Note that the order in which they are listed here roughly reflects their relia-
bility. Firstly, prices such as food prices, interest rates, or the exchange rate, can
be easily observed by anyone, and are available on a monthly basis. While errors
are possible in computing aggregate indices such as the GDP deflator, we still rank
price data as the most reliable.
Second, financial stocks, such as government debt or the assets and liabilities
of the central bank, are continuously kept track of by the financial entities involved,
and are available on a monthly basis as “exact measurements”.
Third, balance of payments data are estimated rather than directly measured,
but because they are reasonably well observable (all exports and imports must cross
the border at one of a small number of points) and because of the importance of
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foreign exchange to a small, open economy like Ghana, they are fairly reliable1.
Fourth, government transactions are spread over many ministries and agencies
and are only assembled into an overall picture after the fact, and thus although
“directly observed” by the government, still are less reliable than the previous three.
Finally, sectoral production data include estimates on many not readily ob-
servable activities, and are likely to be tainted by underreporting and estimation
errors, and are thus least reliable of all.
The reader might be wondering why we list data for individual sectors when
the overall GDP decomposition by sector in real as well as nominal terms is available
from both the World Bank and the IMF. The reason is that both of these are based
on the same real-side GDP disaggregation from the Ghana Statistical Service, and
this GDP disaggregation appears upon closer examination somewhat suspect, as
discussed in Section 7.1.
1At least, this is likely to be true during the period in question, as the liberal trade policies
provided little incentive for smuggling. The picture was quite different during the late seventies to



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Problems and Probable Errors in the Data
Splicing together of different tables into a coherent framework forces one to know
each of the tables fairly intimately, and thus makes it easier to notice inconsistencies,
strange behavior, and likely errors in them.
The table with the highest density of apparent errors is the national accounts
table. Firstly, upon plotting the shares of different sectors in GDP in real terms
(Figure 7.1) one notices that they are strangely constant from 1993 to 2001. This
is quite unlikely given that all macro variables, such as current account deficit and
government spending, vary greatly during the period. Nor are the subsectoral data
from this table compatible with the raw data on the same subsectors from the
IMF country reports (Figure 7.2 shows the corresponding series for manufacturing).
Therefore we have to conclude that the official sectoral GDP decomposition was
probably obtained from an educated guess on overall GDP growth rate by pro-
rating according to 1993 shares of subsectors, 1993 being the date of the last major
estimation effort for national accounts.
The problems with national account data do not stop there. Firstly, gov-
ernment demand as GDP component is taken to be equal to government current
expenditure from the fiscal accounts. This is incorrect because firstly, a large part
of government current expenditure (for example, interest payments on government
debt) is not part of government demand in the national accounts sense; and sec-
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Figure 7.2: Manufacturing output discrepancy
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Figure 7.3: Sectoral Deflators (Source: World Development Indicators 2002; Inter-
national Monetary Fund)
Another, more subtle error has to do with sectoral deflators. In 1993, as na-
tional accounts were comprehensively re-estimated, the deflator for industry was
changed by about a factor of two (Figure 7.3). For pre-1993 data to be compara-
ble to post-1993 data, the former would have to be adjusted to account for that
change of deflator. For sectoral output, that was done by the IMF but not by the
World Bank so that the latter’s nominal industry output series display a jump in
1993. Unfortunately, while the IMF adjusted its pre-1993 deflators for sectoral data,
apparently it did not do so for investment (Figure 7.3).
The failure to correct the deflator then skews the nominal-investment-to-
nominal-GDP ratio upwards; Figure 7.4 shows the ratios of real investment to real








































Figure 7.4: Investment to GDP ratios computed from nominal resp. real time series
(source: International Monetary Fund).
taken directly from IMF data. We see that if we use the nominal values and just
compare 1990 values to 2000 values, then the share of investment in GDP increases
from 1990 to 2000; however, if we use real values of the same variables to build the
ratio, investment as share of GDP decreases over the same period - a difference of
considerable policy relevance.
The IMF-originated spreadsheets we have used come from Bank of Ghana
rather than from an official IMF source. However, comparison to official IMF doc-
uments confirms the phenomenon. Thus, the investment-to-GDP ratio in 1996 is
13.8% when computed from the Statistical Annex to the 1998 IMF Ghana country
report; the same ratio equals 23% when computed from the Statistical Annex to
the 2000 report. The series in 2000 Annex start with year 1993, so the effect we
describe is not visible from any one Annex alone. In an IMF Occasional Paper on
Ghana [Leite et al. 2000, Table 3.4] the investment to GDP ratios are given for years
1975, 1985, 1993, and 1998, and equal 12%, 9.5%, 22%, and 25%, respectively; these
115
numbers are discussed in the text as “[...] Investment in structures and equipment
appears to be increasing steadily”. Thus the confusion we discuss here appears to
be alive and well.
As a result of all these problems with available aggregate data, we decided
to re-compile sectoral output and national account tables using raw sector-level
data and a Leontief assumption for intermediate inputs with the coefficients derived
from the 1993 Ghana SAM. The following section describes how this was done and
combined with the other data to form complete SAM/FAM time series for 1990-2001.
7.2 Sectoral Structure
To reconstruct national accounts from the original sub-sectoral data, we have to de-
cide on the level of sectoral aggregation that we want to use. Aggregating too much
can hide important details of sub-sectoral behavior, but disaggregating too much
can make the resulting framework unduly complex, as well as produce a misleading
illusion of precision if the chosen disaggregation level is not supported by available
data.
The standard sectoral disaggregation for Ghana used in the 1993 SAM as well
as in the compilation of sub-sectoral data is reproduced in Table 7.2. Unfortu-
nately, the sub-sectoral data available from the IMF country reports does not allow
to re-compile the accounts at that disaggregation. As Table 7.1 shows, “raw” sub-
sectoral on both volume and price is only available for Agriculture and Livestock,
Cocoa Production and Marketing,Fishing, and Mining and Quarrying. Further,






























































































































































































































































































Manufacturing, and Electricity. No “raw” volume time series is available in the IMF
Country Reports on any other subsector; however, one can use government fiscal
data to estimate government services.
Based on this, we have decided to use the stylized sectoral aggregation por-
trayed in Table 7.3. There are two sub-sectors each in primary, secondary, and
tertiary sectors. Agriculture is divided into cocoa production and food production
for domestic use, consisting of food crops and fishing. For all of these, both volume
and producer price index time series are available from IMF Country Reports IMF
[2003, 1998]. We separate cocoa out because it is the leading agricultural export,
and aggregating it with the rest would not allow us to investigate e.g. elasticities of
transformation between cocoa and domestic food production.
The remaining primary sub-sector, forestry, is in our framework grouped with
industry, for the following reasons: Firstly, it is in the Ghanaian case a non-
sustainable extraction industry; second, it uses wage labor and comparatively high
amounts of fixed capital and is not in the short-term constrained by the weather
or other agricultural productivity factors. In all these, it is similar to mining or
manufacturing, and different from food crop or cocoa production, which in Ghana is
mostly done by small landowners with very primitive technology (and thus minimal
fixed capital). As it makes sense to aggregate sub-sectors of similar structure and
behavior, we thus group it into the “Other Industry” sector, together with electric-
ity and manufacturing. Another similarity of these three sub-sectors is that only
volume time series are available, but no prices. We rescale these volume time series


































































































































































































































































































































Finally, as no data is available on the construction sector, it is proxied by taking
the 1993 value from the 1993 SAM and assuming it to be proportional to the total
of the other three industry sub-sectors through time. By adding these four (respec-
tively, adding the first three and rescaling to account for construction), we obtain
the volume series for “Other Industry”. As the producer price deflator we take the
CPI component describing industrial prices, rescaled to average value of 1 in 1993.
The reason it is titled “Other Industry” is because it does not include mining.
Mining is separated from the rest of the secondary sector because of its unique
position in Ghana. Namely, most of mining is foreign-owned, and produces almost
exclusively for export. The high share of foreign ownership implies that the mining
sector investment is not constrained by domestic factors such as credit availability.
Finally, according to the 1993 SAM, the operating surplus in mining is 49%, as
opposed to average 31% in the rest of the secondary sector. Finally, as export
statistics are more readily available than statistics on nontraded goods, there is
both price and volume data on mining. All these features set the mining sector
apart from the rest of the secondary sector.
Finally, in the tertiary sector we distinguish between government and non-
government services. Government services nominal value is taken to equal the sum
of government wages and salaries and government current expenditure on goods and
services. In our stylized account, we pretend that the government is the sole entity
that pays for government services (and provides them to everybody for free). We
use the CPI (rescaled to average value 1 for 1993) as the deflator for government
services (it being one of the few price indices we have), and from that can define the
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volume of government services as the ratio between nominal value and the deflator.
Finally, we have non-government services. For these, no data is available in the
IMF reports2, not the least because a large part of these is provided by the informal
sector, and is largely untaxed and unmeasured. The informal sector functions as
a residual reservoir of labor exhibiting underemployment, and is thus likely to be
demand-driven. Having no data on non-traded services, we formulate a hypothesis in
Section 7.4. However we need to remember that while there is real data on the other
sectors, non-traded non-government services are basically a placeholder: the values
are in the right ball park, but we cannot base any conclusions about the structure
of the Ghanaian economy on the time behavior of our non-traded non-government
services.
Fortunately, the data situation on traded goods and services is somewhat
better than on non-traded ones. On the export side, IMF country reports contain
price and volume time series for over a dozen of goods exports sub-categories, as well
as separately for services. On the import side, there are separate price and volume
series for services, non-oil goods, and oil. Unfortunately, there is no distinction
between food and manufacturing imports, so we have to assume the share of each
of these two is constant and equals the share in the 1993 SAM, and that they both
have the non-oil goods imports deflator.
Table 7.4 summarizes the sources for the export and import components.
2Except for commercial bank income/expenditure tables. But as the financial system in Ghana






































































































































































































































7.3 Overall Accounting Framework
In a standard CGE manner, we use a Social Accounting Matrix to handle the nomi-
nal flows associated with production, consumption and distribution. For all accounts
except the Use of Income accounts, the usual adding-up restrictions are imposed.
This means that outflows into other SAM accounts must always equal inflows from
other SAM accounts, and thus there is no accumulation of money in any of the
accounts. The exception is the Use of Income accounts of the different institutions.
These accept the disposable incomes as inflows, and from them the demand out-
flows are taken, with the residual being the net lending of the particular institution.
These net lending flows, rather than go to another part of the SAM, leave the SAM
and are cumulated inside the Financial Accounting Matrix (FAM), which stores the
financial assets/liabilities of the individual institutions toward each other. All cap-
ital transactions (i.e. transactions that involve no change in net financial wealth),
such as portfolio reallocation by households or issue of government bonds, then take
place through changing the entries of the FAM.
7.4 Structure of the Social Accounting Matrix
To compile a Social Accounting Matrix time series, we combine national accounts,
balance of payments, and government accounts data with the Social Accounting
Matrix for 1993 compiled by the Ghana Statistical Service. We track product flows
in nominal as well as in real terms. Table 7.7 shows the structure of the SAM.
























































































































































































































































index s goes over the set of sectors that we denote as
{food, cocoa, industry,mining, govt, services}
. The index f goes over the different factors of production, in our case consisting
of operating surplus and all eight combinations of male/female, skilled/unskilled,
and employee/mixed income. The index ι goes over institutions with firms and
households separated, that is, households, f irms, commercial banks, central bank,
government and the rest of the world, denoted as
ι ∈ {h, f, b, c, g, w}.
Finally, i refers to institutions with firms and households combined into a “private
sector”, that is
i ∈ {p, b, c, g, w}.
The reason for using the two different indices is that while in the SAM it is both
possible and useful to distinguish between firms and households, the data for the
FAM does not allow such a distinction, as we will see in the section discussing the
FAM.
Having defined the indices, we can now use matrix notation to populate the
SAM. For example, the intermediate input demand of sector s1 for products of
sector s2 can now be denoted as IIs1s2 in nominal terms and iis1s2 in real terms
(1993 cedis). This is another notation we use throughout this document: lowercase
names refer to real or volume terms (1993 prices), and the corresponding uppercase
names refer to the corresponding quantities in current prices.
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Products s Activities s Use of
Income i
rets1s2




















Table 7.5: The real production flows
One final remark on notation: in a matrix of flows (such as the intermediate
inputs matrix defined above) we use the first index to refer to the source of the
flows and the second index to refer to the destination of the flow (traditionally these
are referred to as sources and uses of funds). This appears to us to be the most
natural notation; however one has to be aware that if one writes these matrices out
consistently with the SAM convention (columns denote sources, rows denote uses),
then the first index refers to columns, not rows as usual in matrices.
Having introduced the requisite notation, we are ready to discuss how the
SAM fits together. First, consider the product markets in volume terms, detailed
in Table 7.5. As we discussed in Section 7.2 we have data on constant prices
revenue of each productive sector except non-traded non-government services, as
well as constant-price exports and imports of each sector.
Now we define the nontraded revenue in services to be proportional to the sum
of all other revenues, with the factor of proportionality derived from the 1993 SAM.
















Cocoa .029 .083 .119
Other Agric. .140 .043 .053
Mining .254 .053
Other Industry .040 .332 .044
Nongov. Services .249 .223
Gov. Services .038 .229
Table 7.6: The Leontief Matrix
exported part thereof, and by nts the non-traded part thereof, we can determine nts
as
nts = revs − exs (7.1)
We then assume, as is common in models, that all activities use Leontief technology,
This determines intermediate input demand for export industries and nontraded
industries, respectively:
iiexs1s2 = ls1s2exs1 +
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩










for s1 = government
(7.3)
Here ls1s2 is the Leontief matrix computed from the 1993 SAM (Table 7.6). ii
cocoa
refers to the part of cocoa crop that was not exported raw, but processed prior to
export and thus classified as industrial exports. While processed cocoa products
are thus integrated into industrial exports, their share in industrial exports is not
constant, and so cannot be represented through the Leontief technology. Likewise,
the share of goods and services vs. wages in the provision of government services
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is not fixed but determined by the government, and this is accounted for in (7.3).
Now that we know revenues and intermediate input cost, we can define the two real
GDP components:








We take real private investment demand is directly from the IMF country report. All
oil imports are done by the government-owned Tema Oil Refinery, here integrated
with the government. Thus we denote the oil import vector (with only one nonzero
component, equaling real oil imports) goils . The rest of government expenditure
gnonoils consists of two components, government services and government capital
expenditure. Both of these are known in nominal terms from the fiscal accounts;
we deflate the former by the CPI and the latter by the industry price index (both
price indices are discussed in the Nominal SAM). Now we can decompose imports






In all that follows, the superscript im will refer to non-oil imports. Now that we
have determined all the in- and outflows of the product markets, we can determine
private consumption as a residual:
cs = revs + im
nonoil










cs + is for i = p
goils + g
nonoil
s for i = g
exs for i = w





























Table 7.7: Overall Social Accounting Matrix Structure
Now that all real flows are determined, let us proceed to the SAM in nominal
terms. First, let us introduce the different prices: The producer prices of nontraded




s , respectively. The











respectively. Finally, we assume that imports and nontraded goods actually sold
carry a retail service margin, so that the market retail prices P̃ nts , P̃
im
s equal
P̃ nts = P
nt
s (1 + t
nt






P̃ ims = P
im
s (1 + t
im





For lack of better information, we assume the share of imports is the same across
intermediate imports and final demand. We can then define the retail absorption
deflator as
P̃ abss =






















The remaining nominal inflows into the product markets are retail services and
exports, valued at their respective market prices
EXs = P
ex



































Since both taxes and import revenues go from the product account to the income




IMs for ι = w
Ts for ι = g
0 otherwise
(7.21)




Cs + Is for i = p
Goils +G
nonoil
s for i = g
EXs for i = w
0 for i = c or i = b
(7.22)
Knowing the revenues and the intermediate input costs for both nontraded and
export goods allows us to define value added (minus taxes) as












V As = V A
ex
s + V A
nt
s (7.25)
This value added is distributed across factors of production according to sector-
specific fixed shares Fsf derived from the 1993 SAM (Table 7.8):






































































































































































































































































































































This income is then distributed to institutions as
Yfι = . . . (7.28)
Inside the Income Distribution account, there is a number of flows:
IDι1ι2 = . . . (7.29)











As this disposable income vector comes from accounts ι that separate firms and
households, and goes to accounts i that count them together as the private sector,nd
after summing up households’ and firms’ income into “private”, the disposable in-
come flows are a matrix Yιi that sums up the firm and household disposable income
into private sector disposable income, and sends all the other institutions’ disposable









7.5 Financial Accounting Matrix
We have introduced Financial Accounting Matrix (FAM) in Chapter 5 as a way
to present the liabilities of various institutions towards one another. The FAM
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only contains assets that are by their nature some other institution’s liabilities,
such as deposits, cash or government bonds. Table 7.9 is the complete listing of
FAM entries in our dataset. As we have discussed in Chapter 5, we denote
the entries of the FAM by Φd i1i2 , where d ∈ {l, $} is the denomination, local or
foreign exchange (the latter assumed to be dollars), and i1, i2 ∈ {p, b, c, g, w} where
p stands for the private sector, b for commercial banks, c for the central bank, g for
government, and w for the rest of the world. The first index refers to the issuer,
and the second to the holder of the liability stock in question. Thus for example,
Φ$ pb refers to forex-denominated deposits of the private sector at the commercial
banks. The reader might note that Table 7.9 contains two additional entries, namely
Φl gp and Φl gb that describe loans to government-owned enterprises (the latter are
by convention classified as part of the private sector, together with all other firms),
and government deposits at commercial banks. While these are stocks that appear
in the data, we will stylize them away for use in the model (see Chapter 8), because
the composition of the government’s domestic asset portfolio is not at the center of
the present research. The stylization will also illustrate the use of the Transaction
Matrix technique we develop for efficiently working with FAM time series.
7.5.1 FAM Time Series Compilation
The FAM time series are compiled from two major sources: firstly, balance sheets
of the commercial banks and the central bank, and secondly, data on government
debt stocks. Let us discuss the specifics of each in turn.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































are among the standard financial statistics, and are collected on a monthly basis.
We could find three different datasets with that information, each with its set of
flaws. Two were obtained as spreadsheets directly from the Bank of Ghana, and
one is an excerpt from the International Financial Statistics available online from
the International Monetary Fund. While the datasets were roughly consistent with
each other, the actual numbers in the IFS and Bank of Ghana datasets were not
identical.
The first of the Bank of Ghana datasets was monthly and quite finely disag-
gregated, but only started in 1996, continuing through to the present. This is the
dataset that is used by the Bank of Ghana itself. The second Bank of Ghana dataset
is quarterly, and starts in December 1991. Finally, the IFS dataset is monthly and
goes all the way back into the 1980s, but is less disaggregated than the others, and
in particular does not show denomination of deposits and loans. As the data on
denomination is necessary to distinguish between nominal increases due to savings
and due to capital gains, this is not a negligible flaw.
It would have been nice to use the dataset that the Bank of Ghana (BoG)
itself uses, as it is closest to the original data and most disaggregated. However, its
insufficient time coverage led us to choose the IFS dataset. It would perhaps have
been optimal to somehow splice the two together, using BoG data where available
and IFS data otherwise, but the effort required to do that cleanly would be outside
of the scope of the present project.
Once we have decided to use the IFS dataset, we have to reconstruct the
partition of deposits and loans into local currency- and forex-denominated. We do
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this by computing the respective shares of the different denominations from the
quarterly BoG dataset, and applying those shares to the IFS totals.
This procedure has two potential problems. First of all, the quarterly dataset
does not cover the first two years of our period. However, this turns out not to
be a problem as these years were the beginning of a transition period, when forex-
denominated loans and deposits were just beginning to be introduced. Thus, as




























































Figure 7.6: Share of foreign-denominated loans and deposits in the respective total
tal was actually zero for loans, and was growing pretty linearly for deposits, allowing
a credible extrapolation back to January 1990.
The second problem is of a statistical nature, namely that since the local-
and forex- denominated stocks have been produced by pro-rating from a total, their
residuals will probably be correlated, leading to spurious relationships if one does
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not formulate one’s regressions carefully. This is not by itself tragic, but something
to bear in mind for when we investigate the data.
The other time series necessary to compile the FAM are the government’s
debt stocks. These are unfortunately only available yearly until 1999, and monthly
afterwards for domestic debt, and only yearly for foreign debt. Thus if we want to
infer monthly time series from these, some interpolation scheme is called for. The
simplest would be piecewise constant or piecewise linear interpolation, but as we
are going to differentiate the series (to determine net savings, portfolio adjustment,
etc.), this would have generated spurious discontinuities. Therefore, we use matlab
to interpolate the yearly data using piecewise cubic functions, giving us piecewise
quadratic derivatives.
A final piece of data that is missing in the SAM is the amount of forex held
by the private sector in cash form (as opposed to deposits at banks). Anecdotal
evidence suggests that is not negligible, but unlike for domestic cash, we do not see
a way of estimating this, and thus assume it to be zero. Therefore, net worth esti-
mates are likely to somewhat underestimate the net worth of the private sector and
somewhat overestimate the current account deficit. A possible alternative approach
to estimating that would be that the ratio of forex cash to domestic cash held by
the public is equal to the ratio of forex-denominated deposits to local currency-
denominated deposits, as both are outcomes of portfolio optimization by different
population groups. However, transaction demand is likely to play a higher role for
cash than for deposits, so that estimate would likely err in the opposite direction
from ours; and ours (no forex cash held by the private sector) is easier to construct.
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7.5.2 Net lending flows implied by the FAM
Since the FAM gives us information on all financial stocks in the economy, we can use
it to find the changes in net worth, and thus the net lending, of each institution. As
most savings of the poorer households are in the form of goods rather than financial
assets, that would be an under-estimate of total savings. However, it would still
be useful as it is financial savings that make resources available for new loans; and
adequately accounting for non-financial savings would be a separate project in itself.
The changes in net worth of any institution are due to two sources: flows of
new net lending and revaluation of old asset stocks. In our case, the latter refers
to valuation changes of forex-denominated stocks due to changes in the exchange
rate. We need to correct for these before we can isolate the effect of the new savings
flows. This is done as follows.
Let e be the exchange rate, cedis to the dollar (available on a monthly basis).
Let’s define the depreciation rate of the cedi as
ê(t) = ln(e(t)) − ln(e(t− 1)) (7.32)
Then the change in Φ due to revaluation equals
(∆Φ$ i1i2)from revaluation = êΦ$ i1i2 (7.33)
(∆Φl i1i2)from revaluation = 0 (7.34)
(for derivation of (7.33), see Section 8.1.) Thus we can define the change in Φ
net of revaluation as
DΦ(t) = [Φ(t) − Φ(t− 1)] − (∆Φ)from revaluation (7.35)
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which is nothing else but the net lending flow Si that connects the SAM to the FAM.
7.6 Reconciliation
As we are working with fairly low-level data in a tight accounting framework, it is
unavoidable that even after weeding out obvious errors in the data, such as those
discussed above, the results will not “add up”. Typically, any given table, such as a
balance of payments or government accounts, is already forced to add up by those
compiling it. However, when one aims to bring the different tables together into
a watertight SAM/FAM framework, the different estimates for the same quantity
(e.g. government deficit from the fiscal accounts vs. overall change in government
liabilities in the financial stocks) typically do not match. The question then arises
of how to reconcile different estimates of the same quantity.
We opt for using a hierarchical framework. This works as follows.
If there are two different estimates for a quantity, the hierarchical approach
to reconciliation works by choosing the estimate from the more reliable data group,
and if necessary adjusting the other group to match.
In most cases, reconciliation can be done by simply choosing the less reliable
term as the residual. For example, nontraded food production is computed as the
difference between total production of the industrial sector from sectoral statistics
and industry exports from balance of payments data. However, there is one im-
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portant case where one has to actually adjust the different datasets to match each
other, and that is reconciliation of the net lending flows between the FAM and the
SAM. This is discussed in the following section.
SAM/FAM reconciliation In this section, we describe our solution of the following
problem: The SAM is determined from balance of payments, fiscal, and sectoral
production accounts, in particular determining the net lending flows from each in-
stitution into the FAM. On the other hand, from the FAM itself we get an alternate
estimate of the same quantity as described in Section 7.5.2 .
According to our hierarchical approach, the FAM estimate takes precedence
over the SAM estimate, but there is no obvious residual to absorb the discrepancy.
We solve that by adjusting the SAM data as follows. We have five institutions in
the net lending vector, to wit, nonbank private sector, commercial banks, central
bank, government, and the rest of the world. Note that as the SAM accounting is
watertight (and thus money doesn’t accumulate in the SAM) the sum of the five
net lending flows must be identically zero (a version of the law of Walras).
We adjust the net lending of commercial banks by distributing the discrep-
ancy to the private sector (with the assumed vehicle being either interest income
on deposits or profit distribution to owners); the net lending of the central bank
are assumed to accrue to the government - a common practice in applied models,
according to which the net worth of the central bank can only change through reval-
uation. This leaves the private sector, the government, and the rest of the world.
Due to the law of Walras, it is sufficient to reconciliate two of these and the third
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will automatically fall into line.
We thus complete the FAM/SAM reconciliation by spreading out the discrep-
ancy in government deficit proportionally over all fiscal accounts, both revenue and
expenditure, and likewise spreading the discrepancy in current account deficit pro-
portionally across imports, private current transfers, and non-interest income debits,
as the least easily observable components. The percentage to which they had to be


























































Figure 7.7: Relative Adjustments During FAM/SAM Reconciliation
The last type of data adjustment we undertake is a smoothing of early jumps.
As there were major overhauls of reporting systems in 1991-1993, many data defi-
nitions have changed then, which caused jumps in some data series. To somewhat
alleviate that effect, when a series that was fairly stable post-1993 had apparently
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spurious discontinuities pre-1993, these were smoothed out in a way that preserved
post-1993 values.
7.7 Discussion
7.7.1 Are Different Levels of Household Aggregation in Different Parts of the
Framework Defensible?
One issue certainly needing discussion is whether a model that aggregates all house-
holds together with firms for the handling of financial stocks can have any claim on
credible representation of distributional issues. We would like to argue that this is
indeed the case.
Firstly, including financial stocks at all has to be an improvement on ignoring
them, especially if one is interested in modeling macro policies and variables such as
inflation. Second, a better disaggregation of financial stocks is simply not allowed
by the data - the only way to get e.g. more disaggregated deposit data would be
to make it up, introducing hidden assumptions. The way we do it, the difference in
aggregation is out in the clear, easy for others to evaluate.
Finally, the main impact of more disaggregated financial stock data on the rest
of the model would be through the influence of the wealth of different household
groups on their consumption demand. However, we would like to argue that the
consumption patterns of different household groups are not different enough for that
effect to matter much. We support this claim by examining the results of Powell
and Round [2000] who built a multiplier model based on the Ghana 1993 SAM
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(with a substantial disaggregation of factors of production and household types) and
subjected it to unit income injections into various accounts (namely cocoa, mining,
construction, and education and health). While direct impacts on the incomes of
the different household groups clearly depended greatly on the specific place where
the income injection happened, the indirect effects (i.e. the effects working through
the income-consumption demand loop) only depended in magnitude on the total
on-impact income that accrued to all households (Figure 7.8), and their pattern was
virtually constant across all four injections (Figure 7.9). From this we conclude
y = 1.6681x + 7.9915
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Figure 7.8: Total Multiplier Effect as Function of Total On-Impact Household In-
come
that the effects working through the income-expenditure loop are largely macro
phenomena. Therefore, keeping this part of the model fairly aggregated does not
























































Figure 7.9: The Patterns of Multiplier Income For Different Injections
7.8 Summary
The challenges in compiling a complete flow of funds time series for Ghana for
the 1990s are typical of a developing country. While much data is available, it is
widely scattered and occasionally gravely deficient. In our case, the official Ghana
Statistical Service estimates of real GDP time series by sector are very probably not
trustworthy.
However, it is possible to compile what we think is a reasonably credible stock-
flow consistent yearly SAM/FAM time series for 1990-2001 (including real product
flows) using a combination of sectoral level output and price data, balance of pay-
ments, fiscal and financial stock time series. To reconcile the different estimates,
we adopt a hierarchical approach, with financial stock data being considered more
reliable than balance of payments data, which in turn takes precedence over fiscal
and sectoral output data.
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First, using sectoral, balance of payments, and fiscal time series together with
the Social Accounting Matrix available for 1993, we construct reasonably credible
time series of medium-disaggregation Social Accounting Matrices for the period in
question. Then, combining financial stock data available from the IMF and data
obtained directly from Bank of Ghana, we compile a yearly series of FAMs and
derive the net lending flows implied by these FAM time series. The SAM time series
is then adjusted to be consistent with these net lending flows.
Most of the financial time series are actually available on a monthly basis.
While that does not fit the overall accounting framework, the additional data points
will be useful in investigating behavior through time series econometric techniques.
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Chapter 8
Decomposing the FAM dynamics
How does the Financial Accounting Matrix Φ evolve over time? There are three
basic sources for changes in the financial stocks held by the agents: revaluation,
current transactions, and capital transactions. Revaluation refers to the change of
the price of the stocks. In our case, if the exchange rate changes, the value of foreign
currency-denominated holdings is going to change accordingly (remember we value
all financial stocks in domestic currency). Current transactions refer to transactions
that change the net worth of participating agents. For example, if the government
pays wages to its employees, the net worth of the government decreases and that
of the private sector increases. Finally, capital transactions do not change the net
worth of participating agents. An example is a household making a deposit at a
bank: the household’s deposits increase while its cash holdings decrease by the same
amount, without changing its net worth; likewise the asset composition of the bank
changes (more deposits (liabilities), more cash (assets) and probably more deposits
at the central bank (assets)), but its net worth remains unaffected. The changes to
the FAM from each of these sources are described differently; let us discuss each in
turn.
8.1 Revaluation
Suppose an agent holds an amount V of an asset of denomination d, so that its
price in local currency is P d. Then the value of that asset stock that appears in the
SAM equals V ·P d. If the price P d changes, then the change in the asset stock value
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where P̂ d is a shorthand notation for ∂tln(P
d).
Applying that to all of the FAM, we get
(∂tΦdi1i2)from revaluation = P̂
dΦdi1i2 (8.2)





0 for d = l
ê for d = $
(8.3)
where ê is the depreciation rate of the local currency.
8.2 Current Transactions
The actual current transactions – purchases of products, transfers, taxes, etc. – are
carried out in the SAM. What goes into the FAM is the net resulting change in each
agent’s net worth, that is, each agent’s lending, which we have earlier denoted by
Si. Note that whenever we say “net worth” in this chapter, we mean “financial net
worth”, that is we do not count stocks of physical capital towards net worth, and
thus all purchases, even of capital goods such as machinery or buildings, count as
“current transactions”. This is convenient to do because these are also handled in
the SAM, so that here we can concentrate exclusively upon financial stock dynamics.
The question now is how to feed them into the FAM, as each agent has multiple
different asset stocks that these net lending flows could potentially feed into. The
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way we choose to tackle this is to have the net lending flows feed into each institu-
tion’s cash balances, i.e. its stock of central bank-issued local currency-denominated
liabilities. All institutions are then assumed to re-balance their portfolios according
to whatever portfolio preferences they have. Thus the change to the FAM from
current transactions can be written as
∂tΦfrom current transactions =
∑
i
Si · [lic]. (8.4)




1 for d = l, i1 = i, i2 = c
0 otherwise
(8.5)
Feeding the net lending flows into the cash holdings in this way is justified for
two reasons: firstly, a large part of the transactions are indeed cash-based; and
secondly, those institutions that enter non-cash transactions are likely to rebalance
their portfolio between different assets much faster than the current transactions
can happen (financial markets clear a lot faster than real goods do), so it doesn’t
really matter which of their assets their net savings are hooked up to.
The final question with this scheme is whether it also works for the central
bank, as its liabilities towards itself do not change its net worth. But as we mentioned




Si = 0 (8.6)
and thus the change in net worth of the central bank from the other net lending
flows (that change the amount of central bank’s liabilities held by other institutions)
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will exactly equal Sc. Thus the system is consistent, and we are ready to discuss the
final and most interesting source of changes in the FAM, namely capital transactions,
such as portfolio rebalancing.
8.3 Capital Transactions
The final source of changes in the FAM are capital transactions. These have two
properties that can complicate models: firstly, any capital transaction affects several
entries in the FAM; secondly, these always change in such a manner that the net
worth of the institutions involved is unchanged. The first of these properties is
liable to lead to a proliferation of equations, the second is a constraint that has to
be watched, unless errors arise in these equations.
Let us illustrate that in a simple example: a firm taking up a local-currency
denominated loan from a local commercial bank. For each dollar of the loan value,
the amount of the firm’s debt stock (Φlbf) increases by a dollar, and so does the
amount of the firm’s deposits at that bank (we assume the loan takes the form of
deposits, rather than a cash payout to the firm). This is a very simple example;
in the case of deposit creation, households give cash to banks and acquire deposits
there, but then the bank deposits some of that cash at the central bank (primary
deposit requirement) and buys government bonds for a further share of the cash
(secondary deposit requirement), so that multiple FAM stocks are affected as a
result of one rather simple transaction.
How can we describe these changes in a simple way, with preferably only one
equation per transaction? We propose to do so by introducing a new formalism that
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we call transaction matrices. It is based on the observation that while a transaction,
such as creation of new loans, affects several entries in the FAM, the impact on all
of them is proportional to the amount of the transaction. To further elaborate on
our example of loan creation, let us define a matrix Λloan, as pictured in Table 8.1.
Using the notation we introduced earlier, this matrix can also be written as






Table 8.1: The transaction matrix for creation of new local-currency denominated
loans
Λloan = [lbf ] + [lfb] (8.7)
Suppose the banks make a new loan of size ψloan. Then from our brief discus-
sion of the process of loan creation above we see that the total change in Φ due to
that loan equals




We thus see that with the help of the transaction matrix, we only need one (matrix)
equation to represent one transaction. In addition to that, properly constructed
transaction matrices will automatically make sure that capital transactions do not
affect the net worth of the institutions involved. “Properly constructed” here means
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Λii1 = 0 for all i (8.8)
Thus the transaction matrix formalism to describe financial stocks solves both prob-
lems outlined above, allowing for a simple representation of financial stocks in a
dynamic model. If we have a transaction matrix for each transaction allowed in the
model, and use the index λ to number them and the number ψλ to describe the
amount of a transaction of type λ happening at a given moment, then the changes
in the FAM from capital transactions can be written simply as






This is an extremely useful decomposition as it effectively separates the structure of
the financial sector from the behavior of the institutions therein. The transaction
matrices Λλdi1i2 are constant and describe the kinds of transactions that are possible
in a given economy (“Can households hold foreign exchange? Can firms borrow
abroad?”) whereas the “transaction flows” ψλ describe the decisions of individual
agents as to which of the possible transactions they actually want to undertake.
Hereby the net worth constraint of every institution is automatically observed.
The only thing left to watch for is that none of the entries of Φ should be
allowed to become negative - essentially a boundary condition; but all the “account-
ing constraints” are observed automatically given that all transaction matrices are
“properly constructed”.
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8.4 The Master Equation for FAM Dynamics
Now that we have understood how to model each of the sources of changes in the













This is sufficient for a constructive description of FAM dynamics in a SAM/FAM
model. The exchange rate behavior, determined elsewhere in the model, will de-
termine the first term, the net lending vectors will come from the SAM, and the
transaction flows ψλ can be whatever the agents who control them want them to
be - the transaction matrix formalism will automatically enforce all the net worth
constraints that would have to be imposed as additional equations had we wanted
to directly specify the dynamics of the individual FAM entries.
8.5 Reconstructing Transaction Flows From FAM Time Series
We have just seen how, given an initial value of the FAM together with time series
for the exchange rate and the net lending of each institution, as well as the values
of the transaction flows, we can reconstruct the time path that the FAM follows.
As our approach starts with data, however, we are also interested in the opposite
operation: given the values of the FAM for every moment in time (that we have
assembled from Central Bank statistics) and exchange rate time series, decompose
the FAM changes into revaluation, net lending, and capital transactions. Once
we have achieved that, we can seek to describe the transaction flows in terms of
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portfolio-equilibrating behavior of the institutions, stylize the FAM while preserving
everybody’s net worth by omitting or modifying some of the flows, and play many
other interesting games.
The question thus is: given a set of transaction matrices Λλdi1i2 and time series
for the FAM Φdi1i2(t) and the exchange rate e(t), find Si(t) and ψλ(t).
The first part, namely finding Si(t), is simple. Let us define the revaluation-
corrected change in Φ as












and since all the transaction matrices are properly constructed, the first term is the
only one that contributes to changes in institutions’ net worth. Thus we can find Si





This is exactly how we determined Si in Chapter 7, Equation (7.31).
The second part of the problem, namely determining ψλ, turns out to require a
bit more theory, but is quite cheap in computational terms. First of all, representing
“any” net worth-preserving (after we have cleaned away the other terms) change in
the FAM through a linear combination of transaction matrices is clearly only possible
if we have “enough” transaction matrices. This representation will be unique if we
have “just enough” transaction matrices rather than “too many”. Roughly, this
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means that we need as many TMs as there are nonzero non-cash entries in the
FAM. To make that statement more precise, we will need some linear algebra.
First of all, note that the decomposition (8.12) is unique iff the TMs are linearly
independent. We can re-cast the problem (8.12) as “decompose DΦ into a linear
combination of TMs up to an error in the local cash terms”. Now let V be the space
of all “valid” FAMs, i.e. all FAMs that could in principle occur in a given economy.
Let W be the five-dimensional space of all combinations of local cash terms only,
i.e.
W = span{[lic]|i ∈ Inst} (8.14)
Then let us define a semi-positive definite scalar product on V that is zero exactly















This means that 〈X1, X2〉 is the sum of pairwise products of all entries of the two
matrices except the local-denominated cash entries. If we had left out the second
sum (the one after the minus sign) in (8.15), we would have had the canonical scalar
product on the space of all FAMs - that is, the exact same expression that we would
have gotten by writing out all elements of each FAM as a very long vector (with as
many elements as there are entries in a FAM) and computing the “normal” scalar
product of the two vectors.
With the inclusion of the second sum, (8.15) is equivalent to dropping the
local-denominated cash terms (local-denominated central bank liabilities) and then
flattening out both FAMs into vectors and computing the “regular” scalar product.
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Thus, the product (8.15) of a FAM with itself is the sum of squares of all its
components except the local-denominated central bank liabilities. This is the same
as saying that this scalar product is zero exactly on W .
Now consider the quotient space V/W , that is the space of equivalence classes,
where two vectors in V are considered equivalent if they differ only by an element
of W (that includes zero). Thus if v1 and v2 are two FAMs, and we say v1 = v2
in V/W , this means v1 − v2 = w ∈ W . In our case, this means that an element
of V/W is the set of all FAMs in V that differ at most in the local-denominated
central bank liabilities. Any valid FAM X in V automatically has a corresponding
element π(X) in V/W , namely the set of all matrices that differ from X by at most
local-denominated central bank liabilities.
As the local-denominated central bank liabilities are precisely the elements
ignored by the scalar product (8.15), the latter is a well-defined, positive definite
scalar product on the quotient space V/W .
If the transaction matrices form a basis of V/W , then we can use a scalar
product (any well-defined scalar product on V/W , so (8.15) will do) to uniquely de-
compose any element of V/W into a linear combination of the transaction matrices.







and B be the inverse of A
B = A−1 (8.17)
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then standard linear algebra (basis change in a linear space with a scalar product,
















as elements of V/W (8.19)










wi · [lic] for some wi (8.20)
Since the first term of (8.20) has no impact on net worth (being a sum of transaction
matrices), the change in net worth of institution i from (8.20) is equals wi, and
therefore wi = Si and (8.20) is in fact the decomposition (8.12).
Note that this decomposition is computationally efficient because B is a con-
stant matrix (it is obtained from the constant transaction matrices). Thus the only
computation we need to do at each time step is to compute the scalar product of
DΦ with each TM, and then multiply the resulting vector by the square matrix B.
Thus the transaction matrix decomposition is made constructive. This con-
struction also allows us to exactly answer the question “is a given set of TM’s
enough? Exactly enough?”. The answer is as follows: if the matrix A in (8.16)
is singular and thus won’t invert, the matrices are not linearly independent, and
one should omit some. If A inverts, one defines ψλ by (8.18) and then computes
the residual w from (8.20). If w is indeed in W , that is, consists only of local cash
entries, then we have enough transaction matrices; if not, we need to add some more
to explain the other entries in the residual.
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The final question worth discussing here is: what reason we have to assume
that the transaction matrices do form a basis of V/W ? First of all, we have con-
structed the TMs according to our wishes, so we can make sure they’re a basis if we
want to. The question then becomes, does it make sense to use a set of TMs that
are a basis of V/W ? We would say that it definitely seems wise to use enough trans-
action matrices to enable us to span the changes in the financial stock composition
allowed by the structure of the economy. It is not as clear whether one should use
“just enough” of them, or instead use a larger, linearly dependent set. Since in the
latter case one could select a basis out of the larger set and represent the rest of the
TMs as linear combinations thereof, the question seems to be largely one of style.
If one is building a toy model and for some reason wants to allow lots of redundant
transactions, there does not seem to be an a priori reason not to. However, if one
wants to start from data and have a unique decomposition, as we do, it seems wise
to make the TMs be a basis, as we do. The next section describes the transaction
matrices we use on our dataset.
8.6 The Transaction Matrices We Use
The transaction matrices we use are listed in Table 8.2.
8.7 Summary
This chapter has described a novel way to describe financial stock dynamics. Any
financial transaction typically affects several financial stocks, making it difficult to
see what transactions gave rise to the observed financial stock behavior. By using
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a collection of constant matrices describing the structure of the financial sector in a
given country, we can decompose the changes in the financial stocks into revaluation,
current transactions, and capital transactions in a computationally efficient way.
Conversely, the formalism derived here allows us to directly specify the portfolio
allocation behavior of the different institutions while automatically observing the
wealth constraints of the institutions. This formalism thus greatly simplifies the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Investigation of key individual time series and their policy implications
This chapter is the core of the dissertation. Here, we investigate the behavior of key
macro and sectoral variables during the 1990s, so as to understand the behavior of
the economy in response to various disturbances.
This chapter is the foundation of the subsequent analysis: In Chapter 10, we
sketch out some accounting that follows from this chapter’s analysis; then, after an-
other exploratory chapter (Ch. 11), we devote Chapter 12 to comparing the insights
gained to the common stories about structural adjustment in Ghana and common
assumptions of models of structural adjustment that we had discussed in Chapters
3 and 4, respectively. Finally, in Chapter 13 we use the discussion of Chapter 12 as
a base for explaining the behavior of the Ghanaian economy during the 1990s and
making policy suggestions.
The investigation of data in this chapter is divided into two sections. Section
9.2 looks at the supply side of the product markets, namely the validity of the
Incremental Input-Output Ratio, the determinants of investment, and the existence
of price substitution between production for the domestic market vs. for export.
Section 9.3 investigates the demand side of the product markets, namely at the
sources of demand injections, the savings ratio, the consumption demand, and the
price elasticity of substitution between imports and domestically produced goods.
Most of the data (except prices) used in these sections is available on a yearly basis,
giving us a total of 12 data points per variable. This is barely enough to make
reliable statistical inferences; Section 9.1 discusses our way of addressing that.
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As this chapter goes through quite a lot of data, each section is followed by a
section summary as an orientation help to the reader.
9.1 A method for dealing with short data series
While for the financial series, twelve years of monthly data allow us to use a variety
of statistical techniques to analyze the data, the situation is more constrained for
real macro and sectoral data. With such short time series, there is a high danger
of spurious regression, that is, of equations fitting well by chance rather than as an
expression of an underlying causal relationship.
We address this in the following manner: data from 1990 until 1997 are used
for calibration of the equations, and data from 1998 until 2001 to validate it. Thus,
if the equation that fits well in the calibration period also performs well during the
validation years, we conclude that it reflects a causal relationship; otherwise, we
discard it.
This procedure is also useful to get a feeling for how good the model could
be as an instrument of prediction. Once the equations have been validated in the
manner described above, one could then re-calibrate them to the data for the whole
twelve years and use them to predict behavior for 2002 onwards. The ability of the
equation to predict data for 1998-2001 using only data for 1990-1997 could then be
regarded as an indicator of its likely ability to predict future behavior for which no
validation data is available. While doing that is outside of the scope of the present
dissertation, it will be useful in further work on the issue.
All equations tested attempt to explain the independent variable (for example,
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share of imports in consumption of manufactured goods) by means of a (possibly
time-lagged) dependent variable (for example, a relative price) with a possible in-
clusion of a time trend. Besides using the non-lagged value, we try out a fixed lag
(using the value of the independent variable a fixed time, say three months ago),
and an exponential-distributed lag (a weighted average with the weight decaying
exponentially as a function of lag). This gives us three options for lag specification;
an independent decision is whether to include a time trend or not, resulting in six
possible equations. The coefficients to be optimized are an intercept, the coefficient
of the independent variable, a time trend where included, and a time constant where
a time lag is included.
To interpret the time trend and time constant coefficients, one should note
that the unit of time here is one month, thus a time constant of 3 means a lag time
of 3 months, and a time trend of 0.05 means 0.05 per month thus .6 per year.
Since the real-side data are available yearly, and some price series are available
monthly, in such cases the equation was formulated using monthly data, and the
resulting forecast was then summed up at yearly intervals to enable comparison
with the yearly data. In the cases where the independent data was available yearly,
interpolation was used to compute lags that were not multiples of a year.
We estimate the equation by minimizing the squared error of the equation over
the estimation period. As the time lags are a nonlinear function of the lag time,
nonlinear estimation is used.
To make it easier to compare prediction errors in different variables, we first
estimate a constant approximation to the independent variable during the estimation
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period (1990-1997), and then use it to compute R2 measures for both the estimation
and the validation period (the latter being 1998-2001) in the standard way: suppose
the error of the constant approximation is ec, and the error of another approximation
over the same period is e. Then the R2 over that period is defined as R2 = 1− e/ec.
Note that while inside the estimation period adding another variable always leads
to an improved R2 in the usual manner, the extended equation may well (and often
does) have worse fit than a constant over the validation period. Thus the R2 is quite
often negative over the validation period.
Another criterium for equation validity is the value of the time constant that
describes the lag with which the independent variable influences the dependent
variable. We limit the lag to 36 months, in our view an ample margin to allow
changes in the independent variable to have their impact. If the value of the time
constant from the optimization process actually hits the 36-month maximum, we
take that as a sign of a spurious regression and disregard that particular equation.
This practice is confirmed by the fact that such equations typically also have quite
high errors in the validation period.
After selecting the equation that, when estimated over the estimation period,
does best at predicting the validation period behavior, and is thus presumably the
best causal description of the independent variable, we re-estimate it for the whole
period 1990-2001.
The results are summarized in a table for each of the variables inspected. The
best equation’s name is framed and the corresponding constant values are in bold,
as are the constants for that equation re-estimated using data from the whole time
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period. If the estimated value of a time constant equals 36, the constants of that
equation are set in slanted type to indicate that they’re suspect.
To provide visual information over the behavior of the time series investigated
as well as the predictions thereof, we include a graph with each table. There, the
diamonds are the data points being approximated, the thin lines are all the different
equations estimated over the estimation period, and the thick blue line is the best
equation being estimated over the whole period.
Having explained the methodology, we are now ready to discuss the individual
results.
9.2 Supply Side
9.2.1 Incremental Capital-Output Ratio
The first thing we test is the infamous Incremental Capital-Output Ratio or ICOR,
that is the assumption that new investment translates in strict proportion into







, that is the growth rate of GDP is proportional to ratio of investment to GDP,
or also as ∆y/I = σ, that is the growth rate of GDP divided by investment is a
constant.
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Figure 9.1: Ratio of Investment to GDP (log scale)
mean of .626 and a standard deviation of .501, thus a t-ratio of 1.25 - not significant
even at 10% level. If we use last year’s investment to allow for an installation lag,
the t-value is 1.33 - also not significant.
Finally, we regress the rate of growth of GDP on ratio of investment to GDP,
using both the this year’s and last year’s investment at the same time as two ex-
planatory variables. We get an R2 of 12% and neither of the explanatory variables
is significant at the 10% level (t-values of .019 and .698, respectively).
We thus conclude that in accordance with the references quoted in our discus-







































































































































































































































































































































































We try to predict the ration of investment to GDP in real terms as a function of
interest rates on treasury bills and the relative price of imported vs. domestically
produced manufactured goods. The latter is a proxy for return to investment as most
capital equipment is imported, and most of it is used in domestic manufacturing.
As in most of the equations investigated in this chapter, we take the natural
logarithm of both the dependent and the independent variable, so that the coeffi-
cients can be interpreted as dimensionless elasticities. We make an exception for
the interest rate.
This equation does very badly at prediction during the validation period, with
none of the formulation able to out-perform the constant approximation. However,
we can look at patterns in estimated coefficients, and try to draw conclusions from
these.
What we see is firstly, a falling time trend that has disturbing implications for
the overall capital stock in the country. Second, the relative price elasticity is pretty
consistently slightly above -1, implying a high degree of responsiveness to relative
prices. In particular, in the case of a currency depreciation, investment could be
expected to contract quite strongly, so that it would shrink even in nominal terms.
The response to interest rates corresponds to investment over GDP shrinking by
one to four percent (not percentage points) for each percentage point increase in
interest rates - a substantial response if we consider that the interest rates have
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Constant only -1.21 0% 0%
Exponential delay -1.30 0.0042 -0.74 4.25 79% 67%
Fixed delay -1.30 0.0042 -0.73 4.47 79% 67%
No delay -1.34 0.0039 -0.42 75% 65%
Exponential delay,
no trend
-0.98 -1.11 36 7% 21%
Fixed delay, no trend -1.20 -0.05 35 0% -3%
No delay, no trend -1.17 -0.19 4% 9%









Table 9.2: Ratio of exports to nontraded goods in industrial production as function
of relative price
9.2.3 Ratio of exports to nontraded goods in industrial production
In comparison to investment, we are quite successful at predicting the ratio
of exports to nontraded goods in industrial production. The following features
leap to the eye: firstly, equations that include a time trend do vastly better in the
validation period than those that do not. This can be understood as reflecting
the opening up of the economy over the 1990s; all the more so as the time trend
decreases if we estimate the equation for the whole 12 years of the 1990-2001 period.
That can be seen as corresponding to a slowing-down of the opening-up process in
the second half of the period after the drastic trade reforms have had their initial
impact during the first half.
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A more surprising result is that the relative price elasticity turns out to be
consistently negative, and is actually greater in absolute value if we use the whole
time period. This is at first glance surprising as this means that higher prices of
exports relative to nontraded manufactured goods lead to an increase of nontraded
manufactured goods production compared to export production. This is completely
contrary to what one would expect from a traditional neoclassical supply-constrained
productivity-frontier profit-optimizing model.
However, it is fully consistent with a demand-driven nontraded manufacturing
sector, as common e.g. in structuralist models: if exports prices rise relative to
domestic manufactures, this means an increase in income when measured in terms of
domestic manufactures, and thus increased demand for the latter, and thus increased
production thereof. The fact that the elasticity is higher in absolute value if we
estimate the equation using the whole period rather than just 1990-1998 is consistent
with this interpretation: during the second half of the period, exports were a larger
share of the economy, and thus we’d expect this effect to be stronger, as it in fact
is.
This conclusion is also corroborated by separating out mining exports (virtu-
ally all mining output is exported) from the rest of industrial exports (table not
reproduced here). As mining has a completely separate capital stock from the rest
of the industry, one would expect the substitution effects between nontraded and
export production to become more pronounced if one excludes mining exports. How-
ever, upon excluding mining the equation fit became much worse (though the price
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Constant only -1.84 0% 0%
Exponential delay -1.85 -0.0098 3.28 36 42% -404%
Fixed delay -1.87 -0.0014 0.71 30 14% -155%
No delay -1.89 0.0008 0.05 5% -23%
Exponential delay,
no trend
-1.92 0.51 36 14% -219%
Fixed delay, no trend -1.91 0.37 18 13% -198%
No delay, no trend -1.88 0.15 4% 42%







Table 9.3: Ratio of exports to nontraded goods in agricultural production as function
of relative price
important injection if nontraded industry output is demand-driven.
We can thus conclude that the nontraded manufacturing output is demand-
determined.
9.2.4 Ratio of exports to nontraded goods in agricultural production
The picture for agriculture is quite different from that for industry. Firstly, the
time trend in the ratio of exports to nontraded production is unstable over differ-
ent formulations, but largely negative. The reason for this is probably that while
nontraded production is expanding along with total area under cultivation (more
on that below), far and away the only export crop is cocoa, and its production is
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restricted to forested areas, whose total area is shrinking.
The other result is a uniformly positive price elasticity of substitution. Its
values vary between .71 and .15, but the equation with best fit in the validation
period (actually the only one to outperform the constant) has a price elasticity
of .15, which changes to .42 when the same equation is estimated over the whole
period. This is not implausible, as cocoa is an embedded crop and the lifetime of a
tree is several years. Thus while a farmer might devote differing amounts of effort to
tending the trees during different years, this doesn’t lead to a price response nearly
as strong as one would have if cocoa competed with food crops for scarce soil.
The positive price elasticity of substitution between exports and nontraded
crops indicates a supply-constrained sector where production allocation decisions
are made on the basis of relative price. Let us examine the data for the agricul-
tural sector a little closer to see whether the supply constraint hypothesis can be
corroborated.
9.2.5 Behavior of the Agricultural Sector
Let us consider three data variables: first, the ratio of the wholesale food price index
(average over the major food crops) to the Consumer Price Index - a measure of the
relative price of food crops; second, total food crop production per acre, and finally,
total land area under cultivation (Figure 9.2).
We see that a clear change in behavior sets in at about the middle of our
period, in year 1995 (the two periods are separated by the dotted line). Prior to
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Figure 9.2: Food crop production, wholesale price of food crops relative to the CPI
and land area under cultivation
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the same direction as production. That indicates a demand-driven regime (apart
from 1990 which must have been an exceptionally bad harvest). However, from 1995
onwards, the area under cultivation grows steadily, and decreases in production (due
to adverse weather conditions) are accompanied by an increase in price, indicating
a supply-constrained regime. It thus seems likely that around 1995, population
growth has caught up with the country’s capacity to supply food crops, so that
the agricultural sector has switched from a demand-driven to a supply-constrained
regime.
Such a regime switch would also explain the bad fit of the equations, as well
as the somewhat surprising fact that the fit of the best equation was actually better
for the validation period (R2 = 42%) than for the estimation period (R2 = 4%) -
the reason for the latter being that the supply-constrained mode represented by the
positive price elasticity did not kick in before 1995.
Thus we can conclude that as indicated by all the available data, agricultural
production for domestic use has hit a binding supply constraint around year 1995.
Section Summary
This section has investigated some important relationships related to the supply
side of the product markets. We began by testing the venerable Incremental Capital
Output Ratio, and found it to be as devoid of factual support as was the case in all
previous research on the issue.
Then, we turned to the investment-to-GDP ratio as function of the relative
price of domestic manufactures to imports, as well as of the interest rate on treasury
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bills. The performance of all equations was quite poor during the validation period
(perhaps not surprising, as investment is notorious for being hard to predict); still,
the signs and even values of the estimated coefficients were quite stable, and indi-
cated an elasticity larger than one with respect to the relative price of imported vs.
domestic manufactures, and a response of one to four percent to each percentage
point of interest rates.
Finally, investigating the reaction to relative price of exports vs. goods pro-
duced for the domestic market showed drastically different behavior across sectors.
In industry, the data strongly indicated that production for domestic market was
demand-driven. In the case of agriculture, the data showed a change of regime in the
middle of the period under investigation, as the growing population pushed the sec-
tor’s capacity to supply food crops, so that the sector was clearly supply-constrained
from year 1995 onwards.
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9.3 Demand Side
9.3.1 Demand Injection Decomposition
As we turn to the demand side of the product markets, the first thing we look at are
the sources of injections and leakages in the economy. The simplest way to look at
them is to plot each institution’s net savings over time (Figure 9.3), as net savings
represents the difference between the injection and the leakage that are provided by
the institution in question.
Another way to represent the same data is the Taylor decomposition (discussed
in detail in Berg and Taylor [2000]). That is defined as follows: Suppose GDP is
completely demand driven. By diving each institution’s income by total GDP, we get
its ‘leakage ratio’. That would be the savings ratio for the private sector, the overall
tax ratio for the government, etc. By comparing that with that same institution’s
demand, we can see what the GDP would be like if the only leakage and injection
were due to that institution. It is straightforward to show that the actual GDP is
a weighted average of these what-if GDPs (derivation is given in Berg and Taylor
[2000]). This representation is shown in Figure 9.4.
Both these figures show the same pattern, namely that the government was
the major driver of the economy throughout the period. It is perhaps not surprising
in a small poor developing country such as Ghana to see that the rest of the world is
a net drain on demand, even after accounting for foreign aid inflows; nor is it a big
surprise to see that interest payments on government debt (that’s the main source
of the deposit money banks’ income) is a comparable drain on demand. What
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is somewhat more surprising is that the private sector is likewise a net demand
sink, with private savings exceeding private investment throughout. This would
seem to imply that investment is not constrained by availability of savings. Thus
we see that to the extent that output was demand-determined, government was
the major driver of economic growth. We have seen in the previous section that
domestic manufacturing production is in fact demand-driven. Although there is
no data available for services, services are quite likely demand-driven as well due
to the nature of the sector. Thus at least half of GDP is likely due to demand-
driven sectors, and therefore government deficit reduction is likely to have strong
recessionary impacts. We will return to this line of thought in Chapter 12.
9.3.2 Net Private Savings
Here we attempt to explain net private savings (that is savings minus investment)
as a share of private disposable income, as a function of the treasury bill interest
rate. Note that our estimate of net private savings is fairly reliable, as it is directly
derived from monthly financial stock data.
There are two things worth observing here. First, net savings is more stable
than investment, suggesting a flexible savings ratio that accommodates investment
demand. Secondly, interest rates appear to have no predictive power whatsoever
in explaining its variation, which is somewhat surprising, as theory predicts that
increases in interest rates should decrease investment and increase savings, thus
increasing net savings.
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Constant only 0.95 0% 0%
Exponential delay 0.85 -0.0014 0.0063 36 52% -554%
Fixed delay 0.95 -0.0005 0.0010 1 38% -269%
No delay 0.93 -0.0009 0.0020 54% -908%
Exponential delay,
no trend
0.98 -0.0010 36 10% -85%
Fixed delay, no trend 0.98 -0.0009 18 14% -92%
No delay, no trend 0.96 -0.0002 0% 0%
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Constant only 537 0% 0%
Exponential delay -992 1.28 -0.73 1.09 97% 97%
Fixed delay -1056 1.51 0.94 2.35 97% 95%
No delay -964 1.16 -0.61 97% 97%







Table 9.5: Consumption of industrial goods as function of total consumption and
relative price
private demand and then allocate investment and consumption out of that total,
rather than define separate investment and consumption demand functions.
9.3.3 Consumption Function
If we follow the logic of the previous sections, then to fully specify the private
consumption demand by sector it is sufficient to specify consumption of nontraded
industrial goods. Total private demand as a share of private disposable income is
fairly stable, nontraded agricultural goods are supply-determined, and after speci-
fying the investment function we can take demand for services as the residual.
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Constant only -0.52 0% 0%
Exponential delay -0.61 0.0075 -1.24 4.49 89% 71%
Fixed delay -0.62 0.0036 -1.16 3.57 88% 73%
No delay -0.63 0.0035 -1.01 79% 87%
Exponential delay,
no trend
-0.44 -1.16 3.64 59% 77%
Fixed delay, no trend -0.44 -1.13 3.87 59% 75%
No delay, no trend -0.47 -1.01 53% 75%









Table 9.6: Ratio of imports to nontraded goods in consumed industrial goods as
function of relative price
sumption. The fit is quite good. The function here is actually
CI = const1 + (const2 + ε ∗ P ) ∗ C
where CI is the consumption of industrial goods, const1 is the intercept, ε is labeled
in the table as “elasticity” (not really an elasticity in this case) and P is the ratio
of retail price of industrial goods to retail price of food.
9.3.4 Ratio of imports to nontraded goods consumption
The last relationship we investigate here is the relative price response of import













     









Constant only -1.39 0% 0%
Exponential delay -1.70 0.0022 -1.46 36 76% -434%
Fixed delay -1.52 0.0013 -0.53 18.68 80% -442%
No delay -1.38 0.0001 -1.01 0% 1%
Exponential delay,
no trend
-1.44 -0.60 31.18 37% -28%
Fixed delay, no trend -1.44 -0.37 18.17 58% 32%
No delay, no trend -1.39 -0.02 0% 0%







Table 9.7: Ratio of imports to nontraded in consumed non-government services as
function of relative price
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(There is no actual data on the split of goods imports into agricultural and
industrial, and in the 1993 SAM industrial imports are the majority by far; in
compiling the dataset, we have assumed a fixed ratio of industrial to agricultural
imports. However, as the agricultural supply constraint made itself felt in the second
half of the 1990s, the share of agricultural imports in the total could well have
increased - so it would have been cleaner to do this here for goods imports as a
whole. On the other hand, the World Bank figures (only available for some years)
on the ratio of agricultural to industrial imports suggest that ratio is quite stable.
Therefore, we stay with the present formulation for now.)
The predictive power of the constant price elasticity of substitution is quite
strong in the case of industry. All variants of the equation that include time trend
have a validation R2 over 70%. The actual elasticity always comes out larger than
one, which is good news for trying to control import demand through relative price
adjustments.
On a more disturbing note, the ratio of imports to nontraded industrial goods
exhibits a disturbing increasing time trend; in itself this is a manifestation of the
opening of the economy during the 1990; however, as we have discussed in Chapter 3,
imports have consistently outgrown exports. Fortunately, this trend is substantially
lower if we estimate the equation for the whole period, indicating a slowdown in
endogenous import growth.
The fit was less good for services, with the price elasticity being still consis-
tently negative but varying in absolute value among different functional forms.
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Summary
In examining the demand side of the product markets, we have seen that government
demand was the major driving force of the economy in the period we examine.
Private savings net of investment were actually positive throughout, thus also a
net demand drain. The ratio of private disposable income to total private demand
(consumption plus investment) was quite stable at about 0.96, possibly implying a
savings ratio that adjusts to meet investment demand. Finally, the share of imports
vs. domestic goods in consumption demand for manufactured goods in real terms
was found to be extremely responsive to their relative price (relative price elasticity
of substitution larger than one). This means that the balance of payments will be
quite responsive to both the exchange rate and the domestic price level.
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Chapter 10
Fix-flex Accounting in an Open Economy
Once one has estimated the price elasticities of import demand and export supply,
as we have in the preceding chapter, the question naturally arises of how to integrate
the resulting functional relationships into the overall model structure, if an overall
model is what one’s after. This chapter solves some not particularly deep but
somewhat tricky accounting issues that arise thereby, namely when one attepmts to
combine several demand-driven and several supply-constrained sectors in an open
economy such as that of Ghana. This accounting would be at the heart of a dynamic
model if building one could fit into this already ambitious project. As it is, it is
something of a note on the margins, as it were.
10.1 A Fix-Flex Framework in an Open Economy
The problem we will solve here is the determination of imports and nontraded
production given aggregate demand levels, when for some of the sectors nontraded
production meets demand, but for other sectors total nontraded production is given
in advance. Suppose that all relaive prices are known (in a model, they would
evolve dynamically in a different module); thus in demand-constrained sectors the
allocation of production between nontraded goods and exports is given. Likewise,
assume we know the export volumes for the sectors whose nontraded production is
demand-driven.
Now consider an increase in aggregate demand, and the way it gets distributed
among imports and nontraded goods. In demand-driven sectors, domestic produc-
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tion will grow along with imports, maintaining a fixed import-to-nontraded volume
ratio. This could be the case for manufactures in Ghana. On the other hand, for
supply-constrained sectors, such as agriculture, all extra demand will spill directly
into imports.
So far, so simple. However, the picture is complicated by two extra develop-
ments: fistly, demand-driven and supply-constrained sectors use each other’s output
as intermediate inputs. Secondly, domestic trasport and retail services, although
demand driven, are only supplied by domestic producers, and are not directly de-
manded by consumers, but rather are bundled with the final goods that consumers
demand.
While all these restrictions could conceivably be formulated as implicit con-
straints on the solution, we feel it is desirable to make the computations explicit.
That will make them more transparent, clarify the causal structrure, and speed up
the numerical solution process. As several hundred runs, at least, are typically nec-
essary for numerical estimation and sensitivity analysis of a dynamic model of the
size ours would have to be, speed is not a negligible factor.
Let us formulate the problem precisely. First, consider the flow equilibrium
condition in the goods markets, in real terms - it is always observed as any product or
service bought by somebody must be sold by somebody else. Let E be the vector of
exports by sector, A the total absorbtion (private consumption plus investment plus
government final demand), II the total intermediate input demand, I imports, and
N non traded production. All of these are vectors with the elements corresponding
to sectors. Further, let S denote the square matrix describing derived demand for
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transport and retail, so that derived demand for transport and retail equals S(I+N).
All rows of S are zero except the row corresponding to transport and retail services,
with the entries in this row containing the sector-specific values of the retail markup.
As transport and retail itself does not attract a retail markup (it can use retail as
intermediate input, but that is taken care of in the Leontief matrix below), the
diagonal entries of S are all zero, and thus S2 = 0.
With the notation just introduced, we can formulate the flow equilibrium
condition in the goods markets, in real terms:
E + A + II + S(I +N) = I +N + E (10.1)
Now intermediate inputs can be decomposed in intermediate inputs used by private
sector for export production, by private sector for nontraded production, and by
the government. We assume that the private sector uses a Leontief technology,
while the government determines the composition of its intermediate input demand
arbitrarily. Thus we have
II = IIg + LE + LN (10.2)
with L being the Leontief matrix. For easier manipulation let us define total demand
as
D = I +N (10.3)
Then (10.1), after canceling out the exports on both sides and inserting (10.2) and
(10.3), becomes
D = (A + IIg + LE) + LN + SD ⇔ (10.4)
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(1 − S) = D (A+ IIg + LE) + LN ⇔ (10.5)
D = (1 + S) [(A+ IIg + LE) + LN ] (10.6)
The second transition holds as S2 = 0, and therefore (1 − S)−1 = (1 + S) (with 1
denoting the unity matrix throughout). The equation (10.6) is actually a quite in-
tuitive version of the product flow equilibrium: total demand equals absorption plus
intermediate input demand, with the retail/transport markup on top of everything.
If we denote
Ã = (1 + S) (A+ IIg + LE) (10.7)
L̃ = (1 + S)L (10.8)
then (10.6) can be re-written as
D = Ã + L̃N (10.9)
Here Ã is a combination of known quantities and is therefore known; likewise L̃.
Having thus converted the basic conservation law into a form suitable for convenient
manipulation, let us now turn to allocating demand between imports and nontraded
goods.
To begin with, let’s pretend all sectors are demand driven and therefore for
each sector i the ratio σi of nontraded goods to imports is a function of relative price
and therefore fixed for our purposes. Let σ be a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
entries are σi. Then the constant ratio relationship can be written as
N = σI + SD (10.10)
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because the domestic transport and retail services are not subject to that ratio
relationnship, but are supplied purely domestically, as a markup on demand.
Using (10.9) we can re-write (10.10) as
N = σ(D −N) + SD = (10.11)
= σ(Ã+ L̃N −N) + S(Ã+ L̃N) = (10.12)
= (σ + S)Ã+ [(σ + S)L̃− σ)]N ⇔ (10.13)
[
1 + σ − (σ + S)L̃
]
N = (σ + S)Ã (10.14)
We are now almost at our goal. However, the reader must at this point resist the
urge to invert the matrix in front of N in (10.14), as (10.14) is not in truth valid for
all sectors, but only for demand-driven ones. All of our manipulations starting with
(10.10) only consisted in rearranging terms without mixing up the different sectors,
and thus the equality (10.14) is still true for the demand-driven sectors, but not for
supply - constrained ones.
Let us denote
B = 1 + σ − (σ + S)L̃ (10.15)
= 1 + σ − (σ + S)(1 + S)L (10.16)
A(1) = (σ + S)Ã (10.17)
= [(σ + S) (1 + S)] (A+ IIg + LE) (10.18)
Then (10.14) can be rewritten as
BN = A(1) (10.19)
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Note that the matrix B is constant and is computed in a straigthforward man-
ner from the known matrices describing import to nontraded ratio, retail markups
and the Leontief technology. Likewise, the vector A(1) is easily computed by multi-
plying the exogenous demand injections by a constant matrix.
Now (10.19) is still only true for the elements corresponding to demand-driven












































As we have said before, only the lower half of (10.21), that is the part refer-
ring to demand-driven sectors is true. Thus we finally arrive at the precisely true
expression for the demand-driven sectors:
BdsNs +BddNd = A
(1)
d (10.22)
As the nontraded output of the supply-constrained sectors vector Ns is known, we











Inserting that into (10.20) we obtain the whole nontraded output vectorN . Inserting
it into (10.9) gives us the total demand D, and solving (10.3) for I gives us imports
by sector.
10.2 Summary
This section derived the accounting for determining total volumes of imports and
nontraded production given total absorbtion and export volumes, in an open econ-
omy combining supply-constrained and demand-driven sectors. It took into account
relative price-determined ratios between imports and nontraded goods, retail ratios,
and the demand for intermediate inputs.
Once the derivation is done, the actual computation required is quite simple.
This can be a useful component of a dynamic model of a fix-flex open economy with
an arbitary number of sectors.
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Chapter 11
Econometric Investigation of Monthly Time Series
11.1 Introduction
In contrast to the real-side variables investigated in the previous chapter, for which
only yearly series are available, most nominal and financial variables, such as the
Consumer Price Index, exchange rate and the interest rates, are available on a
monthly basis for all or most of the period in question. We are thus able to conduct
much more rigorous statistical hypothesis testing, and proceed to do so in the present
chapter. We restrict ourselves to analyzing the behavior of two key nominal prices,
namely the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the exchange rate (cedis to the dollar),
and of the broad money supply. We use the Stata statistical package throughout. As
in the previous chapter, we provide individual summaries for each section, instead
of one chapter summary; the summaries in this chapter are brief and technical, with
the discussion of implications for theory and policy reserved for later chapters.
Let us denote the natural log of the consumer price index by cpi, the natural
log of the exchange rate by er, and the natural log of the broad money supply m2.
(As changes in the value of either macro price are typically in proportion to its
current value, it is common practice to consider them in log form). As we will see
below, all these three variables are first order integrated (I(1)), as is common for
nominal time series.
We begin by listing the explanatory variables suggested by economic theory
for each of our three dependent variables, and running a regular least squares re-
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gression using these. Unfortunately, since all three dependent variables are I(1)
nonstationary, the results of these regressions are only meaningful if the variables
are cointegrated. Using the Durbin-Watson statistic, we fail to find cointegration in
all three cases
In the absence of cointegration, we have to resort to ARIMA-X (Autoregres-
sive Integrated Moving Average with eXogenous variables) regressions using first
differences and lags of independent variables (Stata command arima).
For those independent variables that are only available yearly (namely GDP
and export and import dollar price indices), we first interpolate them to monthly
using an algorithm due to Prof. Clopper Almon, and then only use the 12 month-
seasonal difference S12.X(t)=X(t)-X(t-12)1 in the regressions, as results arising
from using any shorter differences would likely be an artifact of the interpolation
method used.
To find out the correct lag structure for the variables where original data
series were monthly, we first regress the dependent variable on fifteen lags of each
independent variable in turn, as well as ar(1/6,12) and ma(1/6,12), with the 12-
month autoregressive lag inserted to account for possible seasonal effects, and note
1For those of our readers unfamiliar with Stata, an explanation of the notation is in order at
this point. The expression D.X or D1.X refers to the first difference of the variable X, that is,
D.X(t)=X(t)-X(t-1). LN.X refers to lag of order N ; for example, is, L5.X(t)=X(t-5). SN.X(t)
refers to the “seasonal difference”; for example, S4X(t)=X(t)-X(t-4). These operators can be
nested – for example, L2S3.X(t)=X(t-2)-X(t-5)=L2D.X(t)+L3D.X(t)+L4D.X(t).
Further, 1/5 is a short notation for 1,2,3,4,5 (as the usual notation 1-5 could be confused with
subtracting 5 from 1).
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down the lags of the independent variable that prove significant.
We use the information thus obtained to formulate a first, rather generously
overparametrized regression, and use it as a first in a model identification process,
generating a sequence of ever simpler models while at each step computing several
statistics to make sure that residuals still behave as white noise and that we are not
losing substantial quality of fit.
Finally, we test the predictive qualities of the model we have thus identified by
using it to predict its corresponding dependent variable from January 1998 onwards,
one time with coefficients estimated from the whole dataset, and one time with
coefficients estimated using only pre-1998 data. The details for each dependent
variable are presented below.
11.2 Consumer Price Index
To explain the behavior of the Consumer Price Index, we use the following variables:
Money supply (broad money m2, computed from the side of liabilities of the banking
system) and real GDP as the traditional price level determinants in the velocity
of money equation; exchange rate, wholesale price of food crops and price of fuel
(the latter being government-controlled) as important components of cost; and the
interest rate on government bonds. All of these variables except the interest rate
are taken in natural log terms.
The relationship between the price level and the money supply is of particular
interest to us due to its relevance to both theory and policy, as we have discussed
in Chapters 3 and 4. Figure 11.1 shows inflation and broad money growth rate for
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our period.
On the policy side, a vision of an active money supply that drives the aggregate
price level while being itself to a large extent controlled by the government is at the
core of IMF-inspired adjustment programs. On the theoretical side, the direction of
causality between the price level and the money supply is one of the key differences
between structuralist and Walrasian/monetarist CGE models.
As we have seen in Chapter 4, in structuralist models prices are determined
from the side of costs, with no direct influence of the money supply on prices; the
main indirect channel would be through interest rates, larger money supply leading
to more credit supply, lower interest rates and thus lower inflation pressure from the
cost of borrowing.
In Walrasian/monetarist models the picture is almost exactly reversed. To
begin with, the standard money demand equation Py = V (r)M means that an
increase in the money supply translates ceteris paribus directly into a proportional
increase in the price level; secondly, increasing interest rates will increase money
demand, lowering the velocity of money and lowering the price level. The question
of which of these two views is correct is crucial for choosing and evaluating monetary
policy options.
The role of the interest rate is important as the interest rate is a common policy
tool for inflation control. It was for inflation control purposes that the interest rates
in the 1990s were set so high in Ghana. The interest rate is an interesting variable in
this context, as it is considered by monetarists to stimulate money demand and thus




































































































D.cpi D.m2 D.er D.fuel D.food D.rtb
Significant lags 1-9 - 1 0-2 1-3
Table 11.1: Preliminary Lag Structure Examination for CPI
primarily as a component of cost and thus would expect its increase to lead to an
increase in inflation. Thus the sign of its coefficient will be quite interesting to see.
We take the interest rate on treasury bills rather than, say, the interest rate on
deposits, because it is closely related to the other key domestic interest rates, and
because it is the actual instrument that the Bank of Ghana uses for the purposes of
inflation control.
To begin our analysis, let us first test the CPI for stationarity. Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test (dfuller cpi,trend regress) returns ADF=-0.51, correspond-
ing to p = .98. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on D.cpi and D.er returns ADF=-4.6,
corresponding to p = 0.001. Thus we conclude that cpi is I(1).
We proceed to run a regular least-squares regression
reg cpi mb gdp er fuel food rtb; dwstat
which returns a d-value of .285, well below the cointegration significance thresh-
old. Thus the variables are not cointegrated and we have to run an ARIMA-X
regression.
To find out the correct lag structure, we first run
arima D.cpi X L.X ... L15.X, ar(1/6,12) ma(1/6,12)
where the variables X are listed in Table 11.1. GDP does not appear in the
table because it has been interpolated from a yearly series and thus we will only use
S12.gdp.
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From Table 11.1 we see that the impacts of money supply are significant over
a long period, while impacts of rises in wholesale food crop prices (denoted food)
and fuel prices are almost instantaneous and the results are less clear for the other
variables. Based on that information, we formulate the first regression which is
reported in Table 11.2.
The meaning of the different columns of Table 11.2 bears some explanation.
Akaike’s Information Criterion and Schwarz’s Criterion are used to compare quality
of fit for different models while adjusting for the different number of coefficients
in different models, with more negative values meaning better fit (as both are de-
rived from log-likelihood). We computed them using the Stata command arimafit.
Portemanteau (Q) statistic (Stata command wntestq)and Bartlett’s (B) statistic
(wntestb) are measures of whether the residuals behave like white noise. For com-
pactness reasons, we only report the corresponding p-values, that is, the probabilities
that a given residuals sequence has been produced by a white noise process. There-
fore, higher p-values are evidence for white noise and therefore for a good model.
We start from a generously overparametrized regression, including autoregres-
sive and moving average terms 1/6 and 12, the latter being there to account for
possible seasonal effects. In successful steps we can whittle that down to ar(1)
which is then highly significant and remains so throughout the latter regressions.
In the next step, we proceed to trim down the independent variables. To see
whether a variable (meaning all of its lags) belongs into the regression, we use two
measures: firstly, we use the Stata command test to test the hypothesis that the
coefficients of all of the lags of that variable are zero; secondly, we use lincom to test
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ARMA terms Exo terms AIC SIC wntestq wntestb
ar(1,2,12) ma(1,2,12) D.m2. . . L12D.m2,
S12.gdp,
D.er. . . L6D.er,
D.fuel. . . L2D.fuel,
D.food. . . L3D.food,
D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb
-781 -668 77% 92%
ar(1,2) ma(1,2) D.m2. . . L12D.m2,
S12.gdp,
D.er. . . L6D.er,
D.fuel. . . L2D.fuel,
D.food. . . L3D.food,
D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb
-778 -671 84% 99.90%
ar(1) ma(1) D.m2. . . L12D.m2,
S12.gdp,
D.er. . . L6D.er,
D.fuel. . . L2D.fuel,
D.food. . . L3D.food,
D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb
-779 -677 76% 78%
ar(1) D.m2. . . L12D.m2,
S12.gdp,
D.er. . . L6D.er,
D.fuel. . . L2D.fuel,
D.food. . . L3D.food,
D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb
-779 -681 47% 36%
ar(1) D.m2. . . L12D.m2,
D.fuel. . . L2D.fuel,
D.food. . . L3D.food,
D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb
-782 -700 74% 70%
ar(1) D.m2. . . L12D.m2,
D.fuel. . . L2D.fuel,
D.food. . . L3D.food
-781 -719 13% 78%
ar(1) D.m2. . . L12D.m2,
D.fuel. . . L2D.fuel,
D.food. . . L2D.food
-783 -724 13% 79%
ar(1) D.m2. . . L12D.m2,
D.fuel. . . L2D.fuel,
D.food. . . L2D.food
-783 -724 13% 79%
Table 11.2: ARIMA-X model identification for D.cpi
199
Sample: 13 to 136 Number of obs = 124 Semi-robust
Wald chi2(20) = 244.07 Log likelihood = 412.7643 Prob > chi2 = 0
D.cpi Coeff. Stdev. z P > z 95% Conf. Interval
m2 D1 0.025 0.028 0.90 36.9% -0.030 0.080
LD 0.074 0.036 2.10 3.6% 0.005 0.144
L2D 0.079 0.041 1.91 5.6% -0.002 0.160
L3D 0.080 0.042 1.89 5.9% -0.003 0.163
L4D 0.163 0.039 4.21 0.0% 0.087 0.239
L5D 0.133 0.042 3.16 0.2% 0.051 0.215
L6D 0.096 0.042 2.27 2.3% 0.013 0.179
L7D 0.009 0.041 0.21 83.0% -0.072 0.089
L8D 0.005 0.030 0.18 86.0% -0.053 0.064
L9D 0.008 0.034 0.23 81.5% -0.058 0.074
L10D -0.013 0.032 -0.43 67.1% -0.076 0.049
L11D 0.004 0.033 0.14 89.3% -0.061 0.070
L12D -0.025 0.028 -0.91 36.5% -0.079 0.029
fuel D1 -0.001 0.010 -0.10 92.4% -0.021 0.019
LD 0.042 0.015 2.73 0.6% 0.012 0.072
L2D 0.016 0.013 1.24 21.7% -0.009 0.040
food D1 0.015 0.010 1.47 14.2% -0.005 0.035
LD 0.022 0.011 1.97 4.9% 0.000 0.045
L2D 0.029 0.009 3.31 0.1% 0.012 0.046
cons 0.0004 0.0063 0.06 95.5% -0.0120 0.0127
ar L1 0.706 0.072 9.85 0.0% 0.566 0.847
/sigma2 0.0086 0.0006 15.28 0.0% 0.0075 0.0098
Table 11.3: ARIMA-X regression for D.cpi
whether the sum of all the lags’ coefficients is zero. If both of these give p-values
above 30%, the variable is a candidate for elimination.
In the first step, we eliminate GDP and the exchange rate, without any losses
in quality of fit or in the likeness of residuals to white noise. Then we do the same
to the interest rate, ending up with a regression presented in Table 11.3.
The regression of Table 11.3 is further summarized in Table 11.4, where we
report the values and standard deviations of the sum of each variable’s coefficients
(describing the total impact of a change in that variable on the price level), as well




Value Stdev Coeff. p Variable p Total
Impact
m2 D. . . L12D 0.673 0.213 0.20% 0.51% 0.85
fuel LD. . . L2D 0.057 0.024 1.90% 2.70% 0.07
food D. . . L2D 0.066 0.025 0.90% 1% 0.08
cons 0.0004 0.0062 96.00% 95%
ar(1) 0.706 0.071 0.00%
Table 11.4: Summary of ARIMA-X regression for D.cpi
as the probability that all of that variable’s coefficients are zero. The column “Total
Impact” shows the overall impact of each variable after accounting for the positive
feedback loop between prices and money supply (see Section 11.4) that increases all
impacts by 27%.
What do we learn from these tables? First of all we see that interest rates,
exchange rate and GDP do not have a significant direct impact on the price level.
On the other hand, the impact of changes in broad money supply is substantial,
with a 1% increase in broad money supply leading to over a .85% increase in the
CPI after inflation inertia is taken into account; the total impacts of fuel prices and
wholesale food crop prices are smaller but also not negligible, with a 1% increase in
either leading to a total .08% resp. .07% increase in CPI. These two price indices
are much more volatile, and their impacts are almost instantaneous, whereas the
impact of increases in money supply takes about a year to fully work itself out.
Thus, the contributions of the price of fuel and the wholesale price of food crops to
inflation at any given time could in principle be larger than those of money supply.
However, we can see that this is rarely the case from Figure 11.2, which shows
the respective contributions to inflation over time of each of the three independent
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variables (reconstructed from the regression in Table 11.3).
A hopeful sign is that the constant turns out to be entirely non-significant (p =
96%), so that inflation is completely predicted by changes in our chosen independent
variables, without a constant term that would have stood for an exogenous trend in
the price level and thus would have suggested we have omitted some of the inflation
determinants, namely those causing that trend.
Another way of assessing how well the regression of Table 11.3 is by using it
for forecasting part of the data, in the manner of Chapter 9. For this, we use the
predict command of Stata to predict cpi from January 1998 onwards. We have
several options to construct such a forecast: firstly, we can use the actual values
of the variable in a previous month to predict the value of the variable at the next
time step. This will result in a very good fit as that was the expression whose error
was maximized in the regression in the first place. However, this is not a good
indicator of prediction quality as we would not know the previous’ month inflation
when predicting a moment several months into the future. Thus, to get a better
estimate of predictive power of our regression, we should determine each month’s
inflation recursively, using last month’s predicted value in the autoregressive term
(option dynamic() in Stata). If such an approach gives good results, that would
be encouraging, but not quite enough - after all, the regression coefficients were
determined using the data for the whole period, not just the pre-1998 period. Thus,
the next step is to re-run the regression of Table 11.3 using only data up to January
1998, and use the resulting coefficients to do post-January 1998 predictions. If that

























































































































































































Figure 11.3: Actual CPI vs. predictions from ARIMA-X regressions
We should note that even the latter approach is not fully equivalent to the
approach of Chapter 9, as model identification, that is the choice of variables and
lags in Table 11.3 was also made using the whole dataset. To make the testing quite
clean, we should repeat the model identification process using only pre-1998 data;
however, as this step would require much more effort than the previous ones, we
regretfully omit it. The results are shown in Figure 11.3 and are quite encouraging
- all three versions do quite well at predicting the CPI several years into the future.
The predictions are both accurate and robust with respect to the choice of estimation
time period.
A plausible way of interpreting the deviations would be to say that the CPI
occasionally outgrows our prediction due to some short-term cost shock, but always
tends back to the medium-term value that is predicted by our regression.
On this hopeful note, we conclude the investigation of the price level and turn
to understanding one of its major determinants, namely the broad money supply.
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11.2.1 Summary
Investigation of the price behavior gives us both expected and unexpected results.
On the expected side, money supply is highly significant for price formation, and
takes its effect gradually over with a lag of two to nine months. Increases in fuel
and wholesale food crop prices are also highly significant, but their impacts happen
over a much shorter period (lags 0-2). Using just these three variables, we can
predict cpi surprisingly well four years into the future (1998-2001), with coefficients
estimated using pre-1998 data only.
On the surprising side, exchange rate depreciation, interest rate changes, and
GDP growth appear to not have significant direct influence on inflation.
11.3 Money Supply
The first issue we have to address in this section is the justification of the definition
of money supply that we will use. The main options are definition from the liability
vs. asset side of the banking system and monetary base vs. broad money (for an
introduction to these terms, see Chapter 5).
Regarding the first of the two choices, we choose to define money supply from
the side of the banking system’s liabilities. This is preferable from both monetarist
and structuralist theoretical perspectives as the money supply is meant to represent
the liquidity held by the private sector.
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Broad Money vs. Monetary Base
As for the choice between monetary base and broad money, the first question one
might ask is whether it makes any difference. In fact, if the reserve requirement is
exactly observed, simple algebra shows the two are proportional. Thus, while from
the theoretical side it would seem preferable to take broad money as a measure of
private sector’s liquid assets, it is common in CGE models [Kraev 2003, Table 2.2]
to take the monetary base as the money supply whose market is cleared by the price
level.
However in the case of Ghana, where interest rates above 30% were not at all
unusual in the 1990s, the reserve requirement was not exactly observed. In fact,
it was common for the banks to have liquidity (in the form of government bonds)
well in excess of the reserve requirement, making base money and broad money two
independent variables.
We test the constancy of the ratio between monetary base and broad money by
first computing the log of that ratio for each month (by subtracting the log of mon-
etary base mb from the log of broad money m2) and then testing it for stationarity
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, which returns Z(t) = −2.202, p = 0.4900.
Thus, we conclude that the two definitions of money supply are not in fact propor-
tional, and it does make a difference as to which one we use. We use broad money
m2 as it would seem a better measure of the private sector’s liquid assets, and use
the monetary base mb as one of its explanatory variables.
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Choice of Explanatory Variables
We choose the following explanatory variables: Consumer Price Index cpi, the
interest rate on government bonds rtb, the exchange rate er, and the monetary
base mb. Of these, all are in log terms except rtb, which is measured in percentage
points.
We choose these independent variables for the following reasons: We have
seen in Section 11.2 that the direct effect of interest rate increases on inflation is
not significant. In itself, this did not settle the question of the total effect of the
interest rates on inflation, as a theoretically important channel is the influence of
interest rates on money supply - something we would not observe in the regression
of Table 11.3 as money supply is also an independent variable there.
As we have discussed in the previous section, an important way in which raising
interest rates could combat inflation is by reducing the money supply (as the private
sector chooses to hold government bonds rather than liquidity when interest rates
rise). Whether they do so or not is an important question for monetary policy.
The role of the CPI is important to complement our understanding of the CPI-
money supply causality. In monetarist theory, money supply drives prices through
clearing of the money market. In structuralist theory, prices can drive money supply
through demand for working capital - firms are assumed to create/repay loans so as
to hold an amount of liquidity proportional to the nominal value of their stock of
goods being processed, and thus proportional to the price level.
We have seen in the cpi section that the money supply has a strong influence
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on the price level, but the question still remains whether there is also causality
pointing in the other direction, creating a feedback loop, or whether the money
supply is largely unaffected by the price level.
Exchange rate is included because the money supply has a substantial foreign
currency-denominated component, making revaluation a potentially important con-
tribution to money supply growth. Finally, monetary base is important as it is more
or less directly controlled by the central bank and is an important policy instrument.
Model Identification and Estimation
First of all, let us note that m2 is nonstationary, I(1): ADF for m2 gives Z(t)=-
2.26, p = 0.26, ADF for D.m2 gives Z(t)=-9.7999, p = 0.0000. Regressing m2 on
rtb,cpi, er and mb gives us a d = .1844, way below the 10% significance level (.322)
for cointegration. Thus the variables in question are not cointegrated, and we will
resort to ARIMA-X regression as before. We have seen before that cpi is I(1). So
are the other independent variables: ADF for rtb gives p = .91, and ADF for D.rtb
gives p = 0.0000; ADF for er gives p = .83, and ADF for D.er gives p = 0.0000;
ADF for mb gives p = .23, and ADF for D.rtb gives p = 0.0000.
Now we proceed to identify and estimate the model using the same strategy as
in the previous section, with the regressions described in Table 11.5. The regression
we ultimately arrive at is shown in Table 11.6 and summarized in Table 11.7.
Looking at these tables, we see that cpi has no significant influence on the
money supply. Further, in contrast to the cpi regression, all variables’ impacts are
quite quick, taking no more than two months to develop. Monetary base increase by
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ARMA terms Exogenous terms AIC SIC wntestq wntestb
ar(1/6,12) ma(1/6,12) D.rtb. . . L5D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L9D.cpi,
D.er. . . L9D.er,
D.mb. . . L9D.mb
-698 -558 97% 100%
ar(1/2) ma(1/2) D.rtb. . . L5D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L9D.cpi,
D.er. . . L9D.er,
D.mb. . . L9D.mb
-668 -557 98% 92%
ar(1/2) D.rtb. . . L5D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L9D.cpi,
D.er. . . L9D.er,
D.mb. . . L9D.mb
-670 -565 97% 92%
- D.rtb. . . L5D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L9D.cpi,
D.er. . . L9D.er,
D.mb. . . L9D.mb
-672 -574 97% 61%
- D.rtb. . . L3D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L3D.cpi,
D.er. . . L4D.er,
D.mb. . . L2D.mb
-705 -653 95% 54%
- D.rtb. . . L3D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L3D.cpi,
D.er. . . LD.er,
D.mb. . . L2D.mb
-713 -671 95% 81%
- D.rtb. . . L2D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L3D.cpi,
D.er. . . LD.er,
D.mb. . . L2D.mb
-714 -674 96% 87%
Table 11.5: ARIMA-X model identification for D.m2
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Sample: 4 to 156 Number of obs = 153 Semi-robust
Wald chi2(12) =111.1 Log likelihood = 370.0599 Prob > chi2 = 0
D.m2 Coeff. Stdev. z P > z 95% Conf. Interval
rtb D1 0.0002 0.0011 0.18 86.0% -0.0020 0.0024
LD -0.0010 0.0010 -0.98 32.9% -0.0031 0.0010
L2D -0.0027 0.0012 -2.21 2.7% -0.0051 -0.0003
cpi D1 -0.104 0.183 -0.57 56.9% -0.462 0.254
LD 0.129 0.267 0.48 62.9% -0.394 0.651
L2D -0.062 0.312 -0.20 84.1% -0.674 0.549
L3D -0.089 0.198 -0.45 65.2% -0.477 0.299
er D1 0.028 0.082 0.34 73.5% -0.134 0.189
LD 0.157 0.070 2.24 2.5% 0.020 0.295
mb D1 0.195 0.047 4.18 0.0% 0.104 0.287
LD 0.114 0.020 5.79 0.0% 0.076 0.153
L2D 0.016 0.023 0.68 49.5% -0.030 0.062
cons 0.017 0.004 4.35 0.0% 0.009 0.025
/sigma 0.022 0.001 14.63 0.0% 0.019 0.024
Table 11.6: ARIMA-X regression for D.m2
Variable Terms included Value Stdev Coefficient p Variable p
rtb D . . . L2D -0.0035 0.0015 2.0% 1.0%
cpi D . . . L3D -0.127 0.203 29.0% 86.0%
er D . . . LD 0.185 0.870 3.3% 3.8%
mb D . . . L2D 0.326 0.052 0.0% 0.0%
cons 0.017 0.004 0.0%
Table 11.7: Summary of ARIMA-X regression for D.m2
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one percent increases money supply by about .3%, and exchange rate depreciation
of 1% increases money supply by a little under .2%. An increase in the interest rate
by ten percentage points results in an extra 3.5% decrease in the money supply3, in
accordance with the portfolio balance theory.
A more worrying development is a constant of .017, corresponding to an ex-
ogenous yearly growth rate of money supply of .017×12 ≈ 20%. This becomes even
more worrying once we use the model of Table 11.6 to predict m2 from January 1998
onwards, once using the coefficients of Table 11.6 and once using the model of Table
11.6 re-estimated using only pre-1998 data. As Figure 11.4 shows, the constant
trend dominates the predictions in both cases, and the predictions fail to capture
the slowdown of money supply growth in 1998. We would like the behavior of money
supply to be explained by the explanatory variables and its own past values – there
is little theoretical justification for an exogenous constant growth rate. Therefore,
we repeat the model identification process, this time forcing the constant in the
regressions to be zero throughout. The model identification process is portrayed in
Table 11.8, with the model we arrive at shown in Table 11.9 and summarized in
Table 11.10. The predictions derived from that model are shown in Figure 11.5. As
before, Total Impact refers to the total medium-term impact after accounting for
3It is perhaps worth reminding the reader that unlike the other variables, rtb is measured in
percentage points (rtb=17 corresponding to 17%) and not considered in log terms. Thus, while a
one percent change in the growth rate of the money supply means D.m2=0.01, an increase of the
interest rate by one percentage point means D.rtb=1. This is the reason that the coefficients of
the interest rate typically have two leading zeros after the comma.
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Figure 11.4: Actual M2 vs. predictions from ARIMA-X regressions
the effect of the feedback loop between money supply and prices, discussed below
in Section 11.4.
As the constant was significant in the regressions of Table 11.5, removing it
naturally results in lower Akaike and Schwarz scores; however, we are compensated
by much better behavior of the predictors, as well as higher significance values. We
see that both predictors still over-estimate the values of m2, but by a lower margin,
and their behavior is much more similar to actual m2 behavior. Furthermore, the
predictor from the model estimated with pre-1998 data has very similar behavior to
that estimated using the full data. Thus we conclude that the model seems to be
robust with respect to choice of estimation data period and reasonably-well behaved,
even if unfortunately not as precise as the model for cpi.
Our explanation for the comparatively poor precision of the model is that our
definition of m2 perforce had to omit foreign exchange cash (mostly dollar bills)
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ARMA terms Exo terms AIC SIC wntestq wntestb
ar(1/6, 12) ma(1/6, 12) D.rtb. . . L5D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L9D.cpi,
D.er. . . L9D.er,
D.mb. . . L9D.mb
-658 -518 99% 100.00%
ar(1/3) ma(1/3) D.rtb. . . L5D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L9D.cpi,
D.er. . . L9D.er,
D.mb. . . L9D.mb
-663 -546 95% 50.00%
ar(1/3) D.rtb. . . L5D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L9D.cpi,
D.er. . . L9D.er,
D.mb. . . L9D.mb
-655 -547 95% 86.00%
ar(1) D.rtb. . . L5D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L9D.cpi,
D.er. . . L9D.er,
D.mb. . . L9D.mb
-656 -555 96% 78.00%
- D.rtb. . . L5D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L9D.cpi,
D.er. . . L9D.er,
D.mb. . . L9D.mb
-658 -560 96% 77%
- D.rtb. . . L3D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . L2D.cpi,
D.er. . . L2D.er,
D.mb. . . L3D.mb
-691 -646 89% 40%
Table 11.8: ARIMA-X model identification for D.m2, no constant



























Figure 11.5: Actual M2 vs. predictions from ARIMA-X regressions without a con-
stant term
213
Sample: 4 to 156 Number of obs = 153 Semi-robust
Wald chi2(14) =333.62 Log likelihood = 360.889 Prob > chi2 = 0
D.m2 Coeff. Stdev. z P > z 95% Conf. Interval
rtb D1 -0.0007 0.0013 -0.52 60.1% -0.0033 0.0019
LD -0.0021 0.0010 -1.97 4.9% -0.0041 0.0000
L2D -0.0038 0.0014 -2.68 0.7% -0.0066 -0.0010
L3D 0.0006 0.0008 0.65 51.6% -0.0011 0.0022
cpi D1 0.071 0.178 0.40 68.9% -0.278 0.421
LD 0.150 0.290 0.52 60.5% -0.418 0.718
L2D 0.108 0.227 0.47 63.5% -0.338 0.553
er D1 0.144 0.096 1.50 13.5% -0.045 0.332
LD 0.223 0.089 2.50 1.2% 0.048 0.398
L2D -0.001 0.084 -0.01 99.3% -0.166 0.165
mb D1 0.222 0.051 4.31 0.0% 0.121 0.323
LD 0.138 0.021 6.54 0.0% 0.097 0.180
L2D 0.034 0.028 1.20 22.9% -0.021 0.090
L3D -0.032 0.022 -1.45 14.6% -0.075 0.011
/sigma 0.023 0.002 12.84 0.0% 0.019 0.026
Table 11.9: ARIMA-X regression for D.m2, no constant
Variable Terms
included
Value Stdev Coefficient p Variable p Total
Impact
rtb D. . . L3D -0.006 0.0018 0.1% 0.0% -0.008
cpi D. . . L2D 0.329 0.085 0.0% 0.1% 0.418
er D. . . L2D 0.366 0.103 0.0% 0.2% 0.465
mb D. . . L3D 0.363 0.053 0.0% 0.0% 0.461
Table 11.10: Summary of ARIMA-X regression for D.m2, no constant
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held by the populace. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is a not insubstantial
component, as dollars are widely used as a store of value; however it is not easy
to measure and thus no data on it was readily available. While it is thus not
included in our definitions of either m2 or mb, it still affects them through portfolio
re-balancing, introducing the imprecision we observe. It would be interesting to
attempt to deduce the actual amount of foreign currency held by the populace by
optimizing this predictor, but we will not attempt that here.
As the model without a constant trend exhibits more reasonable prediction
behavior and is the more reasonable from a theoretical perspective, we will use it
as the base for further analysis. Thus, from Table 11.10 we observe that a ten
percentage point increase in the interest rate actually decreases the money supply
growth rate by 6%, monetary base growth and exchange rate depreciation both have
coefficients of about 0.36, and the CPI is now highly significant with a coefficient of
0.33. All of these effects happen within three months, and are then all increased by
a factor of about 1.27 over the next year, as discussed in the next section.
11.3.1 Summary
This section investigated the dependence of the broad money supply growth on
the changes in interest rates, inflation, exchange rate depreciation, and base money
growth, as well as its own past values. The results show no autoregressive or moving-
average components, but a strong dependence on the exchange rate, monetary base,
and Consumer Price Index, as well as a significant but not huge response to in-
terest rates; all coefficients have signs and magnitudes that are reasonable from a
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theoretical standpoint.
From a .37 coefficient of the depreciation rate in the m2 regression, combined
with the fact that exchange rate depreciation was not significant in the cpi regres-
sion, we draw the somewhat surprising conclusion that the main channel for the
impact of currency depreciation on inflation is not through cost-push, but through
revaluation of the money supply.
In contrast to the CPI regression, all effects are quite fast, taking at most 3
months for the full impact to be felt; the predictions of post-January 1998 values
based on the regressions exhibited realistic behavior and were quite robust with
respect to the estimation time period, but were not as precise as the CPI predictors,
tending to over-estimate money supply.
11.4 Price Level - Money Supply Feedback Loop
As we have seen in the previous sections, if we consider broad money supply m2 to
be given in advance (as a function of time), a change of one percent in m2 will over
time lead to a change of about .33 percent in cpi; conversely, if we consider the
price level to be exogenous, a one percent increase in it will lead over time to about
a .67 percent increase in m2.
In reality, neither of them is given, but rather both evolve (approximately)
according to their behavioral equations that we have estimated in the previous
section. Therefore, the two variables form a feedback loop - a change in the money
supply, happening for whatever reason, will lead to an increase in the price level,
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Figure 11.6: Impact of a unit increase in m2 on cpi
impact. In fact, the total impact can be computed as a geometric progression and
found to be 1/(1−0.33 ∗ 0.67) ≈ 1.28, so that the extra impact of the feedback loop
equals 28% - not huge, but not negligible either.
Out of curiosity, we also plot the incremental and cumulative impacts of a
unit increase in m2 on cpi and vice versa, as a function of time, with and without
taking into account the feedback loop. The time profiles are shown in Figures 11.6
and 11.7, respectively. We see that the feedback loop in each case plays out during
about a year after the no-feedback impact is over, and increase the total impact by
the expected 28%.
11.5 Exchange Rate
Let us now turn to the investigation of the exchange rate. We will use the following
explanatory variables: The interest rate on government bonds rtb, as it is claimed
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Figure 11.7: Impact of a unit increase in cpi on m2
the Consumer Price Index cpi, dollar index of import prices impp, and dollar index
of export prices expp (these three in log terms) as determinants of the real exchange
rate (that the nominal exchange rate is supposed to regulate in Walrasian CGE mod-
els); real GDP gdp as proxy for import demand, also in log terms; and total foreign
exchange reserves total res, defined for our purposes as foreign-denominated assets
of the central bank and the Deposit Money Banks, measured in months of imports.
All of these are available monthly, with the exception of expp, impp and gdp. The
latter are only available yearly and have been interpolated to monthly with an al-
gorithm due to Prof. Clopper Almon (a form of piecewise cubic interpolation). To
lower the chances for the choice of interpolation method to influence our regression
results, we only use yearly differences (S12) of these three variables where differences
are required.
As before, we find out that er, that is, the natural log of the nominal exchange
rate, is I(1): Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (dfuller er,trend regress) returns
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D.er D.rtb D.cpi D.total res
Significant lags 0,4 6,7,12 -
Table 11.11: Preliminary Lag Structure Examination for the Exchange Rate
-1.475, corresponding to p = .83; while Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on D.er
returns -6.636, corresponding to p = 0.0000. Upon running a least squares regression
on all of our independent variables (reg er rtb cpi impp expp gdp total res;
dwstat) we get a d-value of .096, far below the .322 10% significance threshold for
cointegration. Thus again we resort to the ARIMA-X procedure as we had done for
cpi and m2.
First, we regress D.er on fifteen lags of the first difference of each of the
independent variables that are available monthly, with the significant lags listed
in Table 11.11. We now use that information to choose a starting point for
the model identification process. The model identification process is summarized
in Table 11.12. The model we arrive at is presented in Table 11.13 and
summarized in Table 11.14. The meaning of the columns is the same as in the CPI
discussion above. The only additional aspect worth discussing is the different way of
computing “Total Impact” when it is based on a coefficient of a seasonal difference.
The “Total Impact” column is meant to describe the long-term (aggregated)
impact on the dependent variable of a unit change in the corresponding independent
variable. Thus, when several lags of the independent variable are used, we have to
add up the coefficients of all these lags. Now using a 12-month seasonal difference
of a variable X means that a sudden jump in X from one month to the next will
show up in all 12-year periods that include these two months, that is, twelve times.
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ARMA terms Exo terms AIC SIC wntestq wntestb
ar(1/6) ma(1/6) D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb,




D.total res. . . L8D.total res
-634 -527 85% 99.55%
ar(1/3) ma(1/3) D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb,




D.total res. . . L8D.total res
-626 -531 85.24% 90%
ar(1/3) D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb,




D.total res. . . L8D.total res
-606 -517 98% 98%
ar(1) D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb,




D.total res. . . L8D.total res
-610 -526 98% 72%
ar(1) D.rtb. . . L4D.rtb,




-611 -567 87% 85%
ar(1) D.rtb. . . L2D.rtb,
D.cpi. . . LD,cpi,
S12.impp,
S12.expp
-614 -588 87% 95%
Table 11.12: ARIMA-X model identification for D.er
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Sample: 13 to 144 Number of obs = 132
Wald chi2(6) =89.76 Log likelihood = 314.5662 Prob > chi2 = 0
D.er Coeff. Stdev. z P > z 95% Conf. Interval
rtb D1 0.0021 0.0007 3.21 0.1% 0.0008 0.0034
LD 0.0006 0.0011 0.50 61.4% -0.0016 0.0027
L2D 0.0010 0.0014 0.76 44.9% -0.0017 0.0038
impp S12 0.197 0.068 2.88 0.4% 0.063 0.331
expp S12 -0.033 0.028 -1.19 23.6% -0.088 0.022
cons 0.023 0.005 4.39 0.0% 0.013 0.033
ar L1 0.425 0.058 7.26 0.0% 0.310 0.539
/sigma 0.022 0.001 20.02 0.0% 0.020 0.024
Table 11.13: ARIMA-X regression for D.er
Variable Terms
included
Value Stdev Coefficient p Variable p Total
Impact
rtb D. . . L2D 0.0037 0.0019 5.4% 1.3% 0.0037
impp S12 0.196 0.068 0.4% 0.4% 2.35
expp S12 -0.033 0.028 23.0% 23.0% -0.40
cons 0.022 0.005 0.0%
ar(1) 0.424 0.058 0.0%
Table 11.14: Summary of ARIMA-X regression for D.er
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Therefore to compute the total impact of a variable that enters the regression as
a seasonal difference we need to multiply the coefficient of the seasonal difference
by the length of the “season”, in our case 12. A different way of looking at that is
that S12.X refers to a yearly change in X, while D.er is a monthly depreciation rate.
Therefore the factor 12 is needed to make the units match. Thus, the total impact
of a change in the import dollar price index impp is composed of the coefficient of
impp in the regression (0.196) and the factor 12 coming from the seasonal difference.
Before discussing the implications of the model we have just estimated, we
proceed to test the predictive abilities of the chosen model, similarly to the previous
two sections.
We compare the actual course of er after January 1998 (an arbitrary cut-off
point chosen for compatibility with Chapter 9) with two different forecasts: the
coefficients of the first were estimated using all data and the coefficients of the
second were estimated using only pre-Jan. 1998 data. The results are shown in
Figure 11.8.
Unfortunately, we see that this model performs much worse than the models for
cpi and m2 did. The predictor whose coefficients use all data performs decently if not
brilliantly, but the predictor using the same model but with coefficients estimated
from pre-1998 data comes out as essentially only a trend line, unable to reproduce,
even partially, the sharp depreciation of 2000. Thus we get neither good prediction,
nor even a moderate degree of robustness with respect to choice of the estimation
data period.
This failure leads us to attempt, in analogy to our procedure in the case of m2, a
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Figure 11.8: Actual exchange rate vs. predictions from ARIMA-X regressions
fresh model identification while forcing the constant to be zero in all the regressions.
Unlike the case of m2, however, this attempt does even worse at prediction, as shown
in Figure 11.9. Therefore we take the with-constant regressions as the more reliable
and base our subsequent discussion on them, while keeping in mind that their results
should be taken with a larger dose of scepticism than those of the previous sections.
The only variables having a significant influence on the exchange rate are
interest rates and the import price index, together with a strong constant (meaning
a stable exogenous depreciation). Further, inflation, GDP growth and the change
in total foreign exchange reserves appear to not have a significant influence on
currency depreciation, at least not the kind of linear influence that can be detected
by a regression.
How can we explain such strange results? The reason for the results we get,
we think, is that the exchange rate dynamics appear to have two distinct regimes,
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Figure 11.9: Actual exchange rate vs. predictions from ARIMA-X regressions with-
out a constant term
managed floating and freely falling, that correspond to quite different relationships
between the exchange rate and the other variables. The difference between the two
was discovered, tested and discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff [2004], who also pro-
vide a classification into freely floating and freely falling periods for most countries,
including Ghana.
The classification of Reinhart and Rogoff [2004] was based on parallel exchange
rates, of which they also provide monthly time series for most countries. The de-
preciation of their parallel exchange rate, along with the depreciation of the official
exchange rate we have been using, is shown in Figure 11.11. The upper horizon-
tal bars at the bottom of Figure 11.11 indicate the periods classified in Reinhart
and Rogoff [2004] as “Freely Falling/Managed Floating” (as opposed to ‘Managed
Floating”). In our view, their classification is somewhat puzzling, in particular the
classification of 1993 as non-falling and of the first half of 1999 as falling. Thus,
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we did an ad-hoc re-classification, with the lower horizontal bars at the bottom of
Figure 11.11 indicating our definition of freely falling periods.
During our period of study, there were two freely falling and three managed
floating episodes, as can be seen from Figure 11.11. Freely falling periods are char-
acterized not only by higher depreciation values, but also by much higher volatility
of the depreciation rate; furthermore, when plotting D.er against D.cpi in Figure
11.10 separately for all freely falling and all managed floating episodes, we see a
fairly close association between the two during managed floating, but not freely
falling episodes. Running a simple least squares regression gives us R2 = .007 for
the freely falling group and R2 = .1058 for the managed float group. (When doing
the same regressions using the classification of Reinhart and Rogoff [2004], the two
groups appeared much more similar, with R2 = .0052 and R2 = .0403, respectively).
The different relationship between er and cpi during the two modes might be
the reason for the low significance of the exchange rate in the cpi regressions, and
of cpi in the exchange rate regressions.
We thus conclude that a better understanding of the exchange rate behavior
and its relationship to other variables would require separate study of freely falling
and managed floating episodes, as well as of the (perforce nonlinear) mechanics of

































Figure 11.10: Inflation vs. Depreciation for Falling vs. Floating Periods
11.5.1 Summary
Following the same model identification strategy that led us to success in explaining
the behavior of cpi and m2, we identify a model of exchange rate behavior. The only
two significant variables turn out to be the import price index, each 1% increase in
it translating into a 4% depreciation over a year’s time; and the interest rate, with
interest rate increase by 1% increasing depreciation by one third of a percent.
Unlike in the cases of cpi and m2, however, the estimated model proves to
be quite bad at predicting values of er when used as a recursive equation. When
we estimate the same model using only pre-January 1998 data, essentially only the
constant term survives. The prediction behavior is even worse when we repeat the








































































































































































































These problems, together with a brief qualitative discussion of exchange rate
behavior, lead us to conjecture that better understanding of the exchange rate be-
havior would require separate study of managed floating and freely falling periods,
as well as of the conditions for the change between the two modes.
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Chapter 12
Discussion I: Implications for Theory
This chapter discusses the contributions of this project to methodology and theory,
including the evaluation of common CGE model assumptions to the Ghanaian case.
The following chapter uses that discussion to answer the policy questions posed in
this thesis, provide a more general evaluation of the effects of structural adjustment
policies in Ghana, and make policy suggestions.
12.1 Methodological Innovations
12.1.1 Dataset Compilation
We have demonstrated that in spite of low data quality and availability, it is feasible
to construct stock-flow consistent SAM/FAM time series for Ghana for more than
a decade.
Such an exercise is worthwhile for several reasons: firstly, in the process of the
compilation one discovers the errors and inconsistencies in the data and can to an
extent correct for these, or at least draw conclusions as to which uses of that data
are meaningful even in view of the errors and which are not.
Secondly, the resulting dataset allows one to get a better overall picture of the
economy than individual time series or a SAM for one year could have allowed.
Thirdly, a sufficiently long stock-flow consistent SAM-FAM time series pro-
vides a sufficient data base for estimation and validation of a multisectoral dynamic
model. A complete set of real and nominal flow time series allows us to derive the
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causal behavior of the model from history, instead of specifying it a priori as the
CGE models do, be they neoclassical or structuralist. Further, if we split the SAM-
FAM time series into an estimation and a validation segment, we can also gain an
idea of how good the chosen causal structure is at predicting future behavior of the
economy. Such an approach unites the advantage of a CGE-like ability to handle
sectoral disaggregation and a high number of variables with an ability to specify
measures of confidence of the model output.
While that is not a novel approach for industrialized countries with their high
data availability, to the best of our knowledge this is the first time such a dataset
has been compiled for a developing country.
12.1.2 Systematic Integration of Financial Stock Time Series with Flow Data
In developing countries, financial asset stock time series are available and generally
more reliable than most flow data. This is firstly, because stock data are more
easily observed than flow data (as a point observation is enough to pin down a
stock variable, while we have to observe a flow variable over a period of time to
measure it); secondly, because unlike data on physical quantities, most financial
stocks are automatically measured, the numbers in a bank’s computer defining the
corresponding stock; and finally, because typically the banking sector is the most
modernized part of an economy in terms of data collection and processing. This is
true for both the private banking sector and the central bank.
Besides being interesting in its own right, knowledge of financial asset stock
time series allows us to get more reliable estimates for net financial savings (net lend-
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ing) of each institution. In an economy where some important sectors are demand-
driven (that is, probably, any economy), knowledge of net lending is important to
account for injections and leakages contributing to the aggregate demand. Unfortu-
nately, net lending is normally computed as a residual from flow data, and is thus
quite unreliable; using asset stocks for that purpose makes for a much more reliable
estimate.
12.1.3 Testing Nonlinear Relationships on Short Data Series
While we are lucky enough to have monthly time series for the key nominal indicators
such as the Consumer Price Index, the exchange rate, and the money supply, the
real-side sectoral data, along with most nominal flow data, is only available on a
yearly basis.
As our sample length of 12 years is too short to allow for rigorous econometrics,
we use a different method to evaluate hypotheses of real-side behavior. We take the
years 1990-1997 as the estimation period and the years 1998-2001 as the validation
period. We use the estimation period data to estimate the coefficients of (mostly
nonlinear) behavioral hypotheses and then use their ability to predict the validation
period data as the way to choose between the different hypotheses.
This approach has the potential to increase our confidence in the choice of
functional form, as a good fit in the estimation period does not necessarily translate
into a good prediction ability in the validation period. On the other hand, if a func-
tional formulation was good at predicting the validation period data when estimated
with only estimation period data, we can have some confidence in its predictions for
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the future (or counterfactuals in the past) when estimated using the data of both
periods.
12.1.4 A Simple Core for a Dynamic Fix-Flex Model
Using the method just describe to test behavioral hypotheses, we find, not surpris-
ingly, that the Ghanaian economy contains both supply-constrained and demand-
driven sectors. Further, the allocation of total demand between imports and do-
mestically produced goods is dependent on their relative price; some sectors need
intermediate inputs from both supply-constrained and demand-driven sectors; and
demand for domestic retail services (that form a substantial part of the huge infor-
mal service sector) is a proportion of total goods sold, no matter their origin, while
itself demanding intermediate inputs both imported and domestic - all in all, quite
a jigsaw puzzle.
While setting up the model equations to satisfy all these descriptions is not
terribly hard, it is not exactly trivial either; thus, Chapter 10 outlines the accounting
for the real side of a model that would conform to the findings of Chapters 9 and
11 and into which we can directly plug the functions estimated in Chapter 9.
Unfortunately, actual implementation of such a model is beyond the scope of
the present effort.
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12.1.5 A Compact Formalism for Description and Analysis of Financial Stock Dy-
namics
The Transaction Matrix formalism presented in Chapter 8 allows for an elegant inte-
gration of a Social Accounting Matrix describing the nominal flows in the economy
with a Financial Accounting Matrix describing the gross asset stocks.
By using a collection of constant matrices describing the structure of the finan-
cial sector in a given country, this formalism allows us to decompose the changes in
the financial stocks into revaluation, current transactions, and capital transactions
in a computationally efficient way. Conversely, the transaction matrix formalism
allows us to directly specify the portfolio allocation behavior of the different in-
stitutions while automatically observing the wealth constraints of the institutions.
This formalism thus greatly simplifies the specification and estimation of portfolio
behavior in stock-flow consistent models.
The following section contrasts the results of our analysis of Ghanaian data to
common assumptions of economic models we have discussed in Chapter 4.
12.2 Structure of the Ghanaian Economy Compared to Common Model Assump-
tions
12.2.1 Structuralist vs. Monetarist views on Price Formation
As the reader will recall from Section 4.4, the descriptions of price formation and its
relationship to money supply and interest rates are the main point of disagreement
between monetarist and structuralist models.
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According to the monetarist view, the price level is determined so as to clear
the money market. Therefore money supply growth drives inflation, with no influ-
ence in the opposite direction. Furthermore, increasing interest rate levels is sup-
posed to both decrease money supply and increase money demand, thus lowering
inflation.
On the other hand, structuralist theory stresses the influence of cost factors
on inflation, and takes the money supply to be either largely irrelevant to price
formation or driven by the price level. The latter connection is supposed to work
through demand for working capital: firms are supposed to hold an amount of cash
for daily operations, which is proportional to the cost of their intermediate inputs,
and thus roughly proportional to the overall price level. Thus, the demand for
money grows in proportion to inflation. If we further suppose that a significant part
of that working capital is borrowed, we see that an increase in interest rates will
increase the cost of production, and according to the cost-view of price formation,
that will lead to higher inflation. Summing up, structuralist theory would expect
price level to drive money supply rather than vice versa, and an increase in interest
rates to increase inflation.
A final structuralist mechanism important for price formation is indexation
feedback loops. In the simplest example, we would have a firm owner increasing
product prices so as to guarantee a certain profit after the wage costs are accounted
for; at the same time, workers push for wages that are high enough when measured
in terms of the end product, so an increase in the product price automatically leads
to an increase in wages, leading to more product price increases, etc. This is also
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referred to as the inflation from distributional conflict. It can lead to explosive or
stable dynamics, depending on the strength of the feedback; but in any case if there
is a price increase for any other reason, it will be amplified by this feedback loop.
Now let us turn to the econometric evidence and see which of these theories it
supports.
Price-Money Supply Causality
As Sections 11.2 and 11.3 show, broad money supply growth decidedly drives infla-
tion, with a 1% increase in broad money supply causing about 0.67% (p=0.20%)
total increase in the price level, spread over nine months. On the other hand, a 1%
increase in the price index leads to a fairly quick (2-3 months) increase of .33% in
the money supply (p = 0.00%).
Thus in the question of money supply-price direction of causality, neither side
of the theoretical debate is right on its own. In the short term of 0-3 months, the
influence of CPI on money supply prevails, while in the medium term (2-10 months)
the reverse direction of causality comes into its own, resulting in an inflation-money
supply feedback loop. This feedback loop results in an increase of any impact on
cpi or m2 by an additional 28%, spread over about a year after the direct impact
has taken place.
Influence of the Interest Rate on Inflation
In this issue, the monetarists carry the upper hand - the direct influence of interest
rates on inflation is non-significant. Thus the cost-push effect of higher interest
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rates appears to be negligible, and the main channel through which interest rates
impact inflation is through their influence on money supply, discussed below. This
is perhaps not surprising as the banking system in Ghana is quite thin and the
degree of industrialization low; thus the role of loans from the formal banking sector
in production is likely quite low compared for example to the economies of Latin
America (that provided much of the inspiration for structuralist theory).
Influence of the Interest Rate on Money Supply
In contrast to the question of price-money supply causality, the measured influence
of interest rates on money supply is quite in agreement with orthodox portfolio
balance theory: according to the latter, higher interest rates on government bonds
are expected to lead to portfolio substitution from money to bonds, reducing money
supply - and so they do, an increase of 10 percentage points in the interest rate
reducing money supply by 6% (p = 0.1%), spread over three months, with an
additional 2% increase happening over the following year due to the cpi/m2 feedback
loop.
While the effect is statistically significant and has the sign expected by theory,
the practical usefulness of interest rates as an instrument for control of money supply
is quite limited by two factors: firstly, the magnitude of the effect is extremely small
- ten percentage points is a hefty interest rate increase, yet a one-time 8% reduction
in money supply is merely a blip against its typical yearly growth rates of 20% and
more. This is most likely due to the very thin banking system in Ghana. Secondly,
the money supply reduction is a static effect: only changes in the interest rate affect
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money supply, so the positive effect of money supply reduction is felt only once, as
the interest rates are increased; whereas the negative effects of high interest rates,
namely reduced investment and increased interest payment costs to the government,
are felt continuously, as long as the interest rates remain high.
Thus we can conclude that interest rates are not an effective tool for money
supply control in Ghana.
The role of cost factors
We have included three potential cost factors among the explanatory variables for
the price level: the price of fuel (government-controlled), wholesale price of food
crops, and the exchange rate. The first two were seen to be significant, impacting
the CPI quite quickly (which might be the reason for their prominence in discussions
of inflation in Ghana) with total impacts of coefficients of about .08 each ( p = 1.9%
for fuel and p = .9% for wholesale food crop price). As Figure 11.2 showed, while
these impacts were not negligible, they were on the whole much smaller than the
impact of the money supply.
Interestingly, the exchange rate was completely insignificant as an explanatory
variable for the price level. On the other hand, exchange rate was a significant
explanatory variable for the money supply, with a 1% depreciation leading to a .37%
increase in the money supply, spread over three months. This is in the reasonable
range for a country with imports equal to over a third of GDP. Most of this impact
is probably due to revaluation - as Figure 7.6 shows, about 30% of deposits are
foreign-denominated; while no data is available for foreign exchange cash holdings,
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a similar figure does not seem unreasonable.
Remembering that total impact of money supply in the cpi equation was .85,
the medium-term impact of a 1% depreciation is .37% × .85 ≈ 0.31%.
It is interesting that depreciation impacts prices primarily through revaluation-
induced money supply growth, rather than through direct cost factors. Given the
time profiles of both effects, it is likely that the revaluation is really working instead
of direct cost-push rather than masking it, as the other cost factors work almost
instantaneously, so an import-cost-push impact of depreciation would likely also be
felt within 2-3 months. On the other hand, the channel through money supply takes
at least 4-5 months to be felt at all, and is therefore slow enough that it would not
mask cost impacts of the exchange rate.
Constant Velocity of Money Assumption
Having thus largely understood the interactions between price formation and money
supply, we are in a good position to check the verismilitude of the constant velocity of
money assumption that is the simplest version of monetarist theory. (The constant
velocity of money hypotheis states that the price level is proprotional to money
supply and inversely proportional to GDP.)
That relationship is cetainly not identically true. For one thing, broad money
supply, GDP and the Consumer Price index are not cointegrated. Furthermore, in
our ARIMA regression (Table 11.3) the dependence of the price level on GDP comes
out non-significant (though that is possibly due to the fact that we had to use an
interpolation of yearly GDP instead of genuine monthly time series).
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On the other hand, the “stylized fact” that money supply growth over time
translates into inflation more or less percentage point for percentage point appears
to be pretty accurate. We have seen that in fact a one percent increase in money
supply results in a 0.85% rise in the price level, spread over the next 18 months
or so. As the standard deviation of the total impact of cpi on m2 in Table 11.10
was 0.085/0.329 ≈ 26% of the coefficient’s value, our overall coefficient of 0.85 that
was derived from it is not significantly different from 1. Thus, we cannot reject the
hypothesis represented by this stylized fact.
However, the cost-push influence of fuel and wholesale food crop prices comes
on top of the money supply-induced inflation, so that we have to conclude that the
picture of inflation in Ghana is (perhaps not surprisingly) a hybrid of monetarist
and structuralist mechanisms.
12.2.2 Output Determination and the Balance of Payments
The polarization between structuralist and monetarist views that we have seen in the
previous section is to a large extent mirrored in the polarization between structuralist
and Walrasian/neoclassical views on output determination, as we have discussed in
Section 4.4.
While Walrasian models always assume full employment, and therefore con-
clude that a decrease in production in a part of the economy is necessarily followed
by an increase in production in some other part of the same economy (the displaced
labor is assumed to be automatically re-employed somewhere), the structuralists
tend to let output, together with employment, be determined by demand in Keyne-
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sian fashion.
Walrasians claim to draw support for the full employment assumption from
general equilibrium theory (incorrectly, as we saw in Section 4.4.3); structuralists
cite empirical studies of structural adjustment in support of their approach. Thus,
Taylor [1988] in a collection of 18 case studies concludes that the primary reason
for improvements in balance of payments were decreases in import demand due
to decreases in overall demand, as well as increases in exports due to decreases in
domestic demand - all quantity effects; relative price effects did not appear important
in the short run.
It is worth noting that the debate on output determination is not as polarized
as that on price determination; as discussed in Kraev [2003], the models built within
both traditions since the early 1990s increasingly include hybrid formulations, allow-
ing some sectors (such as agriculture) being supply-constrained at full employment,
and some (such as industry and services) being demand driven.
Incremental Capital Output Ratio
The first hypothesis we tested was the Incremental Capital Output Ratio, that is
the hypothesis that the increase in GDP is proportional to investment with a fixed
proportionality ratio. Our investigation of the Incremental Capital Output Ratio
is in agreement with earlier studies thereof in concluding the ICOR is useless as a
description of a country’s output.
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Sources of Demand
Thanks to using financial stock time series, we can construct pretty reliable estimates
of the sources and sinks for aggregate demand during our period (Figures 9.3 and
9.4). Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the Government was the only net demand
source during the 1990s, and all other institutions, that is, the private sector, the
Deposit Money Banks, and the Rest of the World, were net demand sinks.
We could interpret this in two ways: either as saying that government deficits
held consumption and therefore imports at artificially high levels, or to say that the
government was the main driver of the economy. In either case, it is clear that as
long as a substantial part of GDP is demand-driven (and we will see below that
there is evidence for that), cutting government deficits will, ceteris paribus, have a
substantial adverse effect on GDP.
Savings-Investment Balance
As we have mentioned in Section 7.1, in the 1990s investment in real terms was
probably falling as share of GDP (after correcting the apparent deflator error in
IMF data). It was hypothesized that a reason for this was insufficient savings
supply, and higher interest rates were suggested as a remedy for that. However, we
have just seen that the private sector (households and firms combined) is a net sink
of funds; also, the Deposit Money Banks consistently had excess liquidity in the
1990s - hardly a picture one would expect if insufficient funds for lending were the
limiting factor in investment.
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The ratio of savings-investment gap to private disposable income is quite sta-
ble, much more stable than the ratio of investment to GDP. That suggests that
investment mainly happens from own funds, implying passive savings and a limited
role of the formal banking sector as source of loans.
Agriculture
Our examination of the data in Section 9.2.5 indicates that agricultural production
hit an aggregate supply constraint around year 1995. Since then, a production
frontier between food crop production and cocoa (dominant agricultural export)
production is a plausible model, with a relative price elasticity of the ratio of cocoa
to food crops of about .33. The relative scarcity of food crops has also been increasing
since 1995, as indicated by the wholesale food crop price index to Consumer Price
Index ratio.
Industry
When we estimated the relative price response of the exports to nontraded produc-
tion in manufacturing, we came up with a relative price elasticity of -1. This is
quite surprising from the Walrasian point of view, as it says that as export price
increases relative to the price of non-traded manufacturing goods (all other things
being equal), more units of nontraded goods are produced per each unit of exports.
This seems perverse if we think of export production and nontraded goods pro-
duction as being substitutes on a productivity frontier. However, it makes perfect
sense if we assume that the nontraded manufacturing production (i.e. production
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for domestic consumption) is demand-driven, rather than supply-constrained by a
productivity frontier. Then, if the price of exports increases, that means more in-
come for export-producing households, and therefore more demand for both imports
and domestic goods, and therefore more domestic goods being produced.
Thus, we conclude that the nontraded industrial sector is demand-driven.
Do relative Price Effects Matter to the Balance of Payments in the Short Term?
Based on the data investigation in Chapter 9, we conclude that relative price effects
have a modest impact on exports, but a substantial immediate impact on import
demand.
On the export side, in the case of agriculture we observe (in the period be-
ginning 1995) a price elasticity of substitution of .33 between cocoa and food crop
production - modest but not negligible. In the case of industry, the relative price
elasticity is -1, indicating a nontraded sector primarily driven by demand effects,
and thus quantity-driven, rather than price-driven, adjustment.
On the import side, the imports to nontraded goods ratio of industry (exclud-
ing oil) responds to relative price with a quite high price elasticity of substitution,
namely -1. This means that the total nominal amount (in domestic currency) spent
on imports is largely independent of the relative price. This, in turn, implies that
changes in that relative price due to import tariffs or exchange rate depreciation
will produce a proportional response in import volume in foreign exchange terms.
For example, an extra tariff of 10% is likely to induce a decrease of about 10% in
the volume of manufacturing imports, and thus a 10% decrease in the component
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of foreign exchange outflow that is due to that particular category of imports.
Thus, we conclude that both relative price effects and quantity effects are
quite strong in the Ghanaian case, even in the short term, and neither can be safely
ignored.
Trends in exports and imports
In addition to relative price effects, the ratios of nontraded goods to exports and of
nontraded goods to imports (both for industrial goods) exhibit a secular trend.
The trend for the ratio of imports to nontraded goods is yearly 3% growth (4%
when estimated only for the period 1990-1997); for the ratio of exports to nontraded
goods is 4% yearly growth (5% when estimated only for the period 1990-1997).
From this we can conclude that the opening-up process of the Ghanaian econ-
omy is still going on, although slowing down. The reason this is alarming is that
the baseline value for imports is almost twice that for exports, thus if both continue
growing at comparable rates, continuing severe balance of payments problems are
guaranteed.
Such a straightforward trend analysis has to be taken with a grain of salt,
however, as different components of exports have been exhibiting quite different
behavior. While cocoa production has been largely stagnant, non-traditional exports
have been growing quite fast and have in fact just exceeded cocoa in volume at the
end of our period.
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12.2.3 Exchange Rate Determination
Exchange rate determination is a question that typically gets much less attention in
CGE models than either price determination or output determination. Walrasian
models often assume a fixed balance of payments; combined with imports’ and
exports’ dependence on relative prices, that essentially means the nominal exchange
rate’s role is to keep the real exchange rate (ratio between domestic and foreign
prices) more or less constant, compensating for any jumps in the domestic price
level. Since the structuralist models typically focus on quantity adjustments, they
are likely to work with fixed or policy-determined exchange rates, rather than specify
independent behavior for them.
Another popular theory for explaining the behavior of the exchange rate is
Uncovered Interest Parity, which states that the exchange rate is determined by
equalization of future returns from owning Ghanaian vs. other nation’s bonds.
Thus, an increase in interest rates on government bonds is supposed to lead to an
appreciation of the currency. Taylor [2004, Ch. 10] contains a rich discussion of the
various approaches to modeling the exchange rate.
In the case of Ghana, our interviews with Bank of Ghana staff suggest that
forex scarcity and balance of payments considerations are the driving force of de-
preciation.
Unlike the fairly conclusive regression results on price level and money supply
that we have discussed above, our attempts to explain the behavior of the exchange
rate were only moderately successful. Here is the gist of our findings.
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Initial Observations on Exchange Rate Behavior
The first thing that deserves note about dynamics of the exchange rate is that it
switches between two distinct modes, which can be called “managed floating” and
“freely falling” (following Reinhart and Rogoff [2004]); exchange rate depreciation
tends to be mild and to lag between inflation, and then experience a sudden slide,
changing the real exchange rate by almost a factor of two, followed by another
quiescent period.
The observation of the graphs suggests that the freely falling periods are as-
sociated with low foreign exchange reserves and low imports to nontradables price
ratio, and that there is an association between inflation and depreciation, but we
could not discover any of these connections in regressions. The probable reason for
that is a nonlinear form of some or all of these relationships.
Does the Exchange Rate Try to Equalize Real Exchange Rate?
Not really. The dollar price index for imports was the most significant variable in
the regressions, but the dollar price index for exports was not significant. Also, CPI
was not significant.
Further, the dynamic behavior of the exchange rate can hardly be called sta-
bilizing. The alteration of floating/falling periods was the cause of more drastic
changes in relative prices than any other factor in the economy, as can be seen e.g.
in the third series of Figure 3.11.
246
Does the Exchange Rate Respond to the Interest Rate?
Yes, but perversely. Interest rate coefficients in the exchange rate regression were low
but significant (total impact 0.37% extra depreciation per extra percentage point of
interest rate, p = 5.4%), and surprisingly, positive, i.e. indicating that interest rate
increases lead to depreciation. Thus we conclude that Uncovered Interest Parity
is not a useful theory for explaining exchange rate behavior in Ghana, and high
interest rate are at least not conducive to lowering depreciation rates.
12.2.4 Is building CGE models worthwhile?
As we have seen in this chapter, neither structuralist nor neoclassical theory by itself
suffices to explain the observed behavior of the Ghanaian economy. However, by
judiciously combining the structuralist and the neoclassical assumptions, we could
specify a model that would conform to most of our empirical findings (with the
notable exception of exchange rate dynamics).
The reader might now ask why, then, we did not build such a CGE model?
We would respond by wondering what the point of such an exercise would be. CGE
modelers typically say that that the point of CGE models is not prediction but
finding qualitative relationships and “orders of magnitude” of impacts. However,
as there is no way to verify a CGE model, then if the model is to be credible, the
qualitative relationships must already be well understood for us to specify model
equations! And once we have invested the effort into finding out the causal relation-
ships (as we have done in this project), it is not clear what further insight even a
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perfectly specified CGE model would give us, especially as it could lay no claim to
numerical accuracy.
Thus we would argue that the CGE literature of the past two decades was
extremely important in creating a vocabulary of alternative causal hypotheses and
model formulations, and the questions that one has to ask in order to specify the
“right” CGE model are a very good guide to an overall understanding of the econ-
omy, as the current project illustrates. However, once the “right” CGE model
structure has been identified through careful inspection of the data, the value added
of actually building one appears to us to be very low.
A more fruitful approach would be to use the whole dataset to estimate a
dynamic model with the causal structure that we have found in the data. Unlike
CGE models, such a model would not be overdetermined, and having estimated
it to time series, we would both be able to use it for predictions and at the same
time have an idea of the reliability of those predictions, much like in the models of
Inforum for the industrialized countries.
While building such a model would be quite interesting, at the present moment
it would take us far beyond the scope of what is already an extensive project. We
thus regretfully leave that for the future.
12.3 Summary
This thesis has made a contribution both to modeling methodology and to the
theoretical debate between the structuralist and Walrasian/monetarist schools.
On the methodological side, we have successfully compiled a yearly time series
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of complete nominal and real flow accounts and financial stock accounts for the
Ghanaian economy, for a period of 12 years. This is to the best of our knowledge the
first time such a dataset has been compiled for a developing country. A particularly
useful innovation was integration of financial stock accounts with the traditional
Social Accounting Matrix of flow accounts, allowing among other things for more
reliable net lending estimates.
After using this dataset to investigate various aspects of the Ghanaian econ-
omy, we proceeded to formulate prototype accounting equations for a model con-
forming to our understanding of that economy. We have further created a compact
formalism for description and analysis of financial stock dynamics.
On the theoretical side, we have used Ghanaian data to evaluate the con-
troversies between the two major schools of CGE modeling (CGE currently being
the dominant methodology for models of developing countries), namely neoclassical
(Walrasian/monetarist) and structuralist, and to see to what extent the favorite
theories of either school are useful in describing the behavior of the Ghanaian econ-
omy.
The result can be described as largely a draw between the two schools, both for
price formation and output determination. For price formation, causality went from
money supply growth to inflation in the medium term (3-9 months, total coefficient
0.67) and from inflation to money supply growth in the short term (0-3 months,
total coefficient 0.33); the ensuing feedback loop increased all impacts on inflation
and money supply growth by an additional 28%; however cost-push factors were
also important.
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Interestingly, the main channel for the influence of exchange rate on infla-
tion appeared to be through revaluation-driven growth of the money supply, rather
than through, for example, cost of imports. Further, interest rates did not have
a significant direct influence on inflation, while increases in interest rates led to a
statistically significant, but quite small, reductions in money supply.
On the output side, the export vs. nontraded supply of agricultural goods
are likely on a productivity frontier, while domestic manufacturing production is
demand-driven. Both quantity and relative price effects were found to be quite
strong in determining the balance of payments, with relative price effects much
stronger for import demand than for export supply.
Unfortunately, neither standard formulations, nor our regressions were able to
provide descriptions of exchange rate dynamics that the data would support.
Summing up, neither of the two schools is by itself able to provide a descrip-
tion of the Ghanaian economy that would be compatible with the data. However,
between them they provide a vocabulary of alternative formulations that is quite
flexible; in fact, flexible enough for us to construct a realistic description of the
Ghanaian economy (with the exception of exchange rate behavior) by judiciously
combining elements of the two theories.
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Chapter 13
Discussion II: Implications for Policy
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the policy implications of the features of
the Ghanaian economy discussed in the previous chapter. We approach this task
from three mutually complementary angles.
Firstly, we look at the components of a structural adjustment package as
described in Chapter 2, and based on the understanding of the Ghanaian economy
we have gained in the past chapters, ask the question whether each of the policy
measures therein was likely to have the consequences intended by the program,
no consequences, or consequences that were entirely unexpected or opposite to the
program intent.
Secondly, we turn to the three main research questions formulated in Chapter
1. Of these, the last, namely the applicability of standard model assumptions and
theories to the Ghanaian economy, has been addressed in the previous chapter.
Thus, only the first two remain, namely the causes of the poor macroeconomic
performance in the 1990s and the distributional consequences thereof – these are
the questions we will address.
Finally, we formulate a set of policy recommendations that would retain the
positive aspects of the historical policies while improving upon them in the areas
where they were deficient. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the Ghanaian economy
did not undergo any dramatic structural change during the 1990s, therefore these
policy recommendations are likely to be applicable to the present day as well.
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13.1 What were the likely consequences of Structural Adjustment Policies in Ghana?
In this section, we go through the structural adjustment measures one by one and
contrast each measure’s intended impact with its likely actual impact, given our
understanding of the Ghanaian economy as discussed in Chapter 12.
Decrease government deficit This measure is supposed to have a plethora of posi-
tive impacts. Let’s go through them one by one.
Firstly, the resulting decrease in total demand is supposed to improve the
balance of payments through decreasing the demand for imports. That is a realistic
expectation, as import demand is proportional to GDP, other things being equal.
As we have seen that the government was the major source of net demand, and that
a large part of the economy is demand-driven, decreasing government deficit would
doubtless be recessionary and therefore decrease the demand for imports. However,
this decrease would be transient - as soon as the GDP would start growing again,
be it because of government spending or private sector initiatives, import demand
would surge right back up. A sustainable decrease in import demand can only be
achieved through relative price adjustments and provision of domestic alternatives,
both issues we will shortly return to.
Secondly, the decrease in total demand caused by smaller government deficits
is supposed to improve the balance of payments by freeing up domestic productive
capacity to supply more exports (as the IMF analytical approach, the Financial Pro-
gramming Framework (FPF), implicitly assumes the total production is unaffected
by the stabilization program). This argument is not valid in Ghana. In the case of
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agriculture, decreasing domestic demand could indeed somewhat stimulate exports.
as agriculture is facing an aggregate productivity frontier. However, as food crops
are a very large component of aggregate demand, and the relative scarcity of food
has been increasing from 1995 onwards, it would take a very large decrease in GDP
indeed for such an effect to take place.
In the case of industry, the argument has even less traction as domestic indus-
trial production is demand-driven, thus an increase in domestic production will do
nothing to harm exports.
The other hoped-for benefits of government deficit reduction are supposed to
work depending on the source of funds to cover the deficit.
If the deficit is financed by borrowing from the central bank, i.e. by print-
ing money, its reduction is expected to contribute towards inflation control. This
argument certainly applies to Ghana.
If the deficit was financed by foreign borrowing, its reduction will improve
the balance of payments. This argument is correct as far as it goes, as long as the
amount of foreign borrowing can be determined by the government. However, in
the case of poor countries such as those in the Sub-Saharan Africa, one could argue
that the amount of capital inflows (largely consisting of foreign aid) is not directly
under the government’s influence, and is determined by the donors according to a
variety of factors, with high government deficits actually more likely to be branded
as “fiscal irresponsibility” and to decrease the aid inflows.
Finally, if the deficit was financed by borrowing from the domestic financial
sector, deficit reduction is supposed to free up resources for private investment.
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This argument’s applicability to Ghana is limited in that the actual availability of
loanable funds did not appear to be the limiting constraint on investment in Ghana
(remember the banks had persistent excess liquidity and saving exceeded investment
throughout). The limiting constraints on investment appeared instead to be high
interest rates, lack of infrastructure, and lack of investor confidence.
Are any of these three constraints likely to be affected by a government deficit?
If the interest rates are determined by the market to be just high enough for the
market to accept the outstanding government debt, then a decrease in that debt
(or at least in its rate of growth) would indeed have a decreasing influence on the
interest rates, and thus stimulate investment. On the other hand, if the decrease
in deficit is achieved by curtailing of investments in infrastructure such as roads,
then the net effect on investment might well be negative. The final factor, namely
investor confidence, is not defined well enough, and perhaps too controversial for us
to discuss it here.
The final, and in our view most convincing, argument for decreases in gov-
ernment deficits is that such decreases would lead to lower interest payments in the
future, and thus leave less funds for more productive uses. That is hard to disagree
with, but is also less imperative than some of the other arguments, as we are explic-
itly forced to weigh off a decrease in today’s government services against a decrease
in future government services.
Summing up this somewhat lengthy section, in our opinion the only convincing
macroeconomic arguments for control of government deficit in Ghana are firstly,
the need to control growth in money supply so as to control inflation (applying
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to debt financed by borrowing from central bank), secondly, the need to keep the
interest rates reasonably low (applying to debt financed by borrowing from the
domestic banking system, and only if the interest rates are market-determined to
just accommodate the government debt), and thirdly, the need to keep future interest
payments reasonably low.
Curtail support programs such as input procurement and input subsidies for agri-
culture One of the measures to achieve a reduction of government deficit was a
reduction or cancellation of government programs such as input procurement and
input subsidies for agriculture. Besides the positive revenue impact, an intended
consequence was to create a space for the private sector to fill that niche instead of
the government, supposedly leading to greater efficiency.
In our view, that policy has achieved the reverse of its intended purpose. First
of all, the private sector has apparently not sprung up to fill the gap, according
to both the references in Chapter 3 and to the fact that since 1995, Ghana’s food
crop supply was increasingly scarce. This can be expected to have a row of adverse
consequences. Firstly, as most of the poor in Ghana are food farmers, and most
of the food farmers are poor, reduction in government support of agriculture has
directly hit the poorest segment of society.
Secondly, as food production has not been able to keep up with demand, it
is very likely that the shortfall was made up through imports. That, in turn, led
to a worsening of the balance of payments and therefore higher depreciation rate.
As we have seen that probably about a quarter to a third of Ghana’s broad money
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supply is foreign currency-denominated, the increased depreciation translated into
increased money supply growth and thus directly into higher inflation. Thus we
come to the conclusion that curtailing government support of agriculture could well
have damaged agriculture and still led to higher, or at least not lower, medium-term
growth of money supply and inflation.
Our argument here worked the way it did because agriculture is experiencing
an aggregate supply constraint. The story for domestic industry, which is demand-
driven, is quite different, as we will see in the discussion of current account liberal-
ization.
Reduce money supply growth This is supposed to control inflation. While the
connection between money supply growth and inflation is contested theoretically,
our econometric investigation of the Ghanaian case leads us to conclude that broad
money supply growth is indeed the key driver of inflation. Our econometrics show
that an increase in broad money supply translates almost one-to-one into a CPI
increase (with the impact spread over a year and a half), in agreement with the
constant velocity of money hypothesis that the monetarists (including the IMF)
normally use.
Furthermore, it appears that the exchange rate’s influence on inflation also
works through the money supply (revaluation): as the exchange rate depreciates,
the local currency value of foreign currency-denominated assets grows, increasing
the total money supply and thus inflation (at a rate of about 0.31% total extra
inflation per 1% extra depreciation, spread over about a year).
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Thus, control of broad money supply is indeed the key to inflation control in
Ghana. The question then is what level of inflation is to be targeted; this a question
of policy choice rather than theory and thus cannot be decided in isolation, but must
be weighed off against other policy goals. Now that we have econometric estimates
of the strength of the connection, it becomes possible to discuss tradeoffs between
inflation and other policy targets (the pursuit of which would lead to money supply
increases).
Increase Interest Rates There are three often quoted reasons for increasing interest
rates (meaning in the first instance interest rates on government bonds, but deposit
and lending rates broadly follow the bond rates). Firstly, increasing the interest
rates is supposed to stimulate savings, and thus provide more funds for investment.
As we have already discussed, in the case of Ghana the problem lies with investment
demand, not savings supply, and thus increasing interest rates in counterproductive
for stimulating investment.
Secondly, high interest rates are supposed to prevent excessive depreciation of
the currency, according to the Uncovered Interest Parity theory of interest rate for-
mation. Unfortunately, the impact of interest rate on the exchange rate was positive
in the regressions we ran. Thus at least in the Ghanaian case high interest rates do
not appear to be a useful instrument for combating exchange rate depreciation.
Finally, high interest rates are supposed to lower the growth of money supply,
with the consequences for inflation as discussed above. While controlling the growth
of money supply is indeed a worthy goal, in the case of Ghana our econometrics
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indicate a very weak response of broad money supply to interest rates, with an
interest rate increase of ten percentage points resulting in a one-time reduction of
8% in the money supply. The likely reason for that is a very thin financial system,
resulting in little “portfolio rebalancing”. Apart from its small magnitude, the
money supply response to interest rates only happens at the time they are being
raised; keeping them high thereafter has no influence on subsequent money supply
growth rates, but has adverse effects on investment, as well as on the expenditure
on interest payments to the government.
This latter side effect of high interest rates is directly in opposition to one
of the goals of lowering government deficits, namely, lowering government interest
payments. As interest rates on government debt are pushed above the market-
determined rate, the cost of servicing that debt also goes up, reducing funds available
to the government for other purposes.
Summing up, increasing interest rates (beyond the market-determined rate
necessary to accommodate the government debt to the domestic banking system)
is not an effective tool either for control of money supply growth or for support
of the exchange rate. However, it has substantial negative consequences: depress-
ing investment, increasing government interest payment obligations, and creating
inflationary pressures.
Introduce floating exchange rates and depreciate the currency The resulting in-
crease in domestic prices of exports and imports is supposed to make exports more
competitive and to redirect demand away from imports. The overall reduction in
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domestic demand from reductions in government spending is supposed to make sure
there is nonetheless no excess demand for domestic goods.
Our verdict as to this measure is that Ghana really has no choice in the matter.
Firstly, given the persistent foreign currency shortage, the Bank of Ghana really does
not have enough reserves to withstand even a mild currency attack, so fixing the
exchange rate is not an option. Secondly, import demand is very responsive to
relative prices, so Ghana couldn’t really afford an overvalued exchange rate even if
it could maintain it. A sad example is the end of our period: during years 1997-1999,
Bank of Ghana intervened (quite mildly) to prop up the exchange rate, leading to
its progressive overvaluation. The result was that just as the Bank of Ghana ran
out of reserves in 1999, a terms of trade shock occurred, leading to a particularly
nasty depreciation (“freely falling”) episode.
So it seems to us that the only way Ghana could reverse the floating of the
cedi is by completely reversing current and capital account convertibility reforms -
not by a long way politically feasible even if it was desirable.
Once we accept that there is currently no viable alternative to the floating
exchange rate regime, the tendency of the exchange rate to have freely falling periods
is still quite damaging and should be avoided, if possible. The only two ways to
combat that that we can suggest is firstly, for the central bank to refrain from
propping up the currency, hopefully leading to more gradual depreciation regimes;
and secondly, achieving a viable balance of payments position in the medium term.
As long as the trade account, not even counting the debt service payments, is in the
deep red, we cannot expect any currency stability. We will further discuss exchange
259
rate policy in Section 13.3.
Liberalize the current account and reduce price distortions According to Aryeetey
and Harrigan [2000], liberalizing the current account had the following goals: narrow
the gap between official and parallel exchange rate, provide foreign exchange to ease
import strangulation, achieve a viable balance of payments position, clear up arrears,
and introduce current account convertibility.
With the exception of a viable balance of payments, the objectives appear to
have been largely achieved. In general, guaranteeing a sufficient supply of capital
goods and intermediate inputs is quite essential for Ghana, whose primary and
secondary sector are not self-sufficient in either of these. The jump of GDP growth
rates from the first five years of the 1980s to the next five years after that was in
fact due primarily to capital goods and intermediate input availability, along with
huge aid inflows that financed these.
While availability of imports necessary for production was doubtless a good
thing, the concurrent glut of final goods is a different thing altogether. This is best
discussed in the context of the next policy measure, namely elimination of price
distortions.
“Eliminating Price Distortions” refers to abolishing import quotas and reduc-
ing import tariffs, while reducing subsidies to domestic producers. As a combination
of tariffs and subsidies can easily be self-financing, it is not quite obvious to us what
practical benefits such a policy is supposed to carry; what follows is the best we can
do to make sense of the arguments presented.
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The usual theoretical arguments are Pareto efficiency and comparative advan-
tage. Yet comparative advantage theorems all presuppose a closed capital account;
and the practical benefits of Pareto efficiency are not at all clear to the author.
Clearly, absurdly high tariffs (say, several 100%) can have almost the same adverse
effects as abolishing imports altogether; but the same can hardly be said for tariffs
of several dozen percentage points. Sometimes it is also argued that lower prices for
imports benefit consumers; however, as a the same time higher import consumption
means less income to domestic producers (especially after taking into account the
multiplier effects), this argument is not tenable without further refinement.
We have already discussed the subsidies on agricultural inputs; let us now turn
to tariffs on manufactured goods. As we have seen in Chapters 9 and 12, the domes-
tic manufacturing sector is demand-driven, and the distribution of overall demand
for industrial output between imports and domestic goods is quite responsive to
their relative price. Therefore it is safe to assume that the elimination or lowering
of import tariffs had several adverse impacts: firstly, it negatively affected a source
of government revenue; secondly, it worsened the balance of payments through in-
creased demand for imports; and finally, it depressed domestic manufacturing, thus
lowering the national income. As domestic manufacturing is not supply-constrained
but demand-driven, depressing manufacturing of goods for domestic consumption
did not contribute to increasing exports.
Summing up, liberalization of the current account was a quite important policy
measure for reviving domestic production, and was largely successful and beneficial.
The major exception is the elimination of protection of domestic industries through
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lowering of tariffs on imported manufactured final goods. This measure had several
adverse consequences without bringing any benefits visible to the author.
Liberalize the capital account Allowing a higher measure of capital mobility is
expected to attract more funds for investment. The most-cited adverse effects of
opening up capital accounts are capital flight and boom-bust cycles in the credit
markets, Latin America providing an abundance of examples for both. A further
theoretical criticism [Daly 1996b] is that arguing for capital account liberalization
is logically incompatible with comparative advantage arguments, as the latter are
premised on closed capital accounts.
Unlike Latin America, Ghana does not provide much evidence for either of
these adverse effects, nor indeed of the expected benefits. Net private transfers into
Ghana are positive, owing mainly to remittances from Ghanaians working abroad.
Capital flight does not appear to be a major issue, possibly because there was
not much capital there to begin with; and the banking system is too thin, and
the economy too little industrialized, for credit markets to develop substantial own
dynamics that could strongly affect the rest of the economy.
On the side of expected benefits, the only major result appears to be the large
investments by foreign-owned mining companies. However, as these investments
mainly go towards buying capital goods (not produced in Ghana), the constraints
on profit repatriation are weak, and the linkages between the mining sector and the
rest of the economy are also quite weak, the net benefit to Ghana from the foreign
investment in mining appears to be limited at best.
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13.2 Answering Our Research Questions
After discussing each of the structural adjustment policy components in detail, we
are now ready to address our research questions posed in Chapter 1. As the third
of the three questions, namely the applicability to Ghana of commonly used theo-
ries, was extensively addressed in the previous section, our concern here is with the
remaining two questions, namely the reasons for the slowdown in economic perfor-
mance in the 1990s and the distributional consequences thereof.
This section does not add any new ideas to the in-depth discussion of the
previous section. Its purpose is rather to convert the point-by-point analysis of
the previous section into a more compact, unified narrative addressing the research
questions.
13.2.1 Why Was Macroeconomic Performance Not Sustained?
This section discusses the reasons for Ghana’s poor macroeconomic performance in
the 1990s, as compared to the late 1980s, specifically its lower GDP growth rate,
balance of payments problems, and persistent inflation.
Let us first consider the reasons for the upsurge of the late 1980s. We would
say that there are three major reasons: firstly, a major inflow of foreign aid released
the acute foreign exchange strangulation that the country was subject to in the be-
ginning of the 1980s, allowing for extensive imports of capital goods and productive
inputs. This stimulated domestic production across the board, as these productive
inputs were at that point its main limiting factor. Secondly, the aforesaid inflow
263
of foreign aid also served to stimulate domestic demand through multiplier effects.
Finally, more reasonable current account policies (such as devaluing the exchange
rate to a realistic value) and larger producer prices offered to cocoa farmers, among
with other export promotion policies, led to an increase in export supply.
The side effects of that scenario were firstly, a buildup of foreign debt, as
export supply could not catch up with the import demand, especially as the latter
was stimulated by GDP growth; and secondly, a surge in inflation from the demand
stimulus.
Unfortunately, the scenario as outlined above was not sustainable. On the one
hand, as the economy became more and more open, exports and imports continued
to grow at about the same rate. However, as they were starting from baselines
differing by almost a factor of two, the result were persistent trade deficits. As the
interest payments on the growing foreign debt also mounted and the abnormally
large aid inflows of the 1980s were not sustained into the 1990s, the “Rest of the
World” became, and remained throughout the 1990s, a net demand sink, so that
now the multiplier effects from the balance of payments worked to lower GDP.
Let us now turn to sectoral output. As imported inputs and capital goods
became freely available, they were no longer the limiting factors in industrial pro-
duction; the limiting factor now was low demand (capacity utilization of medium
and large factories was around 50% in 1990-1993). Unfortunately, due to the high
degree of trade openness of Ghana in that period, any factor that increased demand
for domestic manufactured goods also increased demand for imports, so that stim-
ulating domestic industry was only possible at a cost of an even worse balance of
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payments. This was in fact what happened in 1992-94 (1992 being an election year),
when the government ran massive deficits, pushing up money supply growth and
further worsening the balance of payments (Figure 9.4).
Unfortunately, even such transient stimuli were negated by very high interest
rates (over 40% being not unusual) that aimed to counter the inflationary conse-
quences of the aforementioned money supply growth. While our regressions indicate
that inflation control through interest rates probably was not very successful, it did
crush the already-low investment-to-GDP ratio.
Turning to agriculture, we conclude that while the initial availability of im-
ported inputs was beneficial, the elimination of government subsidies and procure-
ment services largely negated these benefits. Thus, there was no basis for a sustain-
able growth in the agricultural sector, and local food supply became increasingly
scarce. Though the level of disaggregation of our data does not allow us to di-
rectly verify that hypothesis, it seems very likely that shortage of locally produced
food crops directly contributed to a larger import demand and thus to balance of
payments worsening. The cocoa farmers were positively affected by higher cocoa
purchasing prices, but as agriculture was now on a productivity frontier, realloca-
tion of labor towards cocoa supply further contributed towards food crop scarcity.
Having thus understood GDP growth and balance of payments problems, let us
turn to the persistent inflation. In Chapter 11 we have seen that the major driver of
inflation was money supply growth, amplified by money supply - price level feedback
loop, so that the medium-term impact of one percent extra money supply was about
one percent extra inflation, corresponding to the monetarist predictions. While gov-
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ernment borrowing did of course play an important role in money supply growth,
an equally important factor was revaluation of the foreign exchange-denominated
component of the money supply. Judging by our regressions, about one third of the
money supply is foreign currency-denominated, so that for example a 3% deprecia-
tion would lead to a 1% increase in money supply and thus an about 1% increase
in the price level, spread over about a year.
In contrast to money supply changes that take about 9 months to fully trans-
late into price level increases (and to depreciation, whose influence on inflation also
works through the money supply), the impact of wholesale food crop prices or fuel
prices on inflation was almost instantaneous, taking one to three months. We would
conjecture that this leads to higher visibility of inflation due to these causes, and
thus to their relative prominence in inflation discussions.
13.2.2 What Were the Distributive Impacts of the Structural Adjustment Policies
in the 1990s?
In this section, we address the remaining research question, namely the distributional
impacts of the structural adjustment policies. As a deep investigation of household
survey data was unfortunately beyond the scope of this project, we have to restrict
ourselves to drawing conclusions from the sectoral discussion above to distributive
impacts on the households grouped by their main source of income.
First of all, the state of the economy in the 1990s, while not stellar, was in
many respects vastly superior to the state of the economy in the early 1980s, in the
few years prior to the adoption of the structural adjustment program. All population
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groups have profited from the positive GDP growth and increased availability of im-
ports, both production inputs and final goods. However, on top of that various sec-
tors were affected differently. Employment in manufacturing was adversely affected
by low demand, removal of protection, and high interest rates; the displaced workers
ended up in the informal sector, mainly providing services. Likewise, agriculture, in
particular food crop production, was adversely affected by removal of government
support programs and competition from imports. Cocoa producers, while also ad-
versely affected by removal of government support programs, fared comparatively
better due to increased cocoa purchasing prices. The sector least adversely affected
by liberalization was the informal sector, as it was never government-supported
in the first place and produced almost exclusively nontradable goods, so faced no
competition from imports.
Summing up, while positive GDP growth profited all population groups to
some extent, the food farmers and formal sector employees fared worst of all, while
informal sector was least adversely affected (largely by default). Thus the net incen-
tives worked towards reallocation of the labor force into the informal sector, which
is indeed what we saw in Figure 3.7.
This is a disturbing trend, as the informal sector is one of the least productive
sectors of the economy, and offers few perspectives for development. To have a
chance at working its way out of poverty, Ghana must find ways to stimulate its
agricultural sector, which still contains the majority of the population and the vast
majority of the poor, and its industrial sector, which is the most promising in terms
of higher productivity, lowering of import dependence, and supply of high value
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added exports.
The next section outlines some policy suggestions towards achieving that goal.
13.3 Policy Suggestions
The problems Ghana faced in the 1990s were a result of several interlocking issues,
most importantly a persistent trade deficit, a government that indulged in high
deficits in election years, a supply-constrained agricultural sector, a manufacturing
sector strangulated by high interest rates and low demand due in part to compe-
tition from imports, money supply that had a large foreign currency-denominated
component, and a very strong responsiveness of inflation to money supply growth.
This led to other problems, such as external and internal debt buildup and persistent
inflation and currency depreciation. Clearly no single recommendation will suffice
to tackle that complex of issues; however, we believe that the package presented
here goes a long way towards addressing most of them. Not surprisingly, it involves
some easy gains and some tough choices.
13.3.1 Trade Policy
We would argue that one of the most crucial issues to tackle is the balance of
payments deficit. As long as it persists, foreign debt buildup and thus further hem-
orrhaging of interest payments will have negative impacts on government finances
as well as aggregate demand. Furthermore, the ensuing continuous currency depre-
ciation will result in higher inflation, with a strong possibility of increased use of
foreign currency as a store of value and even in everyday transactions. As the share
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of foreign currency in the overall broad money supply would grow, the impact of
depreciation on inflation would become ever stronger in a positive feedback loop,
leading to higher inflation and possibly eventual effective dollarization of the coun-
try, robbing the government of the ability to use monetary policy as an instrument,
an ability it still possesses now.
The balance of payments deficit must be tackled from both sides, import de-
mand and export supply. We will discuss export supply below among the sectoral
policy recommendations; let us now turn to import demand.
There are two possible reasons for an increase in import demand: firstly, a
relative price shift making imports more attractive, and secondly, the inability of
domestic producers to satisfy demand, leading to forced substitution. Insufficient
domestic supply can only be addressed by supply-side measures and is thus discussed
in the sectoral policies section. Here we only note that it is more likely to be relevant
for the supply-constrained agriculture than for the demand-driven manufacturing.
Let us now turn to the influence of relative price on import demand. We have
seen in Chapter 9 that the relative price elasticity of demand for industry imports is
about -1. Thus, import demand responds strongly to relative price and a moderate
increase in tariffs on manufactured consumption goods would be effective in lowering
import demand, increasing demand for domestic industry as well as raising extra
revenue. That would appear to us one of the easy, low cost/high gain measures.
The key to doing it right is firstly, restrict the tariffs to final goods and the few
capital goods for which domestic substitutes are readily available; secondly, keep
the increases moderate; and finally, restrict the demand-redirecting measures to
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manufactured goods.
While this is not by itself a sufficient measure, it would provide fast balance of
payments relief while stimulating import substitutes; whereas the equally necessary
measures to expand export supply would take several years to kick in.
Note that reining in the share of imports in GDP is necessary; a mere expansion
of exports (even if all the foreign exchange generated thereby accrues to Ghanaian
firms and nationals) would lead to an increased GDP via the multiplier effects, and
thus to a proportionate increase in imports, to a large extent negating the positive
balance of payments effect of increased exports.
13.3.2 Sectoral Policies
While moderate tariffs on manufactured final goods imports will provide a degree
of balance of payments relief and stimulus for domestic manufacturing, over the
medium term it is necessary to expand the supply of exports and import substitutes.
First, consider industry. We have seen that interest rates are not an effective
tool of monetary policy, while high interest rates are a serious impediment to invest-
ment. Therefore interest rates should be market-determined, and therefore positive
in real terms and large enough to accommodate the substantial government debt,
but not any higher than that. This should go a long way to stimulate investment
and manufacturing for domestic consumption.
As industry as a whole is not supply-constrained, any program of support of
export industries needs to be specifically targeted to reach these, rather than the
whole of the secondary sector. As non-traditional exports are by far the fastest
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growing export component, the optimal approach to industrial export support is
likely to consist in programs specific to each export sub-category, rather than broad
macroeconomic measures of the kind that we discuss here.
In agriculture, on the other hand, the binding constraint is not demand defi-
ciency but an aggregate supply deficiency. As at this point export crop and food
crop production actually compete with each other for the total productive capacity,
agricultural policies should aim to expand the productivity of the sector as a whole.
Thus, the optimal policy interventions would be in provisions of infrastructure such
as roads and storage facilities, along with credit and reinstatement of input pro-
curement programs and input subsidies. If it is deemed essential that the latter is
done by the private sector, then that should be achieved by first making sure the
private sector solution works in parallel to the government-run system and only then
dismantling the latter.
13.3.3 Fiscal Policy
One of the first questions that any policy proposal must address is its own financing.
How should the above sectoral interventions be paid for?
Firstly, let us note that a substantial part of the cost of export promotion and
agricultural support programs could be paid for by the proposed import tariff. Sec-
ondly, we need to remember that depreciation has a substantial impact on money
supply growth. Therefore, policies that expand exports (or production of domestic
food crops, leading to smaller food crop imports) and thus improve the balance of
payments will lead to smaller depreciation and therfore decrease the rate of broad
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money supply growth. Thus it is quite feasible that cost-effective agricultural sup-
port measures, even if partially financed by money creation, might actually lead to
lower money supply growth and better balance of payments, once the influence of
lower depreciation rates is taken into account.
Having said this, it is still true that inflation in Ghana is extremely responsive
to money supply growth, so there is a very strong argument for trying to keep the
latter down. However, as the above example demonstrates, inflation control targets
must be weighed off against the other policy targets, rather than treated as an
overriding objective.
13.3.4 Exchange Rate Policy
While we were admittedly not as successful in explaining the exchange rate behavior
through regressions as was the case with the other relationships, it appears that in
broad terms the exchange rate responds to the relative price of domestic goods vs.
imports and to the relative abundance of foreign exchange reserves.
Further, the apparent pattern of exchange rate movements were periods when
depreciation rate was stable and lagged behind the rate of inflation, alternating with
quite violent “freely falling” strong depreciation periods that re-aligned the relative
prices while causing another surge of inflation. There were two freely falling episodes
during our period. The second happened after a period of attempted exchange rate
stabilization by the Bank of Ghana, and was the larger of the two.
The message that we extract from that is that the Bank of Ghana should
under no circumstances attempt to prop the exchange rate up. Besides being costly
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to prop up and immediately increasing import demand, an overvalued exchange
rate will correct itself anyway once the Bank of Ghana runs out of reserves, and the
ensuing depreciation will be all the stronger for the delay.
In fact, in our view the problem of choosing the right intervention strategy
in the exchange rate market might be likened to the optimal strategy of forest fire
management. Just as inflation gradually accumulates to make an exchange rate
overvalued, the dry wood in the forest accumulates and increases the fire hazard.
If one tries to suppress every fire using all the resources one has, eventually there
will be enough dry wood around to make the next fire too big to quench, and
that maxi-fire could well cause more damage than any of the smaller ones we had
suppressed. Instead, the correct method of fire management consists in igniting
smaller, controllable fires on purpose as soon as there’s a little dead wood around,
and thus keeping the fires small.
Likewise, it might be worth while to consider an exchange rate policy that
is based on watching some relative price indicator and intervenes to depreciate the
exchange rate at first signs of overvaluation. There would be several positive con-
sequences to such a strategy: firstly, one could hope to avoid the damaging maxi-
depreciations that happen every so often in the “normal” course of affairs. Secondly,
that little extra depreciation would help lower imports via relative price effects, thus
reducing future depreciation pressures; thirdly, rather than losing money on prop-
ping the exchange rate up, the Bank of Ghana might actually make a bit of a profit
while keeping it at a more realistic level.
The only downside would be higher import prices; however, slightly higher but
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more stable prices of imports might well be better than occasionally lower but more
volatile prices.
13.3.5 Monetary Policy
One of the surprises that has emerged from the regressions is that during the pe-
riod we investigate the interest rates were nearly useless as an instrument to control
money supply growth. Thus the interest rates should be kept as low as the do-
mestic credit market would allow while still being able to absorb the outstanding
government debt.
Therefore, the major instrument of monetary policy available to the Bank of
Ghana is control of the monetary base, especially of money creation from lending to
the government. This should be used with caution, as discussed in the fiscal policy
section.
13.4 Summary
In this chapter we have seen that the theoretical analysis we have conducted in this
thesis was sufficient to answer our research questions as well as to conduct an overall
assessment of structural adjustment policies in Ghana in the 1990s, and to make spe-
cific policy recommendations. The main reasons for the worsening macroeconomic
performance were seen to be an overly liberal import tariff policy, a slowdown in
foreign assistance, and a supply constraint in agriculture due to population growth
and withdrawal of government support. These factors led to further problems, no-
tably a severely deficient demand for domestic industry output, persistent balance
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of payments deficits and growing foreign debt. The overall distributional effects of
structural adjustment were firstly, an overall increase in well-being compared to the
crisis of early 1980s, and secondly, implicit (unintended) net incentives for labor
relocation into the informal sector, which is problematic from both the perspective
of productivity growth and poverty alleviation.
The recommended policies included stimulating demand for domestic manu-
factures through a targeted tariff on imported final goods; broad supply-side policies
for the agricultural sector, such as infrastructure and input provision; and keeping
the exchange rate from becoming overvalued through mild Bank of Ghana interven-
tions.
On the monetary policy side, interest rates were almost useless as a means
of controlling money supply, while currency depreciation had a strong impact on
money supply growth through revaluation effects. Therefore, interest rates should
not be increased beyond market equilibrium values; and measures that improve the
balance of payments and therefore decrease depreciation could well lead to lower





As the specific implications of our analysis for economic theory and for Ghanaian
macroeconomic policy have been discussed in detail in the previous chapters, and
summarized at the end thereof, the purpose of this concluding chapter is not to give
yet another summary, but rather to provide a bird’s-eye discussion of the overall
methodological strategy we have chosen in this thesis.
Our methodology can be summarized as follows: upon formulating the re-
search questions and reviewing the literature on structural adjustment in Ghana,
we proceed to a rather in-depth discussion of alternative models used for assessing
structural adjustment. While in itself such a literature review is a logical start for
research project such as ours, an unusual characteristic for a policy-question thesis
was the depth of comparative analysis of alternative schools of CGE modeling.
Then, after compiling the dataset, we used two different techniques to an-
alyze the time series. For monthly data we used orthdox ARIMA-X time series
econometrics, while for yearly time series we used a somewhat more unusual tech-
nique of fitting alternative functional forms to data for the first two thirds of the
period (1990-1997) and judging them by their predictive ability in the last third
(1998-2001).
Having done so, we have pulled together all the results of these data investi-
gations in detailed discussions, as is typical for a policy-oriented thesis.
Looking back, we can ask ourselves whether that was in fact a well-chosen path
towards our main goal, namely understanding of the Ghanaian economy’s structure
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and behavior in a way that is helpful for evaluating and formulating economic policy.
Specifically, did our delving into CGE theory merely serve to satisfy the author’s in-
tellectual curiosity, or was it an essential step towards the policy analysis at the end
the thesis? Likewise, was the combination of different methods for different parts of
the dataset a fruitful choice, or did the imprecision in the yearly time series analysis
taint whatever illusory precision we might have gotten out of the econometrics on
montly series?
Regarding the first question, we think that the detailed discussion of alterna-
tive CGE formulations was essential to all of the subsequent analysis, by providing
a series of alternative hypotheses on all parts of the economy. It is true that CGE
models cannot be falsified, and therefore are not a research tool but rather an elabo-
rate story-telling medium — but that is the very reason for their value. For the best
part of the last three decades CGE models have served as the repository of what-
ever macroeconomic/sectoral stories their authors thought were key to describing
the economies they modeled; thus the CGE literature is a hoard of economic policy
lore.
It is true that some of the stories CGE models tell are completely unfounded.
However, these stories were formulated in CGE form because they were well-respected
in some economic policy circles (and quite possibly some stories, such as some impli-
cations of the full employment assumption, became influential in policy discussions
solely because they were part of how CGE models traditionally behaved). If that
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is the case, such stories need to be carefully understood and refuted through data
analysis, rather than ignored. On the other hand, some of the stories CGEs tell are
true (such as the dominance of money supply in price level determination in the
case of Ghana) and in such cases, CGE models deliver these stories already nicely
converted to equation form, ready for empirical testing and use with better-designed
modeling methods.
In other words, CGE models are incapable of providing any answers; but a
good understanding of the CGE literature is quite useful for finding out the right
questions.
Thus, detailed examination of CGE models gave us an overview of the al-
ternative causal stories commonly used in describing developing economies such as
Ghana. Was our approach to testing these alternative stories adequate to the task,
and did it make the most of the data available?
We would like to argue that this was in fact the case. In the case of the yearly
series, the number of data points (twelve per series) was just too small to apply any
advanced statistical techniques, so optimization was the logical choice, particularly
as it allowed us to test nonlinear functional forms as well. Likewise, constraining the
estimation to the first two thirds of the data was in our view a useful if somewhat ad
hoc method to verify predictive power of the different functional forms, lowering the
danger of spurious fit. And we did in fact see that the best-fitting function in the
estimation period was not necessarily the best predictor for the validation period.
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Thus, the chosen methodology allowed us to extract reasonably robust conclusions
from comparatively poor data.
The situation was quite different in the case of the monthly series. These did
not only have an ample number of data points for rigorous econometrics, but also
boasted of a much lower measurement error. Thus, the exchange rate is readily
observed with almost no error; the Consumer Price Index and broad money supply
less so, but still with much more precision than, say, production of food crops.
Thus, we were able to not only find out the causal drivers of these variables (and
eliminate important causal driver candidates) but also specify the time profiles of
their respective impacts1. Thus, due to better data quality, we were able to gain a
much more thorough understanding of the Consumer Price Index and broad money
supply behavior than was the case for real-side varaibles we investigated.
The remaining question then is, do different levels of precision of the two
methods present a problem when one tries to combine their conclusions for policy
analysis? Our answer is, briefly, no. Less briefly, this issue is exactly the reason
why we think that an informed, careful discussion such as presented in the previous
chapters is the optimal way of integrating the insights we have gained about indi-
vidual behavioral hypotheses – as opposed to a formal model of the whole economy,
financial, sectoral and all. The reason we think so is that an informed discussion is
a much better instrument for managing widely different levels of uncertainty about
different parts of the system.
1The notable exception was the exchange rate behavior; however this is not very surprising as
exchange rates are notorious for being hard to predict, just like investment functions.
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In a formal model, all variables are prima facie created equal - all look like
floating point real numbers. It is true that uncertainty in parameters can largely
be addressed through systematic sensitivity analysis (though in the models of the
complexity that we are considering here, the cost, both in terms of modeler effort
and computational load, might well be prohibitive). However, systematic sensitivity
analysis of a model with respect to alternative causal connections is almost impossi-
ble, and tends to result in the “anything could happen, really” kind of results. In a
careful discussion, on the other hand, it is much easier to keep track of the different
statements’ different degrees of uncertainty, and to propagate these into conclusions
of varying degrees of confidence.
This is not to say formal modeling is useless. When a model’s methodology,
causal formulations, and data are reasonably robust, it can give more precise in-
sights than a verbal discussion, and sometimes produce surprises that lead to better
understanding. The reader will have noticed that interspersed with analysis of the
data in this thesis were chapters that laid foundations for a future formal model.
On the other hand, it is amazing how accurate intelligent back-of-the envelope
estimates can be; and while substantial uncertainties remain both in the dataset
(for example, we don’t know sectoral producer prices) and in causal formulations
(for example, exchange rate dynamics need more work), a verbal discussion remains
the more versatile, and the more honest, method.
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Appendix A
The structure of the SAM
This Appendix details the SAM structure of the SAM used in this thesis. The
actual values of the SAM and FAM time series are available in an Excel file at
http://www.glue.umd.edu/˜ekraev/thesis/.
The basic blocks of the SAM are shown in Table A.1. The first row and the
first column contain the names of the account groups, such as Products, Activities,
etc. The letter behind each account group denotes the subscript used in representing
the sub-accounts of that account group. There are four such subscripts: s, f , ι and







The subscript f stands for factors of production and has the elements
1. Employees Skilled Male
2. Employees Unskilled Male


































Table A.1: The Blocks of the Social Accounting Matrix
4. Employees Unskilled Female
5. Mixed Income Skilled Male
6. Mixed Income Unskilled Male
7. Mixed Income Skilled Female
8. Mixed Income Unskilled Female
9. Operating Surplus.
The subscript ι stands for institutions with firms and households held separate, that
is
1. Households
2. Non Financial Corporations




6. Rest of the World.
Finally, the subscript i stands for institutions with firms and households aggregated
into “private sector”, that is
1. Private Sector
2. Financial Corporations alias Commercial Banks
3. Central Bank
4. Government
5. Rest of the World
Each SAM block is at the intersection of some two account groups, and there-
fore has the corresponding two subscripts. For example, Value Added has the sub-
scripts s and f , meaning it is a 9 times 6 matrix (remember in a SAM sources are




Decomposition with Respect to a Basis Using a Scalar Product
The purpose of this appendix is showing how, in a finite-dimensional vector space
V with a basis, a scalar product < ·, · > can be used to decompose an arbitrary
element u with respect to that basis.
Suppose the basis elements are {v1, . . . , vn}. We are looking for numbers





Since {v1, . . . , vn} are by assumption a basis, such a decomposition exists and is
unique, by definition of a basis. The question is how to find the coefficients ai
effectively. This works as follows.
Theorem 1 Let bj =< u, vj >, Bij =< vi, vj > and A = B
−1. Then ai =
∑
j Aijbj.
Proof : Consider the decomposition (B.1). Taking scalar products of both sides
with each basis vector vj gives us
< u, vj > =
n∑
i=1









where we have used Bij =< vi, vj >=< vj , vi >= Bji. If we define b to be the
column vector made of the elements bi, and a to be the column vector made of the
elemens ai, then (B.4) can be written in matrix notation as
Ba = b ⇔ (B.5)
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a = B−1b (B.6)






The beauty of this result is that it holds in any finite-dimensional vector space
V that has a scalar product. u and vi can be anything, as long as they are something
we can add up to each other and multiply by real numbers. For example, in our
case they were equivalence classes of Financial Accounting Matrices.
Strictly speaking, in the proof above we have used, without proving it, that
the matrix B would be invertible (that is, non-singular) if {v1, . . . , vn} are a basis
of V . In fact, it is sufficient that they be linearly independent - but pursuing this
thread too far would result in trying to write a crash course in linear algebra, a fate
we’d like to avoid.
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